scholarly journals Energy Commodities: A Review of Optimal Hedging Strategies

Energies ◽  
2019 ◽  
Vol 12 (20) ◽  
pp. 3979 ◽  
Author(s):  
Halkos ◽  
Tsirivis

Energy is considered as a commodity nowadays and continuous access along with price stability is of vital importance for every economic agent worldwide. The aim of the current review paper is to present in detail the two dominant hedging strategies relative to energy portfolios, the Minimum-Variance hedge ratio and the expected utility maximization methodology. The Minimum-Variance hedge ratio approach is by far the most popular in literature as it is less time consuming and computationally demanding; nevertheless by applying the appropriate multivariate model Garch family volatility model, it can provide a very reliable estimation of the optimal hedge ratio. However, this becomes possible at the cost of a rather restrictive assumption for infinite hedger’s risk aversion. Within an uncertain worldwide economic climate and a highly volatile energy market, energy producers, retailers and consumers had to become more adaptive and develop the necessary energy risk management and optimal hedging strategies. The estimation gap of an optimal hedge ratio that would be subject to the investor’s risk preferences through time is filled by the relatively more complex and sophisticated expected utility maximization methodology. Nevertheless, if hedgers share infinite risk aversion or if alternatively the expected futures price is approximately zero the two methodologies become equivalent. The current review shows that when evidence from the energy market during periods of extremely volatile economic climate is considered, both hypotheses can be violated, hence it becomes reasonable that especially for extended hedging horizons it would be wise for potential hedgers to take into consideration both methodologies in order to build a successful and profitable hedging strategy.

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
isaac davis ◽  
Ryan W. Carlson ◽  
Yarrow Dunham ◽  
Julian Jara-Ettinger

We propose a computational model of social preference judgments that accounts for the degree of an agents’ uncertainty about the preferences of others. Underlying this model is the principle that, in the face of social uncertainty, people interpret social agents’ behavior under an assumption of expected utility maximization. We evaluate our model in two experiments which each test a different kind of social preference reasoning: predicting social choices given information about social preferences, and inferring social preferences after observing social choices. The results support our model and highlight how un- certainty influences our social judgments.


Author(s):  
Armin W. Schulz

A number of scholars argue that human and animal decision making, at least to the extent that it is driven by representational mental states, should be seen to be the result of the application of a vast array of highly specialized decision rules. By contrast, other scholars argue that we should see human and animal representational decision making as the result of the application of a handful general principles—such as expected utility maximization—to a number of specific instances. This chapter shows that, using the results of chapters 5 and 6, it becomes possible to move this dispute forwards: the account of the evolution of conative representational decision making defended in chapter 6 together with the account of the evolution of cognitive representational decision making defended in chapter 5, makes clear that both sides of this dispute contain important insights, and that it is possible to put this entire dispute on a clearer and more precise foundation. Specifically, I show that differentially general decision rules are differentially adaptive in different circumstances: certain particular circumstances favor specialized decision making, and certain other circumstances favor more generalist decision making.


2020 ◽  
pp. 248-250
Author(s):  
Paul Weirich

Recognizing that an act’s risk is a consequence of the act yields a version of expected-utility maximization that does not need adjustments for risk in addition to the probabilities and utilities of possible outcomes. This treatment of an act’s risk justifies the expected-utility principle, and the mean-risk principle, for evaluation of an act. Rational attitudes to risks explain the rationality of acting in accord with the principles. They ground the separability relations that support the principles. The expected-utility principle justifies a substantive, and not just a representational, version of the decision principle of expected-utility maximization. Consequently, the principle governs a single choice and not just sets of choices. It demands more than consistency of the choices in a set. It demands that each choice follow the agent’s preferences, and these preferences explain the rationality of a choice that complies with the principle.


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