scholarly journals EU Law’s Half-Hearted Protection of Religious Minorities Minority Specific Rights and Freedom of Religion for All

Religions ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 12 (10) ◽  
pp. 830
Author(s):  
Kristin Henrard

This article begins with some reflections on the definition of religious minorities, their needs and rights and how this relates to the discussion about the need for minority specific rights in addition to general fundamental rights as rights for all human beings irrespective of particular identity features. Secondly, an overall account of the ambiguous relationship between religious minorities and fundamental rights is presented. The third and most extensive section zooms in on the EU and religious minorities, starting with an account of the EU’s general approach towards minorities and then turning to the protection of fundamental rights of religious minorities in/through the EU legal order. First, the EU’s engagement with minority specific rights and the extent to which these norms have been attentive to religious themes will be discussed. Second, the CJEU’s case law concerning freedom of religion and the prohibition of dis-crimination as general human rights is analysed. The conclusion then turns to the overall perspective and discusses whether the EU’s protection of religious minorities’ fundamental rights can be considered ‘half-hearted’ and, if so, to what extent. This in turn allows us to return to the overall focus of the Special Issue, namely the relationship between the freedom of religion for all and special rights for religious minorities.

2019 ◽  
Vol 12 (2) ◽  
pp. 185-215
Author(s):  
Elise Muir

This paper investigates the relationship between legislative provisions and fundamental rights by analyzing the Egenberger, IR, Bauer, Max-Planck and Cresco cases. This paper understands these cases as an invitation to reflect on whether, and if so, to what extent, EU fundamental rights' legislation, read in conjunction with the Charter, could have an impact on the scope of application, substance and/or legal effects of the Charter. This paper argues that the Court of Justice's recent case law can be understood as allowing for EU legislative guidance on fundamental rights to interact in an upward process with the rights enshrined in norms with the same rank as EU primary law. This paper sheds light on the constitutional implications of the overlaps between legislation and constitutional norms on fundamental norms while other contributions in this special issue address effectiveness and the right to an effective remedy in a broader sense.


2018 ◽  
Vol 14 (1) ◽  
pp. 172-190 ◽  
Author(s):  
Stefano Giubboni

Critical-contextual analysis of case law of the European Court of Justice on employers’ contractual freedom – Fundamental right to be immunised against the alleged disproportional protection enjoyed by employees – Progressive ideological overthrow of the original constitutional assumptions of the founding treaties – Prominent example of ‘displacement of social Europe’ – Court of Justice’s case law on the relationship between freedom to conduct a business and labour law – Neoliberal understanding of the freedom of enterprise – Alternative interpretation of Article 16 of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights


2015 ◽  
Vol 17 ◽  
pp. 210-246
Author(s):  
Louise HALLESKOV STORGAARD

AbstractThis article offers a perspective on how the objective of a strong and coherent European protection standard pursued by the fundamental rights amendments of the Lisbon Treaty can be achieved, as it proposes a discursive pluralistic framework to understand and guide the relationship between the EU Court of Justice and the European Court of Human Rights. It is argued that this framework – which is suggested as an alternative to the EU law approach to the Strasbourg system applied by the CJEU in Opinion 2/13 and its Charter-based case law – has a firm doctrinal, case law and normative basis. The article ends by addressing three of the most pertinent challenges to European fundamental rights protection through the prism of the proposed framework.


Author(s):  
Emily HANCOX

Abstract Article 6 Treaty on European Union sets out two sources of fundamental rights in the EU—the Charter and the general principles of EU law—without specifying a hierarchy between them. Even though the Charter became binding over a decade ago, the Court of Justice of the European Union (‘CJEU’) is yet to clarify unequivocally how these two sources interact. In this article I argue based upon the relevant legal framework that the Charter ought to replace the general principles it enshrines. This leaves a role for general principles in the incorporation of new and additional rights into the EU legal framework. Such an approach is necessary to ensure that the Charter achieves its aims in enhancing the visibility of the rights protected by EU law, while also providing the impetus for more coherent rights protection within the EU. What an extensive survey of CJEU case law in the field of non-discrimination shows, however, is that the CJEU has struggled to let its general principles case law go, potentially hampering the transformative potential of the Charter.


2013 ◽  
Vol 15 ◽  
pp. 1-26 ◽  
Author(s):  
Daniel Augenstein

Abstract The contribution explores the implications of disagreements about rights in the ‘multi-layered’ European polity for the autonomy of EU fundamental rights law. It argues that insomuch as the EU’s weak claim to supra-national political authority is corroborated by a strong case for economic integration, the internal market operates not simply as a constraining factor in the effective realisation of fundamental rights, but provides the very foundation of their autonomous interpretation in the EU legal order. Sections II and III elaborate upon the relationship between conflicts of authority in the European legal space and the autonomous interpretation of EU fundamental rights law under conditions of political disagreement. Section IV links the argument to the often-alleged instrumentalisation of EU fundamental rights in the service of the market. Sections V and VI substantiate the guiding contention of the contribution—that the autonomy of EU fundamental rights law is rooted in the unity of the market—with an analysis of pertinent case law. The concluding section suggests that the transformation of the EU into a ‘genuine’ human rights polity must proceed through a politicisation of the market by virtue of fundamental rights law.


