scholarly journals Evolutionary Games of Low-Carbon Behaviors of Construction Stakeholders under Carbon Taxes

2021 ◽  
Vol 18 (2) ◽  
pp. 508
Author(s):  
Qiang Du ◽  
Yunqing Yan ◽  
Youdan Huang ◽  
Chanchan Hao ◽  
Jiao Wu
Keyword(s):  
Construction Industry ◽  
Carbon Tax ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Evolutionary Games ◽  
Policy Implications ◽  
Chinese Government ◽  
Low Carbon ◽  
Carbon Taxes ◽  
Evolutionarily Stable Strategies ◽  
The Real

The development of low-carbon buildings (LCBs) in China has not reached its expected status, although the Chinese government has formulated many relevant regulations. The real estate developers and consumers are essential participants in the development of LCBs. This paper explores whether the government’s implementation of the carbon tax will change their choices of LCBs. Evolutionary game models between developers and consumers are established under static and dynamic carbon taxes. Their evolutionarily stable strategies (ESS) are deduced in different situations. According to the real scenarios in China, numerical simulations are further conducted to show that carbon tax influences the low-carbon behaviors of stakeholders in the construction industry. Under a static carbon tax, the two players cannot reach an equilibrium state, while the game system is stable under a dynamic tax. The probability of the developers constructing LCBs is positively related to the carbon tax, while its degree is gradually weakened as the tax rate increases. Therefore, an appropriate tax should be set to promote the development of LCBs effectively. Finally, policy implications are put forwarded to guide the participants’ low-carbon behaviors and reduce the carbon emissions in the Chinese construction industry.

scholarly journals The Determinants of Carbon Emissions in the Chinese Construction Industry: A Spatial Analysis

2020 ◽  
Vol 12 (4) ◽  
pp. 1428 ◽  
Author(s):  
Na Lu ◽  
Shuyi Feng ◽  
Ziming Liu ◽  
Weidong Wang ◽  
Hualiang Lu ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Construction Industry ◽  
Carbon Emissions ◽  
Industrial Structure ◽  
Spillover Effects ◽  
Energy Structure ◽  
Chinese Government ◽  
Low Carbon ◽  
Industry Agglomeration ◽  
Technology Innovations ◽  
Growth Energy

As the largest carbon emitter in the world, China is confronted with great challenges of mitigating carbon emissions, especially from its construction industry. Yet, the understanding of carbon emissions in the construction industry remains limited. As one of the first few attempts, this paper contributes to the literature by identifying the determinants of carbon emissions in the Chinese construction industry from the perspective of spatial spillover effects. A panel dataset of 30 provinces or municipalities from 2005 to 2015 was used for the analysis. We found that there is a significant and positive spatial autocorrelation of carbon emissions. The local Moran’s I showed local agglomeration characteristics of H-H (high-high) and L-L (low-low). The indicators of population density, economic growth, energy structure, and industrial structure had either direct or indirect effects on carbon emissions. In particular, we found that low-carbon technology innovation significantly reduces carbon emissions, both in local and neighboring regions. We also found that the industry agglomeration significantly increases carbon emissions in the local regions. Our results imply that the Chinese government can reduce carbon emissions by encouraging low-carbon technology innovations. Meanwhile, our results also highlight the negative environmental impacts of the current policies to promote industry agglomeration.

scholarly journals The New Path to Improve Construction Safety Performance in China: An Evolutionary Game Theoretic Approach

2019 ◽  
Vol 16 (13) ◽  
pp. 2443 ◽  
Author(s):  
Pi ◽  
Gao ◽  
Chen ◽  
Liu
Keyword(s):  
Information System ◽  
Construction Industry ◽  
Construction Projects ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Safety Information ◽  
Construction Safety ◽  
Safety Performance ◽  
Theoretic Approach ◽  
Economic Activities ◽  
Evolutionarily Stable Strategies

