scholarly journals The Complexity Entropy Analysis of a Supply Chain System Considering Recovery Rate and Channel Service

Entropy ◽  
2019 ◽  
Vol 21 (7) ◽  
pp. 659 ◽  
Author(s):  
Li ◽  
Shi ◽  
Deng ◽  
Huang
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Recovery Rate ◽  
Closed Loop ◽  
Stackelberg Game ◽  
Dynamic State ◽  
Game Model ◽  
Waste Products ◽  
Service Value ◽  
Dual Channel ◽  
The Stability

In this paper, we study a dual-channel closed-loop supply chain in which a manufacturer considers the market waste products recovery and remanufacture, and a retailer considers provide services to customers. We build a Stackelberg game model and a centralized game model in a static and dynamic state, respectively, and analyze the two dynamic models by mathematical analysis and explore the stability and entropy of the two models using bifurcation, the basin of attraction, chaotic attractors, and so on. The influences of service level and profit distribution rate on the system’s profit are discussed. The theoretical results show that higher price adjustment speed will lead to the system lose stability with a larger entropy value. In the Stackelberg game model, the stability of the system increases as the service value and the recovery rate increases; in the centralized model, the stability of the system decreases with the increase of the service value and increases with the recovery rate increases. When the Stackelberg game model is in a stable state, the manufacturer’s profit increases first and then decreases, and the retailer’s profit first decreases and then increases as the service value of the retailer increases. The research will serve as good guidance for both the manufacturer and retailer in dual-channel closed-loop supply chains to improve decision making.

scholarly journals Government Reward-Penalty Mechanism in Dual-Channel Closed-Loop Supply Chain

2020 ◽  
Vol 12 (20) ◽  
pp. 8602
Author(s):  
Haitao Chen ◽  
Zhaohui Dong ◽  
Gendao Li
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Closed Loop ◽  
Stackelberg Game ◽  
Supply Chain System ◽  
Closed Loop Supply Chain ◽  
Collection Rate ◽  
Dual Channel ◽  
The Government ◽  
The Stability ◽  
Dual Channel Supply Chain

This study establishs a dual channel closed-loop supply chain (CLSC) model under a government–penalty mechanism (RPM) consisting a dual-channel manufacturer, a retailer, and the government. We consider a Stackelberg game between the manufacturer and the retailer, and the government rewards or punishes manufacturers on the basis of the collection rate of used products. This paper analyzes the influence of government RPM on the optimal decisions, the relationship between the two sales channels, and the total social welfare of the supply chain system. We find that the government RPM can improve the stability of the dual-channel supply chain and the collection rate of the used products. Moreover, we are the first to provide a method of deriving the optimal government RPM through a numerical example.

scholarly journals Pricing Decisions of a Dual-Channel Closed-Loop Supply Chain under Uncertain Demand of Indirect Channel

2016 ◽  
Vol 2016 ◽  
pp. 1-13 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jie Gao ◽  
Xiong Wang ◽  
Qiuling Yang ◽  
Qin Zhong
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Closed Loop ◽  
Stackelberg Game ◽  
Uncertain Demand ◽  
Direct Channel ◽  
Closed Loop Supply Chain ◽  
Pricing Decisions ◽  
Dual Channel ◽  
Decentralized Decision Making ◽  
The Impact

The dual-channel closed-loop supply chain (CLSC) which is composed of one manufacturer and one retailer under uncertain demand of an indirect channel is constructed. In this paper, we establish three pricing models under decentralized decision making, namely, the Nash game between the manufacturer and the retailer, the manufacturer-Stackelberg game, and the retailer-Stackelberg game, to investigate pricing decisions of the CLSC in which the manufacturer uses the direct channel and indirect channel to sell products and entrusts the retailer to collect the used products. We numerically analyze the impact of customer acceptance of the direct channel (θ) on pricing decisions and excepted profits of the CLSC. The results show that when the variableθchanges in a certain range, the wholesale price, retail price, and expected profits of the retailer all decrease whenθincreases, while the direct online sales price and manufacturer’s expected profits in the retailer-Stackelberg game all increase whenθincreases. However, the optimal recycling transfer price and optimal acquisition price of used product are unaffected byθ.

