scholarly journals Modelling Consciousness within Mental Monism: An Automata-Theoretic Approach

Entropy ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 22 (6) ◽  
pp. 698
Author(s):  
Peter B. Lloyd

Models of consciousness are usually developed within physical monist or dualistic frameworks, in which the structure and dynamics of the mind are derived from the workings of the physical brain. Little attention has been given to modelling consciousness within a mental monist framework, deriving the structure and dynamics of the mental world from primitive mental constituents only—with no neural substrate. Mental monism is gaining attention as a candidate solution to Chalmers’ Hard Problem on philosophical grounds, and it is therefore timely to examine possible formal models of consciousness within it. Here, I argue that the austere ontology of mental monism places certain constraints on possible models of consciousness, and propose a minimal set of hypotheses that a model of consciousness (within mental monism) should respect. From those hypotheses, it would be possible to construct many formal models that permit universal computation in the mental world, through cellular automata. We need further hypotheses to define transition rules for particular models, and I propose a transition rule with the unusual property of deep copying in the time dimension.

Author(s):  
Peter Lloyd

Models of consciousness are usually developed within physical monist or dualistic frameworks, in which the structure and dynamics of the mind derive from the workings of the physical world (in particular, the brain). Little attention has been given to modeling within a mental monist framework, deriving the structure and dynamics of the mental world from primitive mental constituents only. Mental monism is gaining attention as a candidate solution to Chalmers’ Hard Problem, and it is therefore timely to examine possible formal models of consciousness within it. Here, we propose a minimal set of hypotheses that any credible model of consciousness (within mental monism) should respect. From those hypotheses, it is feasible to construct many formal models that permit universal computation in the mental world, through cellular automata. We need further hypotheses to define transition rules for particular models, and we propose a transition rule with the unusual property of deep copying in the time dimension. In conclusion, we hope to dispel the notion that mental monism requires a deus ex machina, by showing that a parsimonious set of assumptions can yield a naturalistic and computationally potent mental world.


Author(s):  
Anastasia O. Shabalina ◽  

The article considers the main arguments against the neurobiological theory of consciousness from the point of view of the enactivist approach within the philosophy of mind. The neurobiological theory of consciousness, which reduces consciousness to neural activity, is currently the dominant approach to the mind-body problem. The neurobiological theory emerged as a result of advances in research on the phenomena of consciousness and through the development of technologies for visualizing the internal processes of mind. However, at the very heart of this theory, there is a number of logical contradictions. The non-reductive enactivist approach to consciousness, introduced in this article, contributes to the existing argumentation against the reduction of consciousness to neural processes with remonstrations that take into account the modern neuroscientific data. The article analyzes the argumentation of the sensorimotor enactivism developed by A. Noe and offers the account of the teleosemantic approach to the concept of information provided by R. Cao. The key problems of the neurobiological theory of consciousness are highlighted, and the objections emerging within the framework of the enactivist approach are analyzed. Since the main concepts on which the neural theory is based are the concepts of neural substrate, cognition as representation, and information as a unit of cognition, the author of the article presents three key enactivist ideas that oppose them. First, the enactivist concept of cognition as action allows us to consider the first-person experience as a mode of action, and not as a state of the brain substrate. Second, the article deals with the “explanatory externalism” argument proposed by Noe, who refutes the image of cognition as a representation in the brain. Finally, in order to critically revise the concept of information as a unit of cognition, the author analyzes Cao’s idea, which represents a teleosemantic approach, but is in line with the general enactivist argumentation. Cao shows that the application of the concept “information” to neural processes is problematic: no naturalized information is found in the brain as a physical substrate. A critical revision of beliefs associated with the neural theory of consciousness leads us to recognize that there are not enough grounds for reducing consciousness to processes that take place in the brain. That is why Noe calls expectations that the visualization of processes taking place in the brain with the help of the modern equipment will be able to depict the experience of consciousness the “new phrenology”, thus indicating the naive character of neural reduction. The article concludes that natural science methods are insufficient for the study of consciousness.


2007 ◽  
Vol 17 (04) ◽  
pp. 349-361
Author(s):  
SANTIAGO GARCIA CARBAJAL

This paper describes our research on using Genetic Programming to obtain transition rules for Cellular Automata, which are one type of massively parallel computing system. Our purpose is to determine the existence of a limit of chaos for three dimensional Cellular Automata, empirically demonstrated for the two dimensional case. To do so, we must study statistical properties of 3D Cellular Automata over long simulation periods. When dealing with big three dimensional meshes, applying the transition rule to the whole structure can become a extremely slow task. In this work we decompose the Automata into pieces and use OpenMp to parallelize the process. Results show that using a decomposition procedure, and distributing the mesh between a set of processors, 3D Cellular Automata can be studied without having long execution times.


Author(s):  
Hanz Richter ◽  
Rachel E. Maynard

This paper discusses modeling approaches for mechanical systems which may be driven from more than one source of power and which include unidirectional coupling elements. These systems arise in various settings, including heavy-lift helicopters and hybrid automobiles. In this paper, two kinds of mathematical model are examined for the free-wheeling clutch, a key element in these systems. It is shown that it is not possible to define transition rules between coupled and decoupled states using only relative speed or only torque if idealized models are used. A model involving a mixed torque-velocity transition rule is shown to capture the essential switching behavior. By using the bond graph formalism, the inclusion of realistic continuous effects such as inertia and friction becomes simple by modular cascading. A simplified two-driver hybrid dynamical model is constructed and characterized using the mixed model and the concept of clutch line is introduced to characterize the dynamic behavior. This work serves as a basis for subsequent controllability studies and selection of feedback control strategies.