2021 ◽  
Vol 30 ◽  
pp. 174-182
Author(s):  
Kaie Rosin

Although the EU lacks explicit competence to harmonise national principles of criminal law, there are many ways in which EU law and national criminal law are interconnected on a level deeper than mere minimum standards adopted from directives. The article analyses these intersections between EU law and fundamental principles of Estonian substantive criminal law, explaining how the principles of criminal law recognised and interpreted in the case law of the Court of Justice of the EU and covered by the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union exhibit the capacity to affect fundamental principles of Estonian substantive criminal law. The article focuses on five principles specific to substantive criminal law, which are derived from the fundamental principles of the Estonian Constitution and have equivalents in human-rights law: the principle of legality of criminal law, the principle of retroactive application of the more lenient criminal law, proportionality, ultima ratio, and the principle of individual guilt. The analysis demonstrates that the relationship between EU law and the various principles of substantive criminal law is not uniform because the principles of substantive criminal law are not developed evenly at European Union level.


2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Carsten Gerner-Beuerle ◽  
Federico Mucciarelli ◽  
Edmund Schuster ◽  
Mathias Siems

Abstract There is significant legal variation and uncertainty in the conflict of laws rules applicable to companies in the EU. While the case law of the Court of Justice on the freedom of establishment has clarified some questions, it is evident that case law cannot provide for an adequate level of legal certainty. The main recommendation of this article is that private international company law in the EU should be harmonized. The article discusses the main challenges that a future regulation to this effect—called here ‘Rome V Regulation on the Law Applicable to Companies’—would have to overcome. Some of those are of a political nature: for instance, countries may fear that it may become easier for companies to evade domestic company law (eg, rules of employee co-determination), and there are specific considerations that concern companies established in third countries. Another challenge is that a future regulation on the law applicable to companies has to be consistent with existing EU conflict of laws rules as regards, for example, insolvency and tort law, while also complying with the freedom of establishment of the Treaty. It is the aim of this article to discuss these questions in detail, notably the general considerations for harmonisation in this field, a potential harmonization based on the ‘incorporation theory’, how it may be possible to overcome some contentious issues such as the definition of the lex societatis or the relationship between the lex societatis and other areas of law, and the prospects for future international harmonization.


2013 ◽  
Vol 15 (2) ◽  
pp. 137-153 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sara Iglesias Sánchez

Abstract The definition of the legal contours of a citizenship status is intrinsically bound to the determination of a differentiated status for non-citizens. Nonetheless, European citizenship has been designed in a non-exclusionary fashion. This is not so much the result of a conscious exercise of inclusiveness, as the result of the indeterminacy of the EU Treaties. The progressive construction of a common European immigration policy is happening within a constitutional scenario deprived of principles suitable to guide the relationship between the citizenship status and the several newly created status for third-country nationals, who now derive their EU rights not only from their relationships with EU citizens nor from agreements mirroring the fundamental freedoms. For this reason, there is a growing need to make explicit the principles that should govern this relationship. The main purpose of this paper is to discern and analyse the emerging lines of this relationship, which are being unveiled by EU immigration norms, particularly as they are being interpreted in recent judgements of the ECJ. It will be argued that the new EU rules on immigration are helping to uncover the shortcomings and incoherencies of the EU citizenship status since, paradoxically, the structure of EU competences allows for a deeper involvement of EU law in the determination of the rights of third country nationals than of the rights of citizens.


2013 ◽  
Vol 15 ◽  
pp. 1-26 ◽  
Author(s):  
Daniel Augenstein

AbstractThe contribution explores the implications of disagreements about rights in the ‘multi-layered’ European polity for the autonomy of EU fundamental rights law. It argues that insomuch as the EU’s weak claim to supra-national political authority is corroborated by a strong case for economic integration, the internal market operates not simply as a constraining factor in the effective realisation of fundamental rights, but provides the very foundation of their autonomous interpretation in the EU legal order. Sections II and III elaborate upon the relationship between conflicts of authority in the European legal space and the autonomous interpretation of EU fundamental rights law under conditions of political disagreement. Section IV links the argument to the often-alleged instrumentalisation of EU fundamental rights in the service of the market. Sections V and VI substantiate the guiding contention of the contribution—that the autonomy of EU fundamental rights law is rooted in the unity of the market—with an analysis of pertinent case law. The concluding section suggests that the transformation of the EU into a ‘genuine’ human rights polity must proceed through a politicisation of the market by virtue of fundamental rights law.


2019 ◽  
Vol 88 (3) ◽  
pp. 429-458
Author(s):  
Amalie Frese ◽  
Henrik Palmer Olsen

In this article we investigate the relationship between the Court of Justice of the European Union and the European Court of Human Rights as it manifests in explicit cross-references between the two Courts’ jurisprudence. The analysis detects cross-references, how they are used and indications of converge or divergence in the jurisprudence through their explicit citations and references. Our dataset consists of the entire corpus of judgments from both Courts from 2009 (when the EU Charter on Fundamental Rights came into force and until the end of 2016. On the basis of a content search for references to the other Court in both corpora we detect all their cross-references. We find that 1) the Courts’ use each other’s case law surprisingly little, but when they do, it is 2) primarily within the legal domains of criminal justice and immigration policies, and 3) displaying convergence towards the jurisprudence of the other Court.


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