scholarly journals Without Why: Useless Plants in Daoism and Christianity

Religions ◽  
2019 ◽  
Vol 10 (1) ◽  
pp. 65
Author(s):  
Sam Mickey

This article focuses on three examples of religious considerations of plants, with specific attention to the uselessness of plants. Drawing on Christian and Daoist sources, the examples include the following: (1) the lilies of the field described by Jesus in the Gospels of Matthew and Luke; (2) the useless tree of Zhuangzi; and (3) Martin Heidegger’s reading of a mystic poet influenced by Meister Eckhart, Angelus Silesius, for whom a rose blooms “without why,” which resonates with Heidegger’s deconstruction (Destruktion) of the history of metaphysics and his interpretation of uselessness in Zhuangzi. Each of those examples involves non-anthropocentric engagements with the uselessness of plants, which is not to say that they are completely free of the anthropocentrically scaled perspectives that assimilate uselessness into the logistics of agricultural societies. In contrast to ethical theories of the intrinsic value (biocentrism) or systemic value (ecocentrism) of plants, these Christian and Daoist perspectives converge with ecological deconstruction in suggesting that ethical encounters with plants emerge through attention to their uselessness. A viable response to planetary emergency can emerge with the radical passivity of effortless action, which is a careless care that finds solidarity with the carefree ways of plants.

Author(s):  
Paulo Borges ◽  

Our aim is to reflect upon the theme of “Transcending God”, as the core of the spiritual and mystical quest and journey, in Meister Eckhart and Angelus Silesius. We comment positions like “So therefore we pray to God that we may be free of “God”” (Eckhart) and “I must go even beyond God, to a desert” (Silesius), situating them in the context of neoplatonic experience and tradition. Finally, we wonder if we couldn’t find here a previous and more radical “death of God”, where religion is simultaneously accomplished and overpassed by mystical spirituality. This could be the other side of the “death of God” proclaimed by Nietzsche.


2020 ◽  
Vol 2 (2(71)) ◽  
pp. 46-49
Author(s):  
Cholpon Bazarbekovna Alisherova

This article highlights the solution to the problem of the nature and direction of the cultural and historical movement. Different options, concepts are considered. The cultural concepts of Schiller, Herder and others are fected. View on the logic of the development of the cultural and historical process of representation of Soviet culture are revealed in detail. The types of evolutionary concepts of culture, such as single-line volition, are a consideration of the history of culture as the sequential development of various systems (religion, morals, economy e.t.c.) with the identification of general stages in it (E.Taylor, J.Fraser, L. Levy-Bruhl). The second type of evolutionary understanding of the logic of cultural-historical dynamics is the theory of universal evolution. Its essence is to recognize the identity of the development of various ethnic cultures, the denzal of the general stages and the general scheme of movement, but the purpose and meaning, of it is understood by its supporters differently Supporters of this theory are N.Ya Danilevsky, A.Toynbee, V.Solovyov, K. Jaspers, B. Malinvsky and others. Their concepts include the idea of the cultural evolution of mankind, going in different ways to some unity, the idea of polyphonic world culture and recognition the equivalence of all its components. The third type of evolutionary doctrine of culture is theories of multilinear evolution. The views of the representatives of this theory (R.Benedict, M. Herskovitz etc.) affirm the polymerization of the sociocultural space, the intrinsic value of different types and models of culture. Thus, the article gives the basic concepts that offer original solutions to one of the important problems in the philosophy of culture the problems of the logic of the cultural-historical movement. Now, in a period of rapid social rhythm of the development of production and non-production activities, the forecasting of changes in space is becoming especially important/ Taking into account the numerous technical and social consequences of the scientific and technological revolution put forward requirements related to spatial forecasting


2001 ◽  
Vol 18 (2) ◽  
pp. 177-217
Author(s):  
David Sidorsky

The search for moral objectivity has been constant throughout the history of philosophy, although interpretations of the nature and scope of objectivity have varied. One aim of the pursuit of moral objectivity has been the demonstration of what may be termed its epistemological thesis, that is, the claim that the truth of assertions of the goodness or rightness of moral acts is as legitimate, reliable, or valid as the truth of assertions involving other forms of human knowledge, such as common sense, practical expertise, science, or mathematics. Another aim of the quest for moral objectivity may be termed its pragmatic formulation; this refers to the development of a method or procedure that will mediate among conflicting moral views in order to realize a convergence or justified agreement about warranted or true moral conclusions. In the ethical theories of Aristotle, David Hume, and John Dewey, theories that represent three of the four variants of ethical naturalism (defined below) that are surveyed in this essay, the epistemological thesis and the pragmatic formulation are integrated or combined. The distinction between these two elements is significant for the present essay, however, since I want to show that linguistic naturalism, the fourth variant I shall examine, has provided a demonstration of the epistemological thesis about moral knowledge, even if the pragmatic formulation has not been successfully realized.


