scholarly journals Ideal Reactive Equilibrium

Games ◽  
2019 ◽  
Vol 10 (2) ◽  
pp. 19
Author(s):  
Asha Sadanand
Keyword(s):  
Nash Equilibrium ◽  
Incomplete Information ◽  
Thought Process ◽  
Equilibrium Concept ◽  
Process Dynamics ◽  
Incomplete Information Games ◽  
Information Sets ◽  
Subgame Perfection ◽  
The Ideal ◽  
Information Games

Refinements of the Nash equilibrium have followed the strategy of extending the idea of subgame perfection to incomplete information games. This has been achieved by appropriately restricting beliefs at unreached information sets. Each new refinement gives stricter and more mathematically-complicated limitations on permitted beliefs. A simpler approach is taken here, where the whole idea of beliefs is dispensed with, and a new equilibrium concept, called the ideal reactive equilibrium, that builds on some pioneering work by Amershi, Sadanand and Sadanand on thought process dynamics, is developed.

Games with Unawareness

2020 ◽  
Vol 0 (0) ◽  
Author(s):  
Yossi Feinberg
Keyword(s):  
Nash Equilibrium ◽  
Incomplete Information ◽  
Equilibrium Solution ◽  
Solution Concept ◽  
The Other ◽  
Extensive Form ◽  
Normal Form Games ◽  
Incomplete Information Games ◽  
Extended Nash Equilibrium ◽  
Information Games

AbstractWe provide a tool to model and solve strategic situations where players’ perceptions are limited, as well as situations where players realize that other players’ perceptions may be limited and so on. We define normal, repeated, incomplete information, and extensive form games with unawareness using a unified methodology. A game with unawareness is defined as a collection of standard games (of the corresponding form). The collection specifies how each player views the game, how she views the other players’ perceptions of the game and so on. The modeler’s description of perceptions, the players’ description of other players’ perceptions, etc. are shown to have consistent representations. We extend solution concepts such as rationalizability and Nash equilibrium to these games and study their properties. It is shown that while unawareness in normal form games can be mapped to incomplete information games, the extended Nash equilibrium solution is not mapped to a known solution concept in the equivalent incomplete information games, implying that games with unawareness generate novel types of behavior.

Strategic Interaction and Interstate Crises: A Bayesian Quantal Response Estimator for Incomplete Information Games

2008 ◽  
Vol 16 (3) ◽  
pp. 250-273 ◽  
Author(s):  
Justin Esarey ◽  
Bumba Mukherjee ◽  
Will H. Moore
Keyword(s):  
Asymmetric Information ◽  
Incomplete Information ◽  
Learning Process ◽  
Private Information ◽  
Statistical Treatment ◽  
Quantal Response ◽  
Crisis Bargaining ◽  
Incomplete Information Games ◽  
Information Characteristics ◽  
Information Games

Private information characteristics like resolve and audience costs are powerful influences over strategic international behavior, especially crisis bargaining. As a consequence, states face asymmetric information when interacting with one another and will presumably try to learn about each others' private characteristics by observing each others' behavior. A satisfying statistical treatment would account for the existence of asymmetric information and model the learning process. This study develops a formal and statistical framework for incomplete information games that we term the Bayesian Quantal Response Equilibrium Model (BQRE model). Our BQRE model offers three advantages over existing work: it directly incorporates asymmetric information into the statistical model's structure, estimates the influence of private information characteristics on behavior, and mimics the temporal learning process that we believe takes place in international politics.

Military Capabilities and Escalation: A Correction to Bueno de Mesquita, Morrow, and Zorick

2000 ◽  
Vol 94 (2) ◽  
pp. 425-427 ◽  
Author(s):  
M. Cristina Molinari
Keyword(s):  
Incomplete Information ◽  
Armed Conflict ◽  
Incomplete Information Games ◽  
The Relationship ◽  
Information Games

Bueno de Mesquita, Morrow, and Zorick analyze the evolution of crises as a two-sided incomplete information game in order to illuminate the relationship between observable military capabilities and the escalation of a dispute to armed conflict. I show that an error in the derivation of the equilibria invalidates their conclusions, and I offer a few suggestions on how to model the evolution of crises as incomplete information games.

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