scholarly journals Institutional Inertia and Institutional Change in an Expanding Normal-Form Game

Games ◽  
2013 ◽  
Vol 4 (3) ◽  
pp. 398-425 ◽  
Author(s):  
Torsten Heinrich ◽  
Henning Schwardt
Keyword(s):  
Normal Form ◽  
Institutional Change ◽  
Form Game ◽  
Normal Form Game

scholarly journals Ising model versus normal form game

2010 ◽  
Vol 389 (3) ◽  
pp. 481-489 ◽  
Author(s):  
Serge Galam ◽  
Bernard Walliser
Keyword(s):  
Ising Model ◽  
Normal Form ◽  
Form Game ◽  
Normal Form Game ◽  
Model Versus

Quantifying Commitment in Nash Equilibria

2019 ◽  
Vol 21 (02) ◽  
pp. 1940011
Author(s):  
Thomas A. Weber
Keyword(s):  
Nash Equilibrium ◽  
Normal Form ◽  
Nash Equilibria ◽  
Dynamic Game ◽  
Subgame Perfect Equilibrium ◽  
Canonical Extension ◽  
Perfect Equilibrium ◽  
Form Game ◽  
Normal Form Game ◽  
The Given

To quantify a player’s commitment in a given Nash equilibrium of a finite dynamic game, we map the corresponding normal-form game to a “canonical extension,” which allows each player to adjust his or her move with a certain probability. The commitment measure relates to the average overall adjustment probabilities for which the given Nash equilibrium can be implemented as a subgame-perfect equilibrium in the canonical extension.

COALITION-PROOF NASH EQUILIBRIA IN A NORMAL-FORM GAME AND ITS SUBGAMES

2010 ◽  
Vol 12 (03) ◽  
pp. 253-261
Author(s):  
RYUSUKE SHINOHARA
Keyword(s):  
Normal Form ◽  
Nash Equilibria ◽  
Sufficient Condition ◽  
Form Game ◽  
Normal Form Game ◽  
Aggregative Games ◽  
The Relationship ◽  
Coalition Proof

The relationship between coalition-proof (Nash) equilibria in a normal-form game and those in its subgame is examined. A subgame of a normal-form game is a game in which the strategy sets of all players in the subgame are subsets of those in the normal-form game. In this paper, focusing on a class of aggregative games, we provide a sufficient condition for the aggregative game under which every coalition-proof equilibrium in a subgame is also coalition-proof in the original normal-form game. The stringency of the sufficient condition means that a coalition-proof equilibrium in a subgame is rarely a coalition-proof equilibrium in the whole game.

scholarly journals Information and Beliefs in a Repeated Normal-Form Game

2008 ◽  
Author(s):  
Dietmar Fehr ◽  
Dorothea F. Kübler ◽  
David Nils Danz
Keyword(s):  
Normal Form ◽  
Form Game ◽  
Normal Form Game

Modeling competitive situations

2020 ◽  
pp. 355-386
Author(s):  
David M. Kreps
Keyword(s):  
Normal Form ◽  
Noncooperative Game ◽  
Extensive Form ◽  
Game Tree ◽  
Decision Node ◽  
Form Game ◽  
Normal Form Game ◽  
Form Representation ◽  
Information Sets ◽  
Extensive Form Game

This chapter studies how competitive situations are conventionally modeled in noncooperative game theory. It uses two sorts or forms of models: the so-called extensive form game and the normal or strategic form game. An extensive form representation of a noncooperative game is composed of the following list of items: a list of players; a game tree; an assignment of decision nodes to players or to nature; lists of actions available at each decision node and a correspondence between immediate successors of each decision node and available actions; information sets; an assignment of payoffs for each player to terminal nodes; and probability assessments over the initial nodes and over the actions at any node that is assigned to nature. There is no single way to proceed in general from a normal form game to a corresponding extensive form game. In one obvious extensive form, the players all choose complete strategies simultaneously, but often other extensive forms could be constructed from a given normal form.

The Computational Complexity of Finding a Mixed Berge Equilibrium for a k-Person Noncooperative Game in Normal Form

2018 ◽  
Vol 20 (04) ◽  
pp. 1850010
Author(s):  
Ahmad Nahhas ◽  
H. W. Corley
Keyword(s):  
Computational Complexity ◽  
Normal Form ◽  
Noncooperative Game ◽  
Equilibrium Strategy ◽  
Mixed Strategies ◽  
Case Scenario ◽  
Worst Case ◽  
Form Game ◽  
Normal Form Game ◽  
Berge Equilibrium

The mixed Berge equilibrium (MBE) is an extension of the Berge equilibrium (BE) to mixed strategies. The MBE models mutually support in a [Formula: see text]-person noncooperative game in normal form. An MBE is a mixed-strategy profile for the [Formula: see text] players in which every [Formula: see text] players have mixed strategies that maximize the expected payoff for the remaining player’s equilibrium strategy. In this paper, we study the computational complexity of determining whether an MBE exists in a [Formula: see text]-person normal-form game. For a two-person game, an MBE always exists and the problem of finding an MBE is PPAD-complete. In contrast to the mixed Nash equilibrium, the MBE is not guaranteed to exist in games with three or more players. Here we prove, when [Formula: see text], that the decision problem of asking whether an MBE exists for a [Formula: see text]-person normal-form game is NP-complete. Therefore, in the worst-case scenario there does not exist a polynomial algorithm that finds an MBE unless P=NP.

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