Evidence shows that there are many work-related accidents and injuries happening in construction projects and governments have taken a series of administrative measures to reduce casualties in recent years. However, traditional approaches have reached a bottleneck due to ignoring market forces, and thus new measures should be conducted. This study develops a perspective of safety performance (SP) for construction projects in China and puts forward a conception of the safety information system by using several brainstorming sessions to strengthen the safety supervision of participants in the construction industry. This system provides rating information to the public, and bad performance contractors enter into a blacklist which will influence their economic activities. Considering the limited rationality of government and various contractors, this paper builds a reasonable evolutionary game model to verify the feasibility of the safety information system. The analysis results show that there is not a single set of evolutionarily stable strategies (ESSs), as different situations may lead to different ESSs. The efficiency of applying the safety information system (the blacklist) in the construction industry can be proved by reducing the government’s safety supervision cost and by enhancing construction safety at the same time.

scholarly journals Analysis of Multi-Stakeholders’ Behavioral Strategies Considering Public Participation under Carbon Taxes and Subsidies: An Evolutionary Game Approach

2020 ◽  
Vol 12 (3) ◽  
pp. 1023 ◽  
Author(s):  
Wanting Chen ◽  
Zhi-Hua Hu
Keyword(s):  
Public Participation ◽  
Government Regulation ◽  
Low Cost ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Behavioral Strategies ◽  
Low Carbon ◽  
Carbon Taxes ◽  
The Public ◽  
Carbon Production ◽  
Label System

Considering public participation in environmental management, we developed a tripartite game model among governments, manufacturers and publics under carbon taxes and subsidies to investigate whether the mutual relationship between governments and the public can urge manufacturers to adopt low-carbon technology by examining the interaction effect among the multi-stakeholders. In this study, we focus on manufactured products without significant low-carbon peculiarity. For these products, consumers have no way to identify which are from low-carbon production and which are not. The results show that governments and the public have a complementary and coordinating relationship indeed. The regulation cost of governments, the supervision reward for the public and the supervision cost of the public can all influence the behavioral strategies among the multi-stakeholders, including governments, manufacturers and the public. With the regulation cost strengthens dramatically, governments can consider increasing the supervision reward to support the public to participate in the management of manufacturers’ behaviors. Publics should also actively improve their management ability, and the low cost of public participation in supervision is an effective reflection to make up for the lack of government regulation. The implementation of carbon taxes is more advantageous in urging low-carbon manufacturing than government subsidies for low-carbon production. A complete carbon label system can reflect the low-carbon preferences of consumers to help manufacturers integrate low-carbon behavior into their operational decisions.

Resource Allocation as an Evolving Strategy

1996 ◽  
Vol 4 (1) ◽  
pp. 33-55 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sverrir Olafsson
Keyword(s):  
Network Management ◽  
Evolutionary Game Theory ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Evolutionary Games ◽  
Network Services ◽  
Efficient Utilization ◽  
Evolutionarily Stable Strategies ◽  
Network Utilization ◽  
Function Network ◽  
Evolutionarily Stable

The efficient utilization of resources is an issue of essential importance in modern network management. The emergence of increasingly complicated and continuously changing network services requires softer and fuzzier methods in network management. In this paper we demonstrate how evolutionary game theory can be used for an efficient allocation of service requirements onto an ensemble of heterogeneous network components. By incorporating differentiated pricing structures into a system utility function, network agents are encouraged to increase their usage of those components that are presently badly utilized. It is demonstrated how this approach can enhance network utilization significantly. Some new results regarding evolutionarily stable strategies in nonlinear evolutionary games are also reported.

Path Analysis on the Influence Factors of Construction Carbon Emissions and Policy Implications for Jiangsu in China

2012 ◽  
Vol 524-527 ◽  
pp. 2595-2601 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jian Rong Tang ◽  
Bai Yu Zhang ◽  
Li Juan Wu
Keyword(s):  
Path Analysis ◽  
Construction Industry ◽  
Carbon Emissions ◽  
Influence Factors ◽  
Developed Countries ◽  
Policy Implications ◽  
Practical Significance ◽  
Low Carbon ◽  
Process Of Urbanization ◽  
And Control