2021 ◽  
pp. 1468795X2110369
Author(s):  
Michael Burawoy

One of the most contentious debates coursing through sociology is what to do with the canon of Marx, Weber, and Durkheim: abandon the canon, start afresh with a new canon, or reconstruct the existing canon? In this paper I examine the claims of Connell, the foremost advocate of abandoning the cannon. She claims the canon is an arbitrary imposition that bears no relation to the actual history of sociology and we would be better off examining how the canon came to be. She does not consider the intrinsic value of the canon and instead advances the idea of Southern theory. It is not clear what is Southern about Southern theory nor what holds together the array of theorists she proposes. As an alternative I propose reconstructing the canon with the life and work of W.E.B. Du Bois who was propelled by precisely the issues that concern Connell. The canon is relational so that Du Bois is not simply added but brought into conversation with Marx, Weber, and Durkheim, leading to a rereading of each theorist. The canon has always been subject to revision when it atrophies, when it moves out of sync with questions raised by the world and by sociology. I agree with others that contemporary questions push Du Bois to the forefront—however, not at the expense of Marx, Weber, and Durkheim but in dialogue with them. I outline a possible direction of such dialogues from which all would benefit. Just as the inclusion of Marx had dramatic consequences for the recalibration of Weber and Durkheim, so the same will happen with the inclusion of Du Bois with regard to Weber, Durkheim, and Marx, and, at the same time, stiffening and advancing a Du Boisian sociology. Incorporating Du Bois into the existing canon may appear to be a reformist move but if attention is paid to the whole gamut of Du Bois’s oeuvre, then the consequences could be revolutionary, even to the point of sidelining one or more of Marx, Weber, and Durkheim.


1918 ◽  
Vol 11 (4) ◽  
pp. 355-375
Author(s):  
Charles Rockwell Lanman

Frederic Palmer's account of Angelus Silesius, published in the April number of this Review, portrays admirably the struggles of a German mystic of some three hundred years ago, to attain the unattainable, to give utterance to the unutterable. Three and twenty hundred years ago, the like struggles were making part of the spiritual history of distant India. Perhaps Dr. Palmer's essay may lend a certain timeliness to an endeavor to interest Occidental readers in those sombre followers of the Mystic Way, who—time out of mind—have held retreat for meditation in the solemn stillness of the forests “lapped by the storied Hydaspes.”


Author(s):  
Ignacio García-Pereda ◽  
Ana Duarte Rodrigues ◽  
Francisco Manuel Parejo-Moruno

At the turn of the nineteenth century, agriculture in Spain was seen as an empirical know-how that was transmitted from generation to generation through practice. However, at the royal gardens the idea that agriculture was a scientific branch of knowledge was already germinating. Focusing on the two brothers—Claudio (1774–1842) and Esteban (1776–1812) Boutelou—this paper argues that these gardeners, profiting from their positions at the Spanish royal gardens, promoted agronomic development and education. In spite of the importance of the Boutelou family, a five-generation dynasty of gardeners, historiography has paid scant attention to them, as well as to the importance of agronomic travels and their reports. This paper aims at interweaving the boundaries between the history of science, history of agriculture, and gardens and landscape studies. Through the lenses of history of science and the application of Long's conceptual framework of ‘trading zones’ and Baldassarri and Matei's ‘gardens as laboratories’, we focus on the position of the Boutelou brothers in the gardens of the royal estates and the new Sanlúcar acclimatization garden. We then demonstrate how they were influenced by travels abroad and how Arthur Young, a Briton, became their role model. Moreover, we establish a relation between the Boutelou's network of experts and the rise of translations of English and French books and the appearance of the first agricultural teaching manuals in Castilian, often published in the context of agricultural societies. Finally, we show how this was fundamental to the renewal of agronomic practices and education in Spain.


