scholarly journals Dynamic Evolution Model of a Collaborative Innovation Network from the Resource Perspective and an Application Considering Different Government Behaviors

Information ◽  
2019 ◽  
Vol 10 (4) ◽  
pp. 138 ◽  
Author(s):  
Wu ◽  
Shao ◽  
Feng
Keyword(s):  
Network Evolution ◽  
Evolution Model ◽  
Dynamic Evolution ◽  
Innovation Network ◽  
Transfer Policy ◽  
Collaborative Innovation ◽  
Innovation Output ◽  
The Government ◽  
Small Change ◽  
Innovative Behaviors

The evolution of a collaborative innovation network depends on the interrelationships among the innovation subjects. Every single small change affects the network topology, which leads to different evolution results. A logical relationship exists between network evolution and innovative behaviors. An accurate understanding of the characteristics of the network structure can help the innovative subjects to adopt appropriate innovative behaviors. This paper summarizes the three characteristics of collaborative innovation networks, knowledge transfer, policy environment, and periodic cooperation, and it establishes a dynamic evolution model for a resource-priority connection mechanism based on innovation resource theory. The network subjects are not randomly testing all of the potential partners, but have a strong tendency to, which is, innovation resource. The evolution process of a collaborative innovation network is simulated with three different government behaviors as experimental objects. The evolution results show that the government should adopt the policy of supporting the enterprises that recently entered the network, which can maintain the innovation vitality of the network and benefit the innovation output. The results of this study also provide a reference for decision-making by the government and enterprises.

scholarly journals An Evolution Analysis of Collaborative Innovation Network considering Government Subsidies and Supervision

2019 ◽  
Vol 2019 ◽  
pp. 1-12
Author(s):  
Yingying Xu ◽  
Liangqun Qi ◽  
Xichen Lyu ◽  
Xinyu Zang
Keyword(s):  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Innovation Networks ◽  
Innovation Network ◽  
Scale Free Network ◽  
Government Subsidies ◽  
Scale Free ◽  
Evolution Analysis ◽  
Collaborative Innovation ◽  
Free Network ◽  
The Government

Collaborative innovation networks have the basic attributes of complex networks. The interaction of innovation network members has promoted the development of collaborative innovation networks. Using the game-based theory in the B-A scale-free network context, this paper builds an evolutionary game model of network members and explores the emergence mechanism from collaborative innovation behavior to the macroevolution of networks. The results show that revenue distribution, compensation of the betrayer, government subsidies, and supervision have positively contributed to the continued stability of collaborative innovation networks. However, the effect mechanisms are dissimilar for networks of different scales. In small networks, the rationality of the revenue distribution among members that have similar strengths should receive more attention, and the government should implement medium-intensity supervision measures. In large networks, however, compensation of the betrayer should be attached greater importance to, and financial support from the government can promote stable evolution more effectively.

scholarly journals The Evolutionary Game Theoretic Analysis for Sustainable Cooperation Relationship of Collaborative Innovation Network in Strategic Emerging Industries

2018 ◽  
Vol 10 (12) ◽  
pp. 4585 ◽  
Author(s):  
Weiwei Liu ◽  
Jianing Yang
Keyword(s):  
Financial Incentives ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Innovation Network ◽  
Theory Approach ◽  
Non Profit ◽  
Emerging Industries ◽  
Research Institutes ◽  
Collaborative Innovation ◽  
The Government ◽  
Cooperation Relationship

Strategic emerging industries (SEIs) represent the future direction of industrial developments and are crucial in stimulating the overall and long-term development for economy and society. The government plays a key role in promoting the development of SEIs. This paper, for the first time, investigates the cooperation relationship among innovation members, such as enterprises, universities and research institutes in a collaborative innovation network of strategic emerging industries under government intervention. A three-population evolutionary game theory approach was employed under different scenarios for the government acting as the stakeholder, considering the non-profit, definite fit as well as uncertain profit when incentive and punishment policies are adopted. A novel evolutionary game model of the cooperation relationship among collaborative innovation network members under government’s intervention is established. The results of the simulation experiments show that government’s intervention significantly influences the cooperation relationship between enterprises, universities and research institutes. When the sum of financial incentives and punishments is greater than the total additional cost (TAC), enterprises, universities and research institutes should pay for collaborative innovation. Moreover, government’s financial intervention can effectively promote the cooperation between enterprises, universities and research institutes.

DYNAMIC EVOLUTION MODEL BASED ON SOCIAL NETWORK SERVICES

2013 ◽  
Vol 24 (11) ◽  
pp. 1350081 ◽  
Author(s):  
XI XIONG ◽  
ZHI-JIAN GOU ◽  
SHI-BIN ZHANG ◽  
WEN ZHAO
Keyword(s):  
Social Network ◽  
Confidence Limit ◽  
Dynamic Network ◽  
Network Evolution ◽  
Evolution Model ◽  
Network Services ◽  
Dynamic Evolution ◽  
Dynamic Changes ◽  
High Betweenness ◽  
High Connectivity

Based on the analysis of evolutionary characteristics of public opinion in social networking services (SNS), in the paper we propose a dynamic evolution model, in which opinions are coupled with topology. This model shows the clustering phenomenon of opinions in dynamic network evolution. The simulation results show that the model can fit the data from a social network site. The dynamic evolution of networks accelerates the opinion, separation and aggregation. The scale and the number of clusters are influenced by confidence limit and rewiring probability. Dynamic changes of the topology reduce the number of isolated nodes, while the increased confidence limit allows nodes to communicate more sufficiently. The two effects make the distribution of opinion more neutral. The dynamic evolution of networks generates central clusters with high connectivity and high betweenness, which make it difficult to control public opinions in SNS.

A continuous-time network evolution model describing 3-interactions

2021 ◽  
pp. 1-20
Author(s):  
István Fazekas ◽  
Attila Barta ◽  
Csaba Noszály ◽  
Bettina Porvázsnyik
Keyword(s):  
Continuous Time ◽  
Network Evolution ◽  
Evolution Model

scholarly journals How to Promote Compliance Management in the Electricity Market? An Analysis Based on the Evolutionary Game Model

2021 ◽  
Vol 9 ◽  
Author(s):  
Luosong Jin ◽  
Cheng Chen ◽  
Yun Li ◽  
Xiangyang Wang ◽  
Yuanyuan Cheng
Keyword(s):  
Electricity Market ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Evolution Process ◽  
Regulatory Agencies ◽  
Dynamic Evolution ◽  
Model Parameters ◽  
Game Model ◽  
Compliance Cost ◽  
Compliance Management ◽  
The Government

In this paper, we aim to analyze how to effectively promote compliance management in the electricity market. We construct an evolutionary game model under the two different scenarios, i.e., the scenario without governmental supervision and the scenario with governmental supervision, and explicitly describes the strategic behaviors and dynamic evolution process of power enterprises and regulators in the power market. According to the results of the evolutionary stable strategy, we find that, in the absence of governmental supervision, the long-term stable equilibrium of power enterprises' choice of strategy “Compliance” and regulatory agencies' choice of strategy “Not bribery” is hard to be realized. Only if the government effectively supervises the compliance management of the electricity market can the ideal compliance behavior of the two stakeholders be achieved. Furthermore, we conduct a simulation study to analyze the impacts of the various model parameters on the dynamic evolution process. The specific results show that the lower compliance cost, the higher psychological cost, and the larger profit loss of the power enterprises, as well as the lower inspection cost, the higher psychological cost, and the larger rewards of the regulatory agencies, can promote the formation of compliance management. Besides, the larger penalty charged by the government is also conducive to the compliance management of the electricity market.

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