scholarly journals “Indirect” Information: The Debate on Testimony in Social Epistemology and Its Role in the Game of “Giving and Asking for Reasons”

Information ◽  
2019 ◽  
Vol 10 (3) ◽  
pp. 101
Author(s):  
Raffaela Giovagnoli

We will sketch the debate on testimony in social epistemology by reference to the contemporary debate on reductionism/anti-reductionism, communitarian epistemology and inferentialism. Testimony is a fundamental source of knowledge we share and it is worthy to be considered in the ambit of a dialogical perspective, which requires a description of a formal structure, which entails deontic statuses and deontic attitudes. In particular, we will argue for a social reformulation of the “space of reasons”, which establishes a fruitful relationship with the epistemological view of Wilfrid Sellars.

Hypatia ◽  
2021 ◽  
pp. 1-26
Author(s):  
Paul Giladi

Abstract This article has two aims: (i) to bring Judith Butler and Wilfrid Sellars into conversation; and (ii) to argue that Butler's poststructuralist critique of feminist identity politics has metaphilosophical potential, given her pragmatic parallel with Sellars's critique of conceptual analyses of knowledge. With regard to (i), I argue that Butler's objections to the definitional practice constitutive of certain ways of construing feminism is comparable to Sellars's critique of the analytical project geared toward providing definitions of knowledge. Specifically, I propose that moving away from a definition of woman to what one may call poststructuralist sites of woman parallels moving away from a definition of knowledge to a pragmatic account of knowledge as a recognizable standing in the normative space of reasons. With regard to (ii), I argue that the important parallels between Butler's poststructuralist feminism and Sellars's antirepresentationalist normative pragmatism about knowledge enable one to think of her poststructuralist feminism as mapping out pragmatic cognitive strategies and visions for doing philosophy. This article starts a conversation between two philosophers whom the literature has yet to fully introduce to each other.


Proceedings ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 47 (1) ◽  
pp. 43
Author(s):  
Raffaela Giovagnoli

Traditional epistemology rests on sources of information and knowledge such as perception, memory, ways of reasoning etc. In social epistemology, we find the primacy of an “indirect” form of information and knowledge, namely “testimony”: a justified belief can be acquired by hearing what others say or write. We focus on the contemporary debate, and in particular, on “communitarian” views.


Episteme ◽  
2015 ◽  
Vol 12 (1) ◽  
pp. 75-93 ◽  
Author(s):  
Matthew Congdon

AbstractIn this paper, I make explicit some implicit commitments to realism and conceptualism in recent work in social epistemology exemplified by Miranda Fricker and Charles Mills. I offer a survey of recent writings at the intersection of social epistemology, feminism, and critical race theory, showing that commitments to realism and conceptualism are at once implied yet undertheorized in the existing literature. I go on to offer an explicit defense of these commitments by drawing from the epistemological framework of John McDowell, demonstrating the relevance of the metaphor of the “space of reasons” for theorizing and criticizing instances of epistemic injustice. I then point out how McDowell’s own view requires expansion and revision in light of Mills' concept of “epistemologies of ignorance.” I conclude that, when their strengths are used to make up for each others' weaknesses, Mills and McDowell’s positions mutually reinforce one another, producing a powerful model for theorizing instances of systematic ignorance and false belief.


1970 ◽  
Vol 5 (1) ◽  
pp. 177-199
Author(s):  
Józef Bremer

In his philosophical works Wilfrid Sellars (1912-1989) - like Ludwig Wittgenstein - clearly distinguishes the domain of philosophy from that of empirical sciences. Within the framework of this differentiation he insists on a further sharp distinction between the concepts of empirical or factual linguistics and those of pure semiotic. It is quite clear - thus Sellars's example - that formal logic and pure mathematics are not empirical sciences nor do they constitute branches of any such science. This distinction was historically gained from the development of pure syntax. According to Sellars, pure syntaxis concerned with „rules defining the formal structure of calculi rather than languages'' (Sellars, PPE 182). In a syntactic system understood in this sense we use neither the concepts of designation or truth, nor of verifiability or meaningfulness. The concepts used in logic and mathematics - taken as examples of such systems - are clarified through identification with concepts which occur in the formation and transformation of definitive rules of calculi. In this context, logic and mathematics are normative rather than factual sciences. The basis of their norms is grounded in humanly conceived rules.


Author(s):  
Harvey Siegel

A long tradition in the philosophy of education identifies education’s most fundamental aim and ideal as that of the fostering or cultivating of rationality. This chapter relates this tradition in philosophy of education to recent work, inspired by Wilfrid Sellars, on “the space of reasons.” I briefly lay out Sellars’ notion and discuss its place in the work of some of those he influenced, especially John McDowell. I next address recent work in philosophy of education that suggests that there is a tension between Sellars’ notion and the traditional educational ideal, or that the Sellarsian view as developed by McDowell resolves outstanding difficulties with my version of the traditional view. I argue that there is less tension than some of my critics suggest, and that the Sellarsian notion is compatible with the traditional view, but that it leaves out an important aspect of that view that should not be lost.


2018 ◽  
Vol 4 (4) ◽  
Author(s):  
Matthew Congdon

Recent discussions in critical social epistemology have raised the idea that the concept “knower” is not only an epistemological concept but an ethical concept as well. Though this idea plays a central role in these discussions, the theoretical underpinnings of the claim have not received extended scrutiny. This paper explores the idea that “knower” is an irreducibly ethical concept in an effort to defend its use as a critical concept. In section 1, I begin with the claim that “knower” is an irreducibly normative and social concept, drawing from some ideas in Wilfrid Sellars. In section 2, I argue that one’s being a knower involves demands for various sorts of ethically laden recognition. I develop this thought by arguing that Axel Honneth’s threefold typology of recognition—love, respect, and esteem—finds clear expression within the context of socio-epistemic practice. I conclude in section 3 by arguing that Miranda Fricker’s proposed “analogy” between epistemic and moral perception should be modified to indicate a closer relationship than mere analogy.


Proceedings ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 47 (1) ◽  
pp. 43
Author(s):  
Raffaela Giovagnoli

Traditional epistemology rests on sources of information and knowledge such as perception, memory, ways of reasoning etc. In social epistemology, we find the primacy of an “indirect” form of information and knowledge, namely “testimony”: a justified belief can be acquired by hearing what others say or write. We focus on the contemporary debate, and in particular, on “communitarian” views.


Author(s):  
Willem A. de Vries
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