The historical experience from developed countries shows that carbon emissions, with the process of urbanization, will exceed the construction industry, transport and other sectors of society and eventually occupy the first. So, it not only has practical significance, but has far-reaching strategic significance to transform the high-carbon construction into low-carbon. The paper describes the direct, indirect and general influences of the construction carbon emissions based on the path analysis and the related statistic data of Jiangsu Province from 1998 to 2007. It provides an effective guidance for the budget and control of the low-carbon development path with the detailed analysis on each factor’s influence and mechanism.

scholarly journals The Evolutionary Game Analysis of Multiple Stakeholders in the Low-Carbon Agricultural Innovation Diffusion

Complexity ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 2020 ◽  
pp. 1-12 ◽  
Author(s):  
Lixia Liu ◽  
Yuchao Zhu ◽  
Shubing Guo
Keyword(s):  
Innovation Diffusion ◽  
Agricultural Development ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Evolutionary Process ◽  
Low Carbon ◽  
Carbon Taxes ◽  
Agricultural Innovation ◽  
Agricultural Enterprises ◽  
The Government ◽  
The Impact

Encouraging the adoption and diffusion of low-carbon agricultural technology innovation is an important measure to cope with climate change, reduce environmental pollution, and achieve sustainable agricultural development. Based on evolutionary game theory, this paper establishes a game model among agricultural enterprises, government, and farmers and analyzes the dynamic evolutionary process and evolutionary stable strategies of the major stakeholders. The impact of innovation subsidies, carbon taxes, and adoption subsidies on low-carbon agricultural innovation diffusion is simulated using Matlab software. The results show that the government’s reasonable subsidies and carbon taxes for agricultural enterprises and farmers can increase the enthusiasm of agricultural enterprises and farmers to participate in low-carbon agriculture. This study can be used as a basis for the government to formulate more targeted policies to promote the diffusion of low-carbon agricultural innovation.

scholarly journals Can a Dynamic Reward–Penalty Mechanism Help the Implementation of Renewable Portfolio Standards under Information Asymmetry?

Symmetry ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 12 (4) ◽  
pp. 670
Author(s):  
Xing Xin
Keyword(s):  
Information Asymmetry ◽  
Government Regulation ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
National Development ◽  
Power Industry ◽  
Chinese Government ◽  
Regulation Mechanism ◽  
Low Carbon ◽  
Renewable Portfolio Standards ◽  
Private Power

To further promote the low-carbon and sustainable development of China’s power industry, the Chinese government is vigorously introducing competition into power sales market. Simultaneously, On November 15, 2018, the National Development and Reform Commission issued the “Notice on Implementing the Renewable Portfolio Standards (Draft)” to propose the implementation of power sales side Renewable Portfolio Standards (RPS), which cannot be realized without an effective government regulation mechanism. However, information asymmetry and the limited rationality of the regulatory agencies and private power sales companies in the regulation process make the regulatory effect uncertain to the detriment of a sustainable regulation of the power industry. Thus, it is necessary to optimize the regulation mechanism of the RPS policy in China. We considered the competitive relationship between integrated power sales companies and independent power sales companies, and established an evolutionary game model based on a limited rationality. We also analyzed the implementation effects of the static reward penalty mechanism and dynamic reward penalty mechanism, respectively. The system dynamics (SD) simulation results showed that under the static reward penalty mechanism, there is no evolutionary stable equilibrium solution, and there will be volatility that exists in the evolution process. However, the dynamic reward penalty mechanism can effectively solve these problems. What is more, our results implied that governments should formulate appropriate RPS quotas, improve the green certificate trading mechanism, and take into account the market size of power sales while implementing RPS policy.

scholarly journals Evolutionary Game Theoretic Analysis of Low Carbon Investment in Supply Chains under Governmental Subsidies

2018 ◽  
Vol 15 (11) ◽  
pp. 2465 ◽  
Author(s):  
Guang Zhu ◽  
Gaozhi Pan ◽  
Weiwei Zhang
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chains ◽  
Incentive Mechanism ◽  
Rapid Development ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Investment Strategy ◽  
Free Riding ◽  
Low Carbon ◽  
Evolutionarily Stable Strategies ◽  
Evolutionarily Stable ◽  
Profit Growth