2001 ◽  
Vol 52 (1) ◽  
pp. 191-220
Author(s):  
Bent Christensen

Concerning »About Grundtvig's Vidskab«By Bent ChristensenBent Christensen’s contribution presents three texts, viz .firstly his introductory speech at the public defence of the dissertation »About Grundtvi’s Vidskab« An Inquiry into N.F.S. Grundtvig’s »View of the Knowledge Aspect of the Commitment to Life that is a Necessary Part of Christianity« - and, secondly, replies to the two officially appointed critics, as they appear in Grundtvig Studier 1999.In his introductory speech Bent Christensen describes the disciple relationship to Kaj Thaning which has, admittedly, developed into an increasingly critical direction as far as the evaluation of .1832. and the circumstances attached to that year are concerned, but which remains unchanged with respect to the recognition of Kaj Thaning's pioneer work as regards the understanding of the radicalism in Grundtvig’s view of the »intrinsic value«, given in creation, of human life. The divergence is due, more than anything else, to a generational difference in church views. Bent Christensen’s main concern, however, is the question what importance the commitment to life here and now has for the Christian's relation with God and the Christian expectation of the Kingdom of God.The keyword is precisely »importance«. The famous stanza from »The Seven Star of Christendom« really says it all:If our people and our fathers' landTo us are empty words and sounds,If we know not what they signify,Beyond a crowd and soil and strand,Then vain is every word we speakAbout God's Kingdom's mount and vale,About God’s people and His flock.For what is said here, of course, applies to the total involvement in life, of which the scientific activity of understanding is only one particular part. In the most elementary experience of life as well as in science and scholarship on the highest level, we have to do with a consciousness of God - if an indirect one - without which all the words of the history of salvation become »empty«.In his reply to Anders Pontoppidan Thyssen Bent Christensen defends his - in a certain sense - looseness of method, and he denies the implication that his thesis could be seen as a »thesis of vidskab on tottering feet« .I have not from the outset had so much method nor so much thesis that I have been prevented from seeing the hitherto unnoticed, indeed hitherto neglected, aspects of Grundtvig which have been uncovered and interpreted in my dissertation..Bent Christensen refers to the introduction to the thesis, where he has given a detailed account of how it became clear during his work with Grundtvig’s life and writings that .Grundtvig’s view of the knowledge aspect of the commitment to life that is a necessary part of Christianity. must needs be seen precisely as a side or partof an all-embracing totality of life and culture. In the technical terms of a dissertation, the thesis corresponds to what is written on the back of the book’s cover: On one hand it is pointed out that absolutely supreme scholarship (of a humanistic and life-interpreting character) is the upper layer in the all-embracing cultural totality that Grundtvig dreamt about and worked for.But on the other hand it is described in detail how both inner, crucial, factual and positive factors and external, partly highly negative factors cause Grundtvig from around 1835 to concentrate more and more on the preservation, awakening, activities and enlightenment of Danish cultural and national life - with Grundtvig himself in the centre as the great »total poet« of church and people.Responding to Anders Pontoppidan Thyssen’s criticism of the way in which the aspects of church policy and church view are dealt with, Bent Christensen insists that Grundtvig’s 1832-solution assumed its particular form very much as a consequence of the clerical jam that he had to wriggle out of.In the reply to Theodor J.rgensen Bent Christensen denies that his own culturaltheological vision should have put a slant on his work. He is not disappointed that Grundtvig did not attempt to a still larger extent to maintain a Christian unified culture, but on the contrary criticizes Grundtvig, on the one hand, for taking a very exclusive view of the .free congregation of Jesus Christ., but on the other hand for seeking nevertheless, through rather diffuse constructions in church view and »secondary theology«, to preserve an at least kriste-lig (i.e. Christ-like) unity in the Danish society.Bent Christensen goes on to state his reasons why his work has not been more systematically problem-oriented or contextually based on the history of ideas. The decisive fact is that all the influences that Grundtvig obviously received are melted into his Christian universe to such an extent that it would not have been profitable if the reading of Herder and Schelling for example, which was of course a fact, should have entered explicitly into the presentation.Finally, Bent Christensen declares himself in agreement with Theodor J.rgensen’s concluding observations as far as the relation between the universal and the particular in Grundtvig is concerned. Grundtvig’s concept of a national and cultural organism is only part of his view of the whole human race as an organism, so that he cannot be cited in support of a nationalistic self-sufficiency. This is true also of the »superuniversity« in Gothenburg, which, for one thing, was to be a shared Scandinavian project, and which, for another thing, was expressly intended to be the specifically Nordic contribution to the universal-historical scholarship and development of clarification of the collective human race. The same thing applies concerning Grundtvig’s understanding of the relationship between the small Danish congregation and »the horizon of understanding to the catholicity of the Christian church«. In his ecumenical activity Bent Christensen himself has experienced »how good it feels to have the ecumenically universal Grundtvig with him when travelling the world«.


