scholarly journals Exclusion and Underdetermined Qualia

Entropy ◽  
2019 ◽  
Vol 21 (4) ◽  
pp. 405 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kyumin Moon

Integrated information theory (IIT) asserts that both the level and the quality of consciousness can be explained by the ability of physical systems to integrate information. Although the scientific content and empirical prospects of IIT have attracted interest, this paper focuses on another aspect of IIT, its unique theoretical structure, which relates the phenomenological axioms with the ontological postulates. In particular, the relationship between the exclusion axiom and the exclusion postulate is unclear. Moreover, the exclusion postulate leads to a serious problem in IIT: the quale underdetermination problem. Therefore, in this paper, I will explore answers to the following three questions: (1) how does the exclusion axiom lead to the exclusion postulate? (2) How does the exclusion postulate cause the qualia underdetermination problem? (3) Is there a solution to this problem? I will provide proposals and arguments for each question. If successful, IIT can be confirmed with respect to, not only its theoretical foundation, but also its practical application.

2021 ◽  
Vol 28 (11) ◽  
pp. 31-53
Author(s):  
James C. Blackmon

Integrated information theory (IIT) identifies consciousness with having a maximum amount of integrated information. But a thing's having the maximum amount of anything cannot be intrinsic to it, for that depends on how that thing compares to certain other things. IIT's consciousness, then, is not intrinsic. A mereological argument elaborates this consequence: IIT implies that one physical system can be conscious while a physical duplicate of it is not conscious. Thus, by a common and reasonable conception of intrinsicality, IIT's consciousness is not intrinsic. It is then argued that to avoid the implication that consciousness is not intrinsic, IIT must abandon its exclusion postulate, which prohibits overlapping conscious systems. Indeed, theories of consciousness that attribute consciousness to physical systems should embrace the view that some conscious systems overlap. A discussion of the admittedly counterintuitive nature of this solution, along with some medical and neuroscientific realities that would seem to support it, is included.


2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Siddharth Sharma

In this paper I am going to give a mathematical theory of Integrated Information Theory, using entropy as measure of information and hence, as the information distance function. Also, we will consider a set, whose open subsets are mechanisms and topology is the system, we use these two modification in the structure of Integrated Information Theory [2] and Quantum Integrated Information theory [3], to define Entropic Integrated Information Theory, we will also justify our claims to use why entropy should be use as a measure of cause/effect information and as information distance function using [1]. We will also see the relationship of entanglement with concept and conceptual information. This paper is an attempt to binds consciousness, quantum information, entanglement and quantum mechanics together.


Author(s):  
Francis Fallon

This chapter aims to evaluate Integrated Information Theory's claims concerning Artificial Consciousness. Integrated Information Theory (IIT) works from premises that claim that certain properties, such as unity, are essential to consciousness, to conclusions regarding the constraints upon physical systems that could realize consciousness. Among these conclusions is the claim that feed-forward systems, and systems that are not largely reentrant, necessarily will fail to generate consciousness (but may simulate it). This chapter will discuss the premises of IIT, which themselves are highly controversial, and will also address IIT's related rejection of functionalism. This analysis will argue that IIT has failed to established good grounds for these positions, and that convincing alternatives remain available. This, in turn, implies that the constraints upon Artificial Consciousness are more generous than IIT would have them be.


2021 ◽  
Vol 28 (9) ◽  
pp. 65-75
Author(s):  
C. koch

Panpsychism shares many intuitions with integrated information theory (IIT), in particular that consciousness is an intrinsic fundamental property of reality, is graded, and can be found in small amounts in simple physical systems. Unlike panpsychism, however, IIT clearly articulates which systems are conscious and which ones are not (resolving panpsychism's combination problem) and why consciousness can be adaptive. The systemic weakness of panpsychism, or any other -ism, is that they fail to offer a protracted conceptual, let alone empirical, research programme that yields novel insights or proposes new experiments. Without those, progress on the mindâ–“body problem will not occur.


2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Georg Northoff ◽  
Naotsugu Tsuchiya ◽  
Hayato Saigo

AbstractConsciousness is a central issue in cognitive neuroscience. To explain the relationship between consciousness and its neural correlates, various theories have been proposed. We still lack a formal framework that can address the nature of the relationship between consciousness and its physical substrates though. Here, we provide a novel mathematical framework of Category Theory (CT), in which we can define and study the “sameness” between “different” domains of phenomena such as consciousness and its neural substrates. CT was designed and developed to deal with the “relationships” between various domains of phenomena. We introduce three concepts of CT including (i) category; (ii) inclusion functor and expansion functor; and (iii) natural transformation between the functors. Each of these mathematical concepts is related to specific features in the neural correlates of consciousness (NCC). In this novel framework, we will examine two of the major theories of consciousness: integrated information theory (IIT) of consciousness and temporo-spatial theory of consciousness (TTC). These theories concern the structural relationships among structures of physical substrates and subjective experiences. The three CT-based concepts, introduced in this paper, unravel some basic issues in our search for the NCC; while addressing the same questions, we show that IIT and TTC provide different albeit complementary answers. Importantly, our account suggests that we need to go beyond a traditional concept of NCC including both content-specific and full NCC. We need to shift our focus from the relationship between “one” neuronal and “one” phenomenal state to the relationship between a structure of neural states and a structure of phenomenal states. We conclude that CT unravels and highlights basic questions about the NCC in general which needs to be met and addressed by any future neuroscientific theory of consciousness.Author summaryNeuroscience has made considerable progress in uncovering the neural correlates of consciousness (NCC). At the same time, recent studies demonstrated the complexity of the neuronal mechanisms underlying consciousness. To make further progress in the neuroscience of consciousness, we need proper mathematical formalization of the neuronal mechanisms potentially underlying consciousness. Providing a first tentative attempt, our paper addresses both by (i) pointing out the specific problems of and proposing a new approach to go beyond the traditional approach of the neural correlates of consciousness, and (ii) by recruiting a recently popular mathematical formalization, category theory (CT). With CT, we provide mathematical formalization of the broader neural correlates of consciousness by its application to two of the major theories, integrated information theory (IIT) and temporo-spatial theory of consciousness (TTC). Together, our CT-based mathematical formalization of the neural correlates of consciousness including its specification in the terms of IIT and TTC allows to go beyond the current concept of NCC in both mathematical and neural terms.


PROTOPLASMA ◽  
2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Anthony Trewavas

AbstractLacking an anatomical brain/nervous system, it is assumed plants are not conscious. The biological function of consciousness is an input to behaviour; it is adaptive (subject to selection) and based on information. Complex language makes human consciousness unique. Consciousness is equated to awareness. All organisms are aware of their surroundings, modifying their behaviour to improve survival. Awareness requires assessment too. The mechanisms of animal assessment are neural while molecular and electrical in plants. Awareness of plants being also consciousness may resolve controversy. The integrated information theory (IIT), a leading theory of consciousness, is also blind to brains, nerves and synapses. The integrated information theory indicates plant awareness involves information of two kinds: (1) communicative, extrinsic information as a result of the perception of environmental changes and (2) integrated intrinsic information located in the shoot and root meristems and possibly cambium. The combination of information constructs an information nexus in the meristems leading to assessment and behaviour. The interpretation of integrated information in meristems probably involves the complex networks built around [Ca2+]i that also enable plant learning, memory and intelligent activities. A mature plant contains a large number of conjoined, conscious or aware, meristems possibly unique in the living kingdom.


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