scholarly journals Evolution of Cooperation with Peer Punishment under Prospect Theory

Games ◽  
2019 ◽  
Vol 10 (1) ◽  
pp. 11 ◽  
Author(s):  
Satoshi Uchida ◽  
Hitoshi Yamamoto ◽  
Isamu Okada ◽  
Tatsuya Sasaki
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
Prospect Theory ◽  
Evolutionary Game Theory ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Social Dilemma ◽  
Cognitive Distortion ◽  
Evolution Of Cooperation ◽  
Human Beings ◽  
Wide Range ◽  
Parameter Values

Social dilemmas are among the most puzzling issues in the biological and social sciences. Extensive theoretical efforts have been made in various realms such as economics, biology, mathematics, and even physics to figure out solution mechanisms to the dilemma in recent decades. Although punishment is thought to be a key mechanism, evolutionary game theory has revealed that the simplest form of punishment called peer punishment is useless to solve the dilemma, since peer punishment itself is costly. In the literature, more complex types of punishment, such as pool punishment or institutional punishment, have been exploited as effective mechanisms. So far, mechanisms that enable peer punishment to function as a solution to the social dilemma remain unclear. In this paper, we propose a theoretical way for peer punishment to work as a solution mechanism for the dilemma by incorporating prospect theory into evolutionary game theory. Prospect theory models human beings as agents that estimate small probabilities and loss of profit as greater than they actually are; thus, those agents feel that punishments are more frequent and harsher than they really are. We show that this kind of cognitive distortion makes players decide to cooperate to avoid being punished and that the cooperative state achieved by this mechanism is globally stable as well as evolutionarily stable in a wide range of parameter values.

Migration Processes in the Context of Behavioral Economics Theories

2021 ◽  
Vol 1 (4) ◽  
pp. 20-32
Author(s):  
Anastasia Sokolova ◽  
Olga Kalachikova
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
Behavioral Economics ◽  
Evolutionary Game Theory ◽  
Scientific Community ◽  
Cognitive Biases ◽  
Empirical Studies ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Cognitive Distortion ◽  
Migration Behavior ◽  
And Migration

The aim of this article is to investigate the connection between behavioral economy and migration processes. Behavioral economics is a relatively new phenomenon in science and the fact that some research in this area has earned the Nobel Prize makes its contribution significant in the consideration of economic processes. The analysis of sources shows that in the field of Russian studies there is practically no mention of the fact that migration behavior can be explained by the behavioral economics theses. In this article, we explore several key ideas in this area: nudge theory, prospect theory, evolutionary game theory, cognitive distortion, and hedonistic adaptation. In this article, we put forward a hypothesis that migration processes can not only be explained from the standpoint of behavioral economics but can also be regulated using the tools of this direction. Behavioral economics can be the key for discovering the dynamics and true motives of migration. The analysis of information in this area shows, that a person makes decisions mainly based not on the laws of logic and rationalism. Paradoxes such as cognitive biases, etc. reduce the effectiveness of an individual's actions and provide an incentive for the scientific community to expand the number of empirical studies of migration processes within the framework of behavioral economics theories.

scholarly journals A Review of Theoretical Studies on Indirect Reciprocity

Games ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 11 (3) ◽  
pp. 27 ◽  
Author(s):  
Isamu Okada
Keyword(s):  
Evolutionary Game Theory ◽  
Complete Solution ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Social Dilemma ◽  
Evolution Of Cooperation ◽  
Theoretical Studies ◽  
Indirect Reciprocity ◽  
The Past ◽  
The Social ◽  
Look Back