scholarly journals Dynamic Pricing Game in a Dual-channel Closed-loop Supply Chain with Heterogeneous Players and Delay Decision

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Yuhao Zhang ◽  
Tao Zhang
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Nash Equilibrium ◽  
Dynamic Pricing ◽  
Closed Loop ◽  
Stackelberg Game ◽  
Consumer Preference ◽  
Direct Channel ◽  
Closed Loop Supply Chain ◽  
Dual Channel ◽  
Delay Decision

Abstract In this paper, we study a dual-channel closed-loop supply chain(CLSC), where the manufacturer wholesales the new product through the traditional retail channel and distributes the remanufactured product via a direct channel established by himself. We focus on developing two dynamic Stackelberg game models under the assumption of the retailer is an adaptive agent and the manufacturer is a bounded rational player with non-delay and delay decisions. The existence and locally asymptotic stability of Nash equilibrium is investigated, and also the complex dynamics of each model is illustrated including period-doubling bifurcation, Neimark-Sacker bifurcation, strange attractor and chaotic phenomena. Numerical simulations are conducted to examine the impacts of key parameters on the complex behaviors of the long-run dynamic Stackelberg game and the performance of chain members under various scenarios. The results reveal that the excessively high value of the price adjustment speed of the manufacturer, the consumer discount perception for the remanufactured product as well as the consumer preference degree to the direct channel have adestabilization effect on the Nash equilibrium. Besides, the delay decision adopted by manufacturer no matter in the traditional or direct channel does not always necessarily make the system more stable, but the appropriately delay weights can expand the stability domain of the system. Moreover, the manufacturer would suffer a significant profit loss while the retailer can capture more profits when the dual-channel CLSC system falls into periodic cycles and chaos motions. At last, the variable feedback control method is utilized to eliminate the delayed system chaos.

scholarly journals Complexity and Entropy Analysis of a Multi-Channel Supply Chain Considering Channel Cooperation and Service

Entropy ◽  
2018 ◽  
Vol 20 (12) ◽  
pp. 970 ◽  
Author(s):  
Qiuxiang Li ◽  
Xingli Chen ◽  
Yimin Huang
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Stackelberg Game ◽  
Equilibrium Points ◽  
Service Level ◽  
Stability Domain ◽  
Largest Lyapunov Exponent ◽  
Game Model ◽  
Nash Game ◽  
Profit Distribution ◽  
The Stability

In this paper, based on the background of channel cooperation and service of the supply chain, this paper constructs a Nash game model and a Stackeberg game model in the multi-channel supply chain considering an online-to-store channel (OSC). Based on maximizing the profits and the bounded rationality expectation rule (BRE), this paper builds a dynamic game model, respectively, and analyzes the stability of the equilibrium points by mathematical analysis and explores the influences of parameters on stability domain and entropy of the system by using bifurcation diagram, the entropy diagram, the largest Lyapunov exponent and the chaotic attractor etc. Besides, the influences of service level and profit distribution rate on system’s profit are discussed. The theoretical results show that the greater the service level and profit distribution rate are, the smaller the stability domain of the system is; the system will go into chaotic state and the system’s entropy will increase when operators adjust her/his price decision quickly; when the manufacturer or the retailer keeps service level in the appropriate value which is conducive to maximizing her/his profit; the manufacturer should carefully set the service level of OSC to ensure the system’s profit; in Nash game model, the stability of the system weakens than that in Stackelberg game model. Furthermore, this paper puts forward some suggestions to help the manufacturer and retailer in multi-channel supply chain to do the better decision.

scholarly journals The value of information sharing in a dual-channel closed-loop supply chain

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Yanting Huang ◽  
Benrong Zheng ◽  
Zongjun Wang
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Information Sharing ◽  
Private Information ◽  
Value Of Information ◽  
Closed Loop ◽  
Stackelberg Game ◽  
Wholesale Price ◽  
Closed Loop Supply Chain ◽  
Dual Channel ◽  
Model C

