On Long-Term Transmission Rights in the Nordic Electricity Markets

Shaun McRae of the University of Michigan reviews “The Economics of Electricity Markets: Theory and Policy”, by Pippo Ranci and Guido Cervigni. The Econlit abstract of this book begins: “Six papers address the main issues that arise when competition is introduced into the electricity industry. Papers discuss wholesale electricity markets (Guido Cervigni and Dmitri Perekhodtsev); generation capacity adequacy (Cervigni, Andrea Commisso, and Perekhodtsev); congestion management and transmission rights (Perekhodtsev and Cervigni); competition policy in the electricity industry (Cervigni and Perekhodtsev); retail competition (Anna Creti and Clara Poletti); and climate change and the future of the liberalized electricity markets (Cervigni). Ranci is Professor of Economic Policy at the Catholic University of Milan and Chair of the Board of Appeal of the European Agency for the Cooperation of Energy Regulators. Cervigni is Research Director at the Center for Research on Energy and Environmental Economics and Policy at Bocconi University and Chief Economist at A2A S.p.A. Index.”

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Investment Dynamics and Long Term Price Trends in Competitive Electricity Markets

Valuation, Hedging and Speculation in Competitive Electricity Markets ◽

10.1007/978-1-4615-1701-6_10 ◽

2001 ◽

pp. 177-191 ◽

Cited By ~ 1

Author(s):

Petter L. Skantze ◽

Marija D. Ilic

Keyword(s):

Electricity Markets ◽

Investment Dynamics ◽

Price Trends ◽

Competitive Electricity Markets

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The emerging threat of artificial intelligence on competition in liberalized electricity markets: A deep Q-network approach

10.21203/rs.3.rs-903041/v1 ◽

2021 ◽

Author(s):

Danial Esmaeili Aliabadi ◽

Katrina Chan

Keyword(s):

Electricity Markets ◽

Information Disclosure ◽

End Users ◽

Influential Factors ◽

Bidding Strategies ◽

Q Learning ◽

Development Goals ◽

Available Information ◽

The Impact

Abstract BackgroundAccording to sustainable development goals (SDGs), societies should have access to affordable, reliable, and sustainable energy. Deregulated electricity markets have been established to provide affordable electricity for end-users through advertising competition. Although these liberalized markets are expected to serve this purpose, they are far from perfect and are prone to threats, such as collusion. Tacit collusion is a condition, in which power generating companies (GenCos) disrupt the competition by exploiting their market power. MethodsIn this manuscript, a novel deep Q-network (DQN) model is developed, which GenCos can use to determine the bidding strategies to maximize average long-term payoffs using available information. In the presence of collusive equilibria, the results are compared with a conventional Q-learning model that solely relies on past outcomes. With that, this manuscript aims to investigate the impact of emerging DQN models on the establishment of collusive equilibrium in markets with repetitive interactions among players. Results and ConclusionsThe outcomes show that GenCos may be able to collude unintentionally while trying to ameliorate long-term profits. Collusive strategies can lead to exorbitant electric bills for end-users, which is one of the influential factors in energy poverty. Thus, policymakers and market designers should be vigilant regarding the combined effect of information disclosure and autonomous pricing, as new models exploit information more effectively.

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Wind Power Long-Term Scenario Generation Considering Spatial-Temporal Dependencies in Coupled Electricity Markets

Energies ◽

10.3390/en13133427 ◽

2020 ◽

Vol 13 (13) ◽

pp. 3427 ◽

Cited By ~ 2

Author(s):

Geovanny Marulanda ◽

Antonio Bello ◽

Jenny Cifuentes ◽

Javier Reneses

Keyword(s):

Power Generation ◽

Wind Power ◽

Time Scales ◽

Electricity Markets ◽

Distribution Functions ◽

Wind Power Generation ◽

Environmental Benefits ◽

Different Time Scales ◽

Temporal Dependencies

Wind power has been increasing its participation in electricity markets in many countries around the world. Due to its economical and environmental benefits, wind power generation is one of the most powerful technologies to deal with global warming and climate change. However, as wind power grows, uncertainty in power supply increases due to wind intermittence. In this context, accurate wind power scenarios are needed to guide decision-making in power systems. In this paper, a novel methodology to generate realistic wind power scenarios for the long term is proposed. Unlike most of the literature that tackles this problem, this paper is focused on the generation of realistic wind power production scenarios in the long term. Moreover, spatial-temporal dependencies in multi-area markets have been considered. The results show that capturing the dependencies at the monthly level could improve the quality of scenarios at different time scales. In addition, an evaluation at different time scales is needed to select the best approach in terms of the distribution functions of the generated scenarios. To evaluate the proposed methodology, several tests have been made using real data of wind power generation for Spain, Portugal and France.

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Different Approaches Towards Electricity Transmission Expansion

Review of Network Economics ◽

10.2202/1446-9022.1028 ◽

2003 ◽

Vol 2 (3) ◽

Cited By ~ 42

Author(s):

Juan Rosellón

Keyword(s):

Strategic Behavior ◽

Social Cost ◽

Transmission Network ◽

Electricity Transmission ◽

Transmission Expansion ◽

Independent System Operator ◽

System Operator ◽

Transmission Rights ◽

Intense Debate

There is an intense debate regarding the best way to attract investment for the long-term expansion of an electricity transmission network. We study three hypotheses: the long-term financialtransmission- right hypothesis; the incentive-regulation hypothesis; and the market-power hypothesis. The first approach derives optimal transmission expansion through auctions of longterm financial transmission rights by an independent system operator. The second provides a Transco with incentives to expand the network by making it face the entire social cost of congestion. The third approach defines optimal transmission expansion according to the strategic behavior of generators. This paper discusses the analytical and practical strengths and weaknesses of each approach.

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