scholarly journals From Key Encapsulation to Authenticated Group Key Establishment—A Compiler for Post-Quantum Primitives †

Entropy ◽  
2019 ◽  
Vol 21 (12) ◽  
pp. 1183 ◽  
Author(s):  
Edoardo Persichetti ◽  
Rainer Steinwandt ◽  
Adriana Suárez Corona

Assuming the availability of an existentially unforgeable signature scheme and an (IND- CCA secure) key encapsulation mechanism, we present a generic construction for group key establishment. The construction is designed with existing proposals for post-quantum cryptography in mind. Applied with such existing proposals and assuming their security, we obtain a quantum-safe three-round protocol for authenticated group key establishment that requires only one signature per protocol participant.

2016 ◽  
Vol 363 ◽  
pp. 1-7
Author(s):  
María Isabel González Vasco ◽  
Angel L. Pérez del Pozo ◽  
Adriana Suárez Corona

Symmetry ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 13 (2) ◽  
pp. 332
Author(s):  
Jorge Martínez Carracedo ◽  
Adriana Suárez Corona

In this paper, we analyze the security of a group key establishment scheme proposed by López-Ramos et al. This proposal aims at allowing a group of users to agree on a common key. We present several attacks against the security of the proposed protocol. In particular, an active attack is presented, and it is also proved that the protocol does not provide forward secrecy.


2018 ◽  
Vol 2018 ◽  
pp. 1-13
Author(s):  
Youngjoo An ◽  
Hyang-Sook Lee ◽  
Juhee Lee ◽  
Seongan Lim

The notion of key substitution security on digital signatures in the multiuser setting has been proposed by Menezes and Smart in 2004. Along with the unforgeability of signature, the key substitution security is very important since it is a critical requirement for the nonrepudiation and the authentication of the signature. Lattice-based signature is a promising candidate for post-quantum cryptography, and the unforgeability of each scheme has been relatively well studied. In this paper, we present key substitution attacks on BLISS, Lyubashevsky’s signature scheme, and GPV and thus show that these signature schemes do not provide nonrepudiation. We also suggest how to avoid key substitution attack on these schemes.


Symmetry ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 12 (2) ◽  
pp. 197
Author(s):  
Jens-Matthias Bohli ◽  
María I. González Vasco ◽  
Rainer Steinwandt

A group key establishment protocol is presented and proven secure in the common reference string mode. The protocol builds on a group-theoretic assumption, and a concrete example can be obtained with a decision Diffie–Hellman assumption. The protocol is derived from a two-party solution by means of a protocol compiler presented by Abdalla et al. at TCC 2007, evidencing the possibility of meaningfully integrating cryptographic and group-theoretic tools in cryptographic protocol design. This compiler uses a standard ring configuration, where all users behave symmetrically, exchanging keys with their left and right neighbor, which are later combined to yield a shared group key.


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