scholarly journals Forgiveness and the Naturalistic Approach to Religion: A Contextual View of the Problem of Evil

Religions ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 12 (9) ◽  
pp. 756
Author(s):  
Michał Oleksowicz ◽  
Tomasz Huzarek

Cognitive Science of Religion and evolutionary approaches in the study of religion have opened the rapidly developing field of naturalistic explanation of religion. Since its inception, this empirically driven project has undergone a slow evolution, giving rise to the view that explaining religion is not a matter of accounting for a single (cognitive or functional) trait, but rather involves explaining a very complex repertoire of patterns of thinking and behavior. In this paper, we would like to provide a philosophical analysis of the highly complex problem of forgiveness from the Christian religious and naturalistic perspectives. Our analysis demonstrates a crucial way to understand the concepts of guilt, forgiveness and reconciliation as discussed in the context of Christian theology. At the same time, we also discuss certain strengths and weaknesses of the naturalistic accounts. Finally, we formulate some suggestions for advancing the science–religion dialogue on the problem of evil.

Horizons ◽  
1984 ◽  
Vol 11 (2) ◽  
pp. 304-319 ◽  
Author(s):  
Terrence W. Tilley

AbstractThe present essay distinguishes two ways to “settle” the problem of evil, “defense” and “theodicy,” as practiced in contemporary Christian philosophical theology. It argues that Christian theology can defend Christian belief from the charge of inconsistency, but that when it attempts to explain why and how God permits or wills evil in his world, it stumbles over denying the reality of evil or the goodness of God. The essay concludes by arguing that the Christian theologian cannot and should not attempt to make Christianity plausible by constructing theodicies but should concentrate on other methods of demonstrating the plausibility of Christianity.


2019 ◽  
pp. 101-140

This paper clusters around the problem of evil within the framework of depth psychology. The first part briefly introduces the narrative of the Book of Job as an example to contextualise how the ultimate question of God’s relation to evil remained unanswered and was left open-ended in Christian theology. The second part offers a historical reconstruction of the unresolved polemic over the nature of evil between Carl Jung and the English Dominican scholar and theologian Victor White (1902-1960). It explores their different speculations and formulations concerning evil and its psychological implications, until their final fall-out following White’s harshly critical review of Jung’s most controversial work on religion, Answer to Job. The final section of this paper introduces further reflections on a challenging theme that is no less resonant and relevant in today’s world of terrorism in the name of religion than it was in a post-war Europe struggling to recover from totalitarianism and genocide.


2008 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ashok Nagpal ◽  
Ankur Prahlad Betageri

2018 ◽  
Vol 10 (3) ◽  
pp. 105-131
Author(s):  
Bruce Russell

I begin by distinguishing four different versions of the argument from evil that start from four different moral premises that in various ways link the existence of God to the absence of suffering. The version of the argument from evil that I defend starts from the premise that if God exists, he would not allow excessive, unnecessary suffering. The argument continues by denying the consequent of this conditional to conclude that God does not exist. I defend the argument against Skeptical Theists who say we are in no position to judge that there is excessive, unnecessary suffering by arguing that this defense has absurd consequences. It allows Young Earthers to construct a parallel argument that concludes that we are in no position to judge that God did not create the earth recently. In the last section I consider whether theists can turn the argument from evil on its head by arguing that God exists. I first criticize Alvin Plantinga’s theory of warrant that one might try to use to argue for God’s existence. I then criticize Richard Swinburne’s Bayesian argument to the same conclusion. I conclude that my version of the argument from evil is a strong argument against the existence of God and that several important responses to it do not defeat it.


Author(s):  
Mark C. Murphy

This Introduction raises the problem of divine ethics and how it bears on the problem of evil (or ‘argument from evil’). It notes the importance of distinguishing among three conceptions of God: God as maximally great being (as ‘an Anselmian being’), God as that being who is supremely worthy of worship, and God as that being who is fully worthy of allegiance. This book treats the first conception to be the most explanatorily basic, and thus it is the sole focus of inquiry for most of the book (Chapters 1 through 6); the second and third conceptions are considered in the second part of the book (Chapters 7 through 9).


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