scholarly journals Sequential Rationality in Continuous No-Limit Poker

Games ◽  
2014 ◽  
Vol 5 (2) ◽  
pp. 92-96
Author(s):  
Thomas Norman
Keyword(s):  
Sequential Rationality

Stability, sequential rationality, and subgame consistency

2007 ◽  
Vol 34 (2) ◽  
pp. 309-329 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sheng-Chieh Huang ◽  
Xiao Luo
Keyword(s):  
Subgame Consistency ◽  
Sequential Rationality

Structural Consistency, Consistency, and Sequential Rationality

Econometrica ◽  
1987 ◽  
Vol 55 (6) ◽  
pp. 1331 ◽  
Author(s):  
David M. Kreps ◽  
Garey Ramey
Keyword(s):  
Structural Consistency ◽  
Sequential Rationality

scholarly journals Sequential rationality in cryptographic protocols

2013 ◽  
Vol 1 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-38 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ronen Gradwohl ◽  
Noam Livne ◽  
Alon Rosen
Keyword(s):  
Cryptographic Protocols ◽  
Sequential Rationality

scholarly journals Dynamic Contracting under Positive Commitment

2019 ◽  
Vol 33 ◽  
pp. 2101-2108 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ilan Lobel ◽  
Renato Paes Leme
Keyword(s):  
Dynamic Game ◽  
Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium ◽  
Dynamic Contracting ◽  
Bayesian Equilibrium ◽  
Ex Ante ◽  
The Future ◽  
Over Time ◽  
Sequential Rationality

We consider a firm that sells products that arrive over time to a buyer. We study this problem under a notion we call positive commitment, where the seller is allowed to make binding positive promises to the buyer about items arriving in the future, but is not allowed to commit not to make further offers to the buyer in the future. We model this problem as a dynamic game where the seller chooses a mechanism at each period subject to a sequential rationality constraint, and characterize the perfect Bayesian equilibrium of this dynamic game. We prove the equilibrium is efficient and that the seller’s revenue is a function of the buyer’s ex ante utility under a no commitment model. In particular, all goods are sold in advance to the buyer at what we call the positive commitment price.

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