Despite the accumulation of research on indirect reciprocity over the past 30 years and the publication of over 100,000 related papers, there are still many issues to be addressed. Here, we look back on the research that has been done on indirect reciprocity and identify the issues that have been resolved and the ones that remain to be resolved. This manuscript introduces indirect reciprocity in the context of the evolution of cooperation, basic models of social dilemma situations, the path taken in the elaboration of mathematical analysis using evolutionary game theory, the discovery of image scoring norms, and the breakthroughs brought about by the analysis of the evolutionary instability of the norms. Moreover, it presents key results obtained by refining the assessment function, resolving the punishment dilemma, and presenting a complete solution to the social dilemma problem. Finally, it discusses the application of indirect reciprocity in various disciplines.

scholarly journals Evolution of cooperation in evolutionary games for Sanitation Boards

2014 ◽  
Vol 17 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Rocío Botta ◽  
Gerardo Blanco ◽  
Christian E. Schaerer
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
Public Good ◽  
Evolutionary Game Theory ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Evolutionary Games ◽  
Evolution Of Cooperation ◽  
Cost Models ◽  
Policy Makers ◽  
Community Projects ◽  
The Cost

In a group of individuals that come together to produce a good or provide a service, the cooperators (who pay to produce the good) are often exploited by those who receive the benefit without paying the cost. Models were developed over time using incentives (reward or punishment) and the option of abandoning the initiative to promote and stabilize the cooperation. In this paper we analyze several models based on the evolutionary game theory and public good games. We compare and organize them in a taxonomic table following their main characteristics to select the most suitable for a specific problem. The analyzed models are compared by using a public good problem in community projects for water supply. We have reasonable assurance that phenomena that appear on mod- els also occurs in these community projects. Therefore, we propose that evolutionary game theory can be a useful tool for policy-makers in order to improve cooperation and discourage defection in sanitation boards.

On the Original Contract: Evolutionary Game Theory and Human Evolution

2005 ◽  
Vol 27 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Alex Rosenberg ◽  
Stefan Linquist
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
Evolutionary Game Theory ◽  
Gene Sequence ◽  
Sequence Data ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Gene Sequencing ◽  
Evolution Of Cooperation ◽  
Biological Anthropology ◽  
Original Contract ◽  
Gene Sequence Data

AbstractThis paper considers whether the available evidence from archeology, biological anthropology, primatology, and comparative gene-sequencing, can test evolutionary game theory models of cooperation as historical hypotheses about the actual course of human prehistory. The examination proceeds on the assumption that cooperation is the product of cultural selection and is not a genetically encoded trait. Nevertheless, we conclude that gene sequence data may yet shed significant light on the evolution of cooperation.

scholarly journals Evolving Ecological Social Dilemmas: A Spatial Individual-Based Model for the Evolution of Cooperation with a Minimal Number of Parameters

2007 ◽  
Vol 2007 ◽  
pp. 1-5
Author(s):  
H. Fort
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
Natural Selection ◽  
Evolutionary Game Theory ◽  
Spatial Model ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Social Dilemmas ◽  
Payoff Matrix ◽  
Evolution Of Cooperation ◽  
Full Version ◽  
Payoff Matrices

Cooperation, both intraspecific and interspecific, is a well-documented phenomenon in nature that is not well understood. Evolutionary game theory is a powerful tool to approach this problem. However, it has important limitations. First, very often it is not obvious which game is more appropriate to use. Second, in general, identical payoff matrices are assumed for all players, a situation that is highly unlikely in nature. Third, slight changes in these payoff values can dramatically alter the outcomes. Here, I use an evolutionary spatial model in which players do not have a universal payoff matrix, so no payoff parameters are required. Instead, each is equipped with random values for the payoffs, fulfilling the constraints that define the game(s). These payoff matrices evolve by natural selection. Two versions of this model are studied. First is a simpler one, with just one evolving payoff. Second is the “full” version, with all the four payoffs evolving. The fraction of cooperator agents converges in both versions to nonzero values. In the case of the full version, the initial heterogeneity disappears and the selected game is the “Stag Hunt.”

