scholarly journals Elimination of a Second-Law-Attack, and All Cable-Resistance-Based Attacks, in the Kirchhoff-Law-Johnson-Noise (KLJN) Secure Key Exchange System

Entropy ◽  
2014 ◽  
Vol 16 (10) ◽  
pp. 5223-5231 ◽  
Author(s):  
Laszlo Kish ◽  
Claes-Göran Granqvist
Keyword(s):  
Key Exchange ◽  
Second Law ◽  
Johnson Noise ◽  
Exchange System

scholarly journals Comments on “A New Transient Attack on the Kish Key Distribution System”

2016 ◽  
Vol 23 (3) ◽  
pp. 321-331 ◽  
Author(s):  
Laszlo B. Kish ◽  
Claes G. Granqvist
Keyword(s):  
Distribution System ◽  
Key Distribution ◽  
Key Exchange ◽  
Security Measures ◽  
Johnson Noise ◽  
Exchange System ◽  
Classical Physics ◽  
The One

Abstract A recent IEEE Access Paper by Gunn, Allison and Abbott (GAA) proposed a new transient attack against the Kirchhoff-law-Johnson-noise (KLJN) secure key exchange system. The attack is valid, but it is easy to build a defense for the KLJN system. Here we note that GAA’s paper contains several invalid statements regarding security measures and the continuity of functions in classical physics. These deficiencies are clarified in our present paper, wherein we also emphasize that a new version of the KLJN system is immune against all existing attacks, including the one by GAA.

scholarly journals Analysis of an Attenuator Artifact in an Experimental Attack by Gunn–Allison–Abbott Against the Kirchhoff-Law–Johnson-Noise (KLJN) Secure Key Exchange System

2014 ◽  
Vol 14 (01) ◽  
pp. 1550011 ◽  
Author(s):  
Laszlo B. Kish ◽  
Zoltan Gingl ◽  
Robert Mingesz ◽  
Gergely Vadai ◽  
Janusz Smulko ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Correlation Time ◽  
Error Probability ◽  
Key Exchange ◽  
Johnson Noise ◽  
Exchange System ◽  
Single Loop ◽  
Design Flaw ◽  
Information Leak

A recent paper by Gunn–Allison–Abbott (GAA) [L. J. Gunn et al., Scientific Reports 4 (2014) 6461] argued that the Kirchhoff-law–Johnson-noise (KLJN) secure key exchange system could experience a severe information leak. Here we refute their results and demonstrate that GAA's arguments ensue from a serious design flaw in their system. Specifically, an attenuator broke the single Kirchhoff-loop into two coupled loops, which is an incorrect operation since the single loop is essential for the security in the KLJN system, and hence GAA's asserted information leak is trivial. Another consequence is that a fully defended KLJN system would not be able to function due to its built-in current-comparison defense against active (invasive) attacks. In this paper we crack GAA's scheme via an elementary current-comparison attack which yields negligible error probability for Eve even without averaging over the correlation time of the noise.

scholarly journals What Kind of Noise Guarantees Security for the Kirchhoff-Law–Johnson-Noise Key Exchange?

2014 ◽  
Vol 13 (03) ◽  
pp. 1450021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Robert Mingesz ◽  
Gergely Vadai ◽  
Zoltan Gingl
Keyword(s):  
Correlation Analysis ◽  
Numerical Simulations ◽  
Normal Distribution ◽  
Key Exchange ◽  
Johnson Noise ◽  
Exchange System ◽  
Selection Of

This paper is a supplement to our recent one about the analysis of the noise properties in the Kirchhoff-law–Johnson-noise (KLJN) secure key exchange system [Gingl and Mingesz, PLOS ONE 9 (2014) e96109, doi: 10.1371/journal.pone.0096109]. Here, we use purely mathematical statistical derivations to prove that only normal distribution with special scaling can guarantee security. Our results are in agreement with earlier physical assumptions [Kish, Phys. Lett. A 352 (2006) 178–182, doi: 10.1016/j.physleta.2005.11.062]. Furthermore, we have carried out numerical simulations to show that the communication is clearly unsecure for improper selection of the noise properties. Protection against attacks using time and correlation analysis is not considered in this paper. Related simulations are available at http://www.noise.inf.u-szeged.hu/Research/kljn/ .

scholarly journals Alternating (AC) Loop Current Attacks Against the KLJN Secure Key Exchange Scheme

2021 ◽  
pp. 2150050
Author(s):  
Mutaz Y. Melhem ◽  
Christiana Chamon ◽  
Shahriar Ferdous ◽  
Laszlo B. Kish
Keyword(s):  
Electromagnetic Interference ◽  
High Frequency ◽  
Practical Importance ◽  
Low Frequency ◽  
Key Exchange ◽  
Power Density Spectrum ◽  
Voltage Source ◽  
Loop Current ◽  
Johnson Noise ◽  
Density Spectrum

Recently, several passive and active attack methods have been proposed against the Kirchhoff–Law–Johnson–Noise (KLJN) secure key exchange scheme by utilizing direct (DC) loop currents. The DC current attacks are relatively easy, but their practical importance is low. On the other hand, parasitic alternating (AC) currents are virtually omnipresent in wire-based systems. Such situations exist due to AC ground loops and electromagnetic interference (EMI). However, utilizing AC currents for attacks is a harder problem. Here, we introduce and demonstrate AC current attacks in various frequency ranges. The attacks exploit a parasitic/periodic AC voltage-source at either Alice’s or Bob’s end. In the low-frequency case, the procedure is the generalized form of the former DC ground-loop-based attack. In the high-frequency case, the power density spectrum of the wire voltage is utilized. The attack is demonstrated in both the low and the high-frequency situations. Defense protocols against the attack are also discussed.

scholarly journals Do Electromagnetic Waves Exist in a Short Cable at Low Frequencies? What Does Physics Say?

2014 ◽  
Vol 13 (02) ◽  
pp. 1450016 ◽  
Author(s):  
Hsien-Pu Chen ◽  
Laszlo B. Kish ◽  
Claes-Göran Granqvist ◽  
Gabor Schmera
Keyword(s):  
Electromagnetic Waves ◽  
Detailed Balance ◽  
Second Law Of Thermodynamics ◽  
Blackbody Radiation ◽  
Second Law ◽  
Johnson Noise ◽  
Low Frequencies ◽  
Equipartition Theorem ◽  
Energy Equipartition ◽  
Simulation Results

We refute a physical model, recently proposed by Gunn, Allison and Abbott (GAA) [ http://arxiv.org/pdf/1402.2709v2.pdf ], to utilize electromagnetic waves for eavesdropping on the Kirchhoff-law–Johnson-noise (KLJN) secure key distribution. Their model, and its theoretical underpinnings, is found to be fundamentally flawed because their assumption of electromagnetic waves violates not only the wave equation but also the second law of thermodynamics, the principle of detailed balance, Boltzmann's energy equipartition theorem, and Planck's formula by implying infinitely strong blackbody radiation. We deduce the correct mathematical model of the GAA scheme, which is based on impedances at the quasi-static limit. Mathematical analysis and simulation results confirm our approach and prove that GAA's experimental interpretation is incorrect too.

Iris Biometrics Based Authentication and Key Exchange System

2011 ◽  
Vol 3 (1) ◽  
pp. 102-108 ◽  
Author(s):  
K. Saraswathi ◽  
B. Jayaram ◽  
R. Balasubramanian
Keyword(s):  
Key Exchange ◽  
Exchange System ◽  
Iris Biometrics
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