scholarly journals Spatially Distributed Differential Game Theoretic Model of Fisheries

Mathematics ◽  
2019 ◽  
Vol 7 (8) ◽  
pp. 732 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ougolnitsky ◽  
Usov
Keyword(s):  
Differential Game ◽  
Equation Model ◽  
Stackelberg Games ◽  
Theoretic Model ◽  
Information Structures ◽  
Spatially Distributed ◽  
Spatial Coordinates ◽  
Game Theoretic ◽  
Linear Differential ◽  
Inverse Stackelberg Games

We consider a differential game of fisheries in a fan-like control structure of the type “supervisor—several agents”. The dynamics of the controlled system is described by a non-linear differential equation model which is identified on the Azov Sea data. An averaging by two spatial coordinates is conducted. Different information structures of the game are generated by the control methods of compulsion (supervisor restricts the feasible strategies of agents) and impulsion (she exerts an impact to their payoff functionals). Both Stackerlberg and inverse Stackelberg games are considered. For the numerical investigation we use a discretization of the initial model and the method of qualitatively representative scenarios in simulation modeling.

scholarly journals Land tenure and conflict resolution: a game theoretic approach in the Narok district in Kenya

2004 ◽  
Vol 9 (3) ◽  
pp. 383-407 ◽  
Author(s):  
HANS M. AMMAN ◽  
ANANTHA KUMAR DURAIAPPAH
Keyword(s):  
Land Use ◽  
Land Tenure ◽  
Land Ownership ◽  
Theoretic Model ◽  
Theoretic Approach ◽  
Information Structures ◽  
Institutional Reforms ◽  
Asymmetrical Information ◽  
Land Tenure System ◽  
Game Theoretic

Many conflicts in many parts of the developing world can be traced to disputes over land ownership, land use and land degradation. In this paper, we test the hypothesis that information asymmetries among various principals within these countries in land tenure and market systems have caused marginalization of some principals by the others. A sustained process of marginalization driven by these asymmetries has inevitably caused the disadvantaged to revolt resulting in many cases in violent clashes. In this paper, we develop a game theoretic model to test our hypothesis by analyzing the complex interdependencies existing among the various principals in the Narok District in Kenya. Violent clashes have been increasing in the district since the first outbreak in 1993. Preliminary results seem to confirm our hypothesis that asymmetrical information structures among the various principals over land and agricultural markets could have been the catalytic forces for these conflicts. In order to reduce these discrepancies, we recommend two institutional reforms. The first involves the adoption of a hybrid land tenure system whereby land ownership is based on individual titles while the use and sale of the land is governed by communal rules established by a community participatory proceeds. The second recommendation involves the formation of an information network comprising of all principals with the main objective of it being a forum for exchange of ideas and information pertaining to land use options and the opportunities offered by the market system.

Stability in the informal value transfer systems: norms of trust or institutions of control?

2017 ◽  
pp. 120-130
Author(s):  
A. Lyasko
Keyword(s):  
Social Control ◽  
Institutional Economics ◽  
Theoretic Model ◽  
Transfer System ◽  
Value Transfer ◽  
Partner Interaction ◽  
Game Theoretic ◽  
Game Theoretic Model ◽  
Informal Value Transfer System

Informal financial operations exist in the shadow of official regulation and cannot be protected by the formal legal instruments, therefore raising concerns about the enforcement of obligations taken by their participants. This paper analyzes two alternative types of auxiliary institutions, which can coordinate expectations of the members of informal value transfer systems, namely attitudes of trust and norms of social control. It offers some preliminary approaches to creating a game-theoretic model of partner interaction in the informal value transfer system. It also sheds light on the perspectives of further studies in this area of institutional economics.

Hollywood’s Movie Production Companies in Game Theoretic Model

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Nargiz Mammadova ◽  
Aygun Malikova ◽  
Arzu Heydarova
Keyword(s):  
Theoretic Model ◽  
Game Theoretic ◽  
Game Theoretic Model

Digital Authoritarianism and the Future of Human Rights

2021 ◽  
pp. 1-27
Author(s):  
Tiberiu Dragu ◽  
Yonatan Lupu
Keyword(s):  
Human Rights ◽  
New Technologies ◽  
Theoretic Model ◽  
Human Rights Abuses ◽  
Human Rights Regime ◽  
Wide Range ◽  
The Future ◽  
Technological Developments ◽  
Game Theoretic ◽  
Strategic Context

Abstract How will advances in digital technology affect the future of human rights and authoritarian rule? Media figures, public intellectuals, and scholars have debated this relationship for decades, with some arguing that new technologies facilitate mobilization against the state and others countering that the same technologies allow authoritarians to strengthen their grip on power. We address this issue by analyzing the first game-theoretic model that accounts for the dual effects of technology within the strategic context of preventive repression. Our game-theoretical analysis suggests that technological developments may not be detrimental to authoritarian control and may, in fact, strengthen authoritarian control by facilitating a wide range of human rights abuses. We show that technological innovation leads to greater levels of abuses to prevent opposition groups from mobilizing and increases the likelihood that authoritarians will succeed in preventing such mobilization. These results have broad implications for the human rights regime, democratization efforts, and the interpretation of recent declines in violent human rights abuses.

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