1989 ◽  
Vol 64 (3_suppl) ◽  
pp. 1091-1097 ◽  
Author(s):  
Barry Silverstein

Freud's views on the mind-body question are reviewed. It is argued that, throughout his career, Freud was consistent in adopting a dualistic-interactionist view of the mind-body relationship. This position was the prerequisite for his development of a psychology which sought the determinants of consciousness in dynamic, unconscious mental processes, without concern for correlations with an underlying neural substrate.


2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Lianwei Li ◽  
Zhanshan Sam Ma

Abstract Background: The structure and dynamics of breast tissue microbiomes can have far-reaching influences on women’s health, particularly on breast tumor development. However, there is currently little understanding on the ecological processes that shape the structure and dynamics of breast tissue microbiomes.Methods: Here we fill the gap by applying three metacommunity models for investigating the community assembly and diversity maintenance, including Sloan near neutral model, Harris et al. multisite neutral and Tang & Zhou niche-neutral hybrid models to reanalyze the 16s-rRNA sequencing datasets of 23 healthy, 12 benign tumor, and 33 malignant tumor tissue samples. To remedy the practical difficulty in collecting tissue microbiome samples, we adopted a sophisticated random re-sampling (up to 1000 times) scheme in applying the three metacommunity models for analyzing the patterns in the breast tissue microbiomes. Results: First, we found that, at the community/metacommunity levels, the mechanisms of microbiome assembly and diversity maintenance of breast tissue microbiomes were predominantly driven by stochastic drifts of bacteria demography (division, death and dispersal of bacterial cells), whereas the deterministic selection forces such as tumor progression were insignificant. However, at species level, on average, approximately 10% and 5% species were above (positively-selected) and below (negatively-selected) neutral, respectively. Furthermore, malignant tumor may raise the positively selected species up to 17%. Second, malignant tumor appears to inhibit microbial dispersal as evidenced by lowered migration rates, compared with the migration in normal and benign tumor tissues.Conclusions: The mechanisms of microbiome assembly and diversity maintenance of breast tissue microbiomes were predominantly driven by stochastic drifts, and malignant tumor may inhibit microbial dispersal. These theoretic findings can be inspirational for further investigating the relationships between tissue microbiomes and breast tumor progression/development.


2013 ◽  
Vol 4 (1) ◽  
pp. 122-129
Author(s):  
Sandra Wilson

The theory of the organisation-in-the-mind suggests that organisations live within us, are a part of our identity and are bound up with our inner emotional life.  Connecting this theory to Berne’s thinking on the structure and dynamics of organisations and groups it is possible through interpretative phenomenological analysis to conduct research into how what we hold in the unconscious impacts on professional relationships and performance.  The outcome from research in this area is intended to highlight potential areas for development of competence in professional coaches.


2014 ◽  
Vol 10 (1) ◽  
pp. 1762-1766
Author(s):  
Yakup DURMAZ ◽  
Filiz CAYIRAGASI ◽  
Zafer KILIC

Trademark, in todays conditions where competitive environment is getting harder and harder, is not only a name; but also, as products ID, a tool for business which is constituted in the mind of customer and guides the customer in the process of buying. Today, trademark does not seem to be a tool for trading as different from goods and service, and is categorized in the long-term asset. Trademark Strategies are really important for business firms that have large product range in the issue of sustainable competitive advantage pushed up by the trademark. In this respect, in this study firstly information about trademark and sproperties of trademark were given; and then the types of trademark and trademark strategies were handled.  


Author(s):  
Steven Kim

The resolution of a difficult task often follows a series of identifiable steps. Students of creativity have often characterized the process as a four-stage phenomenon: • Preparation: Orientation to the problem and definition of the task. • Incubation: A period of aridity or immersion in unrelated activities. • Illumination: A sudden spark of insight and the recognition of a candidate solution. • Resolution: Assessment of the candidate solution and its implementation. The preparatory phase of a difficult task involves a careful consideration of the underlying problem and a clear specification of the goals. Too often we tackle tasks without an adequate definition of the true problem, and discover too late that the solution resolves an irrelevant problem. A distinguishing feature of challenging tasks lies in their resistance to attack, and solutions do not always spring from a single session of wrestling with the problem. Often difficult issues are resolved, whether gradually or suddenly, over spaced efforts interrupted by unrelated activities. Some students of creativity take the view that incubation is a period of “intermission” in which the problem submerges into the subconscious. The lack of strict conventions in this netherworld allows for the juxtaposition of new objects in novel and even bizarre combinations. The resulting ideas possess the novelty that is an essential ingredient of a creative solution. Other writers take the view that incubation is nothing more than a period of relaxation or recuperation in which a tired mind regains its energies. Still others would claim that the incubation phase is merely a stretch of time that allows the mind to assimilate other stimuli from the environment, whether at the conscious or subconscious level. Whatever the true role of incubation, the fact remains that many of our difficult problems are resolved only after several sessions of conscious effort separated by seemingly unrelated activities. A candidate solution to a difficult problem often occurs suddenly, just like the elementary ideas that constitute them. Such preliminary solutions or “insights,” however, can be misleading or even incorrect. For this reason, the ideas must be properly evaluated.


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