2005 ◽  
Vol 54 (4) ◽  
Author(s):  
Giuseppina D’Addelfio

Nel presente articolo viene affrontato il tema della qualità della vita. Dopo una breve ricostruzione dell’origine di questa espressione e un esame dei contesti in cui più frequentemente essa ricorre, viene presentato l’Approccio che Amartya Sen e Martha Nussbaum hanno elaborato e su cui continuano a lavorare per misurare la qualità della vita in differenti nazioni: l’approccio delle Capacità. In particolare viene presentata l’elaborazione di Martha Nussbaum con la sua lista delle capacità. Sulla base della sua radice aristotelica, questa lista lascia intravedere un’immagine dell’essere umano come un animale razionale fragile e dipendente, in più momenti della sua vita bisognoso di cure. Dunque per quanto l’autonomia sia considerata una meta significativa da raggiungere e proteggere, essa non diventa l’unico fondamento della dignità dell’uomo. Quest’idea, insieme al tema della deformazione dei desideri e delle aspettative in situazioni di difficoltà, offre interessanti spunti alla riflessione bioetica, configurando l’esigenza di qualità della vita come strettamente legata al riconoscimento del suo intrinseco valore e della sua sacralità. ---------- In this article the author deals with the “Quality of Life” issue. After a brief history of the origin of this expression and an exam of the main contexts in which it is used, the approach that Amartya Sen and Martha Nussbaum have been shaping, in order to mesure the Quality of Life in different nations - the Capabilities Approach -, is presented. In particular the author focuses on Nussbaum’s account and on her list of capabilities. On the basis of its Aristotelian root, the list shows an idea of human being as a vulnerable and dependent rational animal - so that he/she needs care, in different moments of his/her life. Hence, autonomy is recognized as a valuable thing to pursue and preserve, but it is not considered as the only ground of human dignity. This issue, with the one of the deformation of preferences and expectations due to difficult situations, gives precious suggestions to bioethics. Namely, the istance of the “Quality of Life” is stressed as closely linked with the recognition of its intrinsic value and sacredness.


2014 ◽  
Vol 40 (128) ◽  
pp. 349
Author(s):  
Norbert Fischer

A fé cristã, que se baseia no Novo Testamento e, por conseguinte, se apoia em uma nova história da salvação, motivou eminentes pensadores como Agostinho, Mestre Eckhart e Emanuel Kant, a investigar, também filosoficamente, a verdade desta mensagem. Agostinho estava convencido de que filosofia (como desejo da sabedoria) e religião não estão mutuamente em uma irreconciliável oposição (Vera rel. 8); Mestre Eckhart procura compreender a verdade supratemporal da doutrina da encarnação e Kant vê a fé cristã como uma “admirável religião“, que “na grande simplicidade de seu relato enriqueceu a filosofia com concepções, bem mais definidas e puras, da moralidade, do que as que até então ela tinha conseguido fornecer” (KU B 462 nota). A religião cristã deve hoje de novo confrontar-se com objeções críticas a respeito de sua verdade. Os autores aqui tratados fornecem orientações, que até agora não foram suficientemente consideradas e merecem ser recordadas.Abstract: The Christian faith, based on the New Testament and, therefore, on a new history of salvation, instigated eminent thinkers such as Augustine, Meister Eckhart and Immanuel Kant to investigate even philosophically the truth of the Gospel’s message. Augustine was convinced that philosophy (as the desire for wisolom) and religion are not necessarily in an irreconcilable opposition (Vera rel. 8); Meister Eckhart sought to comprehend the supratemporal truth of the doctrine of incarnation and Kant believed the Christian Faith to be a “wonderful religion“that in the great simplicity of its statement enriched philosophy with far more definite and purer concepts of morality than philosophy itself could have previously supplied“ (KU B 462 footnote). The Christian religion today is, once again, being confronted to critical objections concerning its own truth. The authors herein mentioned provide us with insights which, until now, have not been considered enough and deserve our attention.


Philosophy ◽  
1958 ◽  
Vol 33 (126) ◽  
pp. 240-273 ◽  
Author(s):  
Austin Jones-Duncan

The object of this paper is to review and examine some of the things which G. E. Moore says about the nature of intrinsic value, about the sort of objects which possess it, and about the method of ascertaining the intrinsic values of things. Most of the discussion will be based on Principia Ethica (1903): for in that work Moore stated the substance of his ethical theories once and for all. He explicitly changed his mind later on a few specific issues, which will be noted when they arerelevant: and I shall argue in my fourth section that he also changed his mind in one matter without acknowledging that he was doing so. With those exceptions, it seems to me that his later writings differ from Principia chiefly by their style of presentation and by the introduction of some new distinctions, and I shall think myself justified, on most points, in treating them as an aid to amplifying or refining the position which Moore adopted in Principia.The other works to be referred to are Ethics (1912); “The conception of intrinsic value”, written about 40 years ago and published in Philosophical Studies; “Is goodness a quality?” in Arist. Soc. Sup. Vol. 1932; and “A reply to my critics” in The Philosophy of G. E. Moore, edited by Schilpp (1942). The last work will be cited as Reply.


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