This paper considers a dual-channel closed-loop supply chain consisting of a manufacturer, a retailer and a collector in which the retailer possesses private demand information and determines whether to share his private information with other chain members. Specifically, we develop four information sharing models, namely no information sharing (Model C-R), the retailer sharing information with the manufacturer (Model C-R-M), the retailer revealing information to the collector (Model C-R-C), and the retailer disclosing information to both the manufacturer and the collector (Model C-R-T). We adopt the Stackelberg game to acquire the equilibrium strategies and examine the value of information sharing on chain members’ decisions. We find that, chain members will set the largest wholesale price, retail prices of direct and indirect channels when the retailer only shares information with the manufacturer and the highest return rate can be obtained in the case of the retailer only revealing information to the collector. We can also find that, information sharing is profitable to the manufacturer and the collector, while is detrimental to the retailer. The manufacturer, the collector and the retailer can reach the largest profits in Model C-R-T, Model C-R-C and Model C-R-M, respectively.

scholarly journals To be raised up or kicked out? Insights for the recycler in closed-loop supply chain with the regulation of government

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Xinxin Xu ◽  
Qunli Wu
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Social Welfare ◽  
Recovery Rate ◽  
Closed Loop ◽  
Sensitivity Analyses ◽  
Closed Loop Supply Chain ◽  
Waste Products ◽  
The Government ◽  
Regulation Model ◽  
Rate Threshold

In order to improve the recovery rate of waste products and maximize the social welfare, this paper investigates the problem of government setting a recovery rate threshold for the recycler in the closed-loop supply chain (CLSC) with the information asymmetry. By establishing the government incentive regulation model, the government can disclose the true recovery cost of the recycler and guide the recycler to make an reasonable effort. In this study, our model obtains the best recovery rate threshold for the recycler from the perspective of maximizing social welfare. Then, we conduct some sensitivity analyses and explore the impacts of related factors on the strategies-making of government and supply chain players. The results of the study indicates that the recovery rate threshold set not only depends on the operation efficiency of the recycler, it also affected by the consumers behavior and the production efficiency of manufacturer. The government should not pursue a high recovery rate blindly, more attention should be paid to control the cost of effort made by the recycler. With the increasing of the negative utility for the recycler to make effort, the government will improve the recovery threshold, otherwise, the threshold will decrease. The results facilitate scientific incentive mechanism development, and provide a reference for promoting CLSC operations.

scholarly journals The Impacts of Fairness Concern and Different Business Objectives on the Complexity of Dual-Channel Value Chains

Complexity ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 2020 ◽  
pp. 1-15 ◽  
Author(s):  
Qiuxiang Li ◽  
Yuhao Zhang ◽  
Yimin Huang
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Market Share ◽  
Stackelberg Game ◽  
Stable State ◽  
Game Model ◽  
Chaotic State ◽  
Dual Channel ◽  
Fairness Concern ◽  
High Level ◽  
Dual Channel Supply Chain

This paper considers a Stackelberg game model in a dual-channel supply chain, which is composed of a manufacturer and a retailer. The manufacturer and retailer consider fairness concern in the market competition, and the manufacturer takes market share and profit as his/her business objectives. The entropy complexity and dynamic characteristic of the dual-channel system are analyzed through mathematical analysis and numerical simulation, such as local stability, bifurcation, entropy, and chaos. The results show that, with the increase of price adjustment speed, the dual-channel supply chain is more complex and falls into a chaotic state in which system entropy increases; the stability of the dual-channel supply chain will be robust with the increase of weight of market share and weaken with the increase of the fairness concern level of the manufacturer and retailer. The high level of fairness concern of the manufacturer and retailer is always disadvantageous to the leading manufacturer but not always bad for the follower retailer. The performance of the dual-channel supply chain is improved with a high level of the manufacturer’s fairness concern and reduced with a high level of the retailer’s fairness concern. We also find the retailer will gain more profits in the chaotic state than the stable state in the Stackelberg game model. The variable feedback control method is applied to control the chaos of the dual-channel supply chain, and choosing appropriate control parameters can make the dual-channel supply chain system return to the stable state from the chaotic state, or delay the system to enter the bifurcation state. The research results can provide a guideline for enterprise decision-making.

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