scholarly journals Evolutionary dynamics in structured populations

2010 ◽  
Vol 365 (1537) ◽  
pp. 19-30 ◽  
Author(s):  
Martin A. Nowak ◽  
Corina E. Tarnita ◽  
Tibor Antal
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
Evolutionary Game Theory ◽  
Evolutionary Dynamics ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Evolutionary Process ◽  
Structured Populations ◽  
Evolution Of Cooperation ◽  
Evolutionary Graph Theory ◽  
Phenotype Space ◽  
Multicellular Organisms

Evolutionary dynamics shape the living world around us. At the centre of every evolutionary process is a population of reproducing individuals. The structure of that population affects evolutionary dynamics. The individuals can be molecules, cells, viruses, multicellular organisms or humans. Whenever the fitness of individuals depends on the relative abundance of phenotypes in the population, we are in the realm of evolutionary game theory. Evolutionary game theory is a general approach that can describe the competition of species in an ecosystem, the interaction between hosts and parasites, between viruses and cells, and also the spread of ideas and behaviours in the human population. In this perspective, we review the recent advances in evolutionary game dynamics with a particular emphasis on stochastic approaches in finite sized and structured populations. We give simple, fundamental laws that determine how natural selection chooses between competing strategies. We study the well-mixed population, evolutionary graph theory, games in phenotype space and evolutionary set theory. We apply these results to the evolution of cooperation. The mechanism that leads to the evolution of cooperation in these settings could be called ‘spatial selection’: cooperators prevail against defectors by clustering in physical or other spaces.

scholarly journals Stags, Hawks, and Doves: Social Evolution Theory and Individual Variation in Cooperation

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jeremy Van Cleve
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
Group Size ◽  
Evolutionary Game Theory ◽  
Kin Selection ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Directional Selection ◽  
Evolution Of Cooperation ◽  
Behavioral Syndromes ◽  
Diversifying Selection ◽  
Selection For

AbstractOne of the triumphs of evolutionary biology is the discovery of robust mechanisms that promote the evolution of cooperative behaviors even when those behaviors reduce the fertility or survival of cooperators. Though these mechanisms, kin selection, reciprocity, and nonlinear payoffs to cooperation, have been extensively studied separately, investigating their joint effect on the evolution of cooperation has been more difficult. Moreover, how these mechanisms shape variation in cooperation is not well known. Such variation is crucial for understanding the evolution of behavioral syndromes and animal personality. Here, I use the tools of kin selection theory and evolutionary game theory to build a framework that integrates these mechanisms for pairwise social interactions. Using relatedness as a measure of the strength of kin selection, responsiveness as a measure of reciprocity, and synergy as a measure of payoff nonlinearity, I show how different combinations of these three parameters produce directional selection for or against cooperation or variation in levels of cooperation via balancing or diversifying selection. Moreover, each of these outcomes maps uniquely to one of four classic games from evolutionary game theory, which means that modulating relatedness, responsiveness, and synergy effectively transforms the payoff matrix from one the evolutionary game to another. Assuming that cooperation exacts a fertility cost on cooperators and provides a fertility benefit to social partners, a prisoner’s dilemma game and directional selection against cooperation occur when relatedness and responsiveness are low and synergy is not too positive. Enough positive synergy in these conditions generates a stag-hunt game and diversifying selection. High levels of relatedness or responsiveness turn cooperation from a fitness cost into a fitness benefit, which produces a mutualism game and directional selection for cooperation when synergy is not too negative. Sufficiently negative synergy in this case creates a hawk-dove game and balancing selection for cooperation. I extend the results with relatedness and synergy to larger social groups and show that how group size changes the effect of relatedness and synergy on selection for cooperation depends on how the per capita benefit of cooperation changes with group size. Together, these results provide a general framework with which to generate comparative predictions that can be tested using quantitative genetic techniques and experimental techniques that manipulate investment in cooperation. These predictions will help us understand both interspecific variation in cooperation as well as within-population and within-group variation in cooperation related to behavioral syndromes.

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