With the rapid development of global industry and economy, excessive carbon dioxide emission has emerged as a critical issue in both developed and developing countries. Using an evolutionary game framework in which game players can adjust their strategies constantly, this paper investigates how to optimize the strategy of low carbon investment for suppliers and manufacturers in supply chains, and discuss the impacts of various factors on evolutionarily stable strategies. Additionally, we examine an incentive mechanism based on governmental subsidies to eliminate free riding and motivate co-investment. Furthermore, a case study and numerical examples are provided for illustration and simulation purposes, leading to several countermeasures and suggestions. Our analytical results show that the strategic choice of low carbon investment is correlated with profit growth coefficients, investment costs and profits from free riding. Investment costs have more significant impacts than other factors on evolutionarily stable strategies, while profit growth coefficients are more important at initial stages in the evolutionary process. The incentive mechanism based on governmental subsidies is an effective solution to motivate co-investment, and governments should take some measures to improve the assess accuracy and supervisory efficiency of investment strategy.

scholarly journals Government Regulation, Executive Overconfidence, and Carbon Information Disclosure: Evidence From China

2021 ◽  
Vol 12 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ren He ◽  
Yanduo Cheng ◽  
Mingdian Zhou ◽  
Jing Liu ◽  
Qing Yang
Keyword(s):  
Climate Change ◽  
Psychological Factors ◽  
Carbon Dioxide Emissions ◽  
Information Disclosure ◽  
Government Regulation ◽  
Positive Impact ◽  
Policy Implications ◽  
Chinese Government ◽  
Low Carbon

Climate change has put countries around the world under great pressure to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. Chinese government has proposed that China will strive to peak carbon dioxide emissions before 2030 and achieve carbon neutrality before 2060. A low-carbon lifestyle is becoming a new trend in China. Therefore, the products of firms that actively respond to climate change are more popular for consumers in China. In the Internet era, the carbon information disclosed by firms has become an important way for consumers to understand the behavior of firms in responding to climate change. In the existing literature on the influencing factors of carbon information disclosure, the psychological factors of executives are seldom investigated. Using a sample of Chinese listed firms in low-carbon pilot provinces and cities during the period of 2015–2019, this study explores the influence of government regulation and executive overconfidence on the quality of carbon information disclosure. The results show that government regulation has a significantly positive impact on the quality of carbon information disclosure. The results also reveal that executive overconfidence negatively affects the quality of carbon information disclosure. Moreover, executive overconfidence negatively moderates the relationship between government regulation and the quality of carbon information disclosure. Our findings make a significant contribution to the role of executive’s psychological factors in firm’s behaviors and provide new insights and policy implications for government, firms, consumers, and other stakeholders.

scholarly journals What Role Should Government Play in the Personal Carbon Trading Market: Motivator or Punisher?

2019 ◽  
Vol 16 (11) ◽  
pp. 1905 ◽  
Author(s):  
Daoyan Guo ◽  
Hong Chen ◽  
Ruyin Long
Keyword(s):  
Carbon Emissions ◽  
Carbon Tax ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Emissions Reduction ◽  
Carbon Trading ◽  
Evolutionarily Stable Strategies ◽  
Operational Mechanism ◽  
Trading Market ◽  
Probabilistic Distances ◽  
The Difference

With increasing downstream carbon emissions, the implementation of a personal carbon trading scheme is urgently required. In order to facilitate the progress, government departments are supposed to adopt a motivating or punitive policy to make guidance for downstream carbon emissions reduction. This study determined and verified the evolutionarily stable strategies (ESSs) of government departments and individuals whose carbon emissions exceeded the initial carbon allowance (CEEICA individuals) by using the evolutionary game and numerical simulation methods, respectively. The findings show that the ESS of government departments is always a punitive policy during the variation of strategies of CEEICA individuals. The ESS of CEEICA individuals is an active plan when the added cost (the difference between emissions reduction cost and trading earning) is less than the carbon tax; otherwise, it is a passive plan. Furthermore, the rate of convergence can be significantly influenced by the probabilistic distances between initial strategies and the ESSs. On the basis of these findings, this study suggested implementing a “punishment first, motivation-supplemented” policy, and developing a stable operational mechanism for a personal carbon trading market.

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