Dynamic Durable Goods Monopoly and Market Power
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We analyze a vertically differentiated market for an imperfectly durable good served by a monopolist in an infinite-horizon, discrete-time game. Our goal is to identify the Markov perfect stationary equilibria where the seller can maintain his monopoly power. We establish that the set of parameters supporting a monopoly outcome is larger when the seller offers different quality versions of the same product. Hence, our results suggest that, when the innate durability of a product is high, the seller should offer different quality versions of the product.
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1988 ◽
Vol 57
(2)
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pp. 265-293
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1984 ◽
Vol 33
(1)
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pp. 183-196
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1986 ◽
Vol 11
(2)
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pp. 216-229
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2000 ◽
Vol 40
(1)
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pp. 15-20
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2001 ◽
Vol 25
(5)
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pp. 789-804
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