scholarly journals Moral Decision Making: From Bentham to Veil of Ignorance via Perspective Taking Accessibility

2021 ◽  
Vol 11 (5) ◽  
pp. 66
Author(s):  
Rose Martin ◽  
Petko Kusev ◽  
Joseph Teal ◽  
Victoria Baranova ◽  
Bruce Rigal
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Perspective Taking ◽  
Moral Decision ◽  
Moral Decision Making ◽  
Veil Of Ignorance ◽  
Self Interest ◽  
Moral Behaviour ◽  
New Type ◽  
The Veil ◽  
Theoretical Proposal

Making morally sensitive decisions and evaluations pervade many human everyday activities. Philosophers, economists, psychologists and behavioural scientists researching such decision-making typically explore the principles, processes and predictors that constitute human moral decision-making. Crucially, very little research has explored the theoretical and methodological development (supported by empirical evidence) of utilitarian theories of moral decision-making. Accordingly, in this critical review article, we invite the reader on a moral journey from Jeremy Bentham’s utilitarianism to the veil of ignorance reasoning, via a recent theoretical proposal emphasising utilitarian moral behaviour—perspective-taking accessibility (PT accessibility). PT accessibility research revealed that providing participants with access to all situational perspectives in moral scenarios, eliminates (previously reported in the literature) inconsistency between their moral judgements and choices. Moreover, in contrast to any previous theoretical and methodological accounts, moral scenarios/tasks with full PT accessibility provide the participants with unbiased even odds (neither risk averse nor risk seeking) and impartiality. We conclude that the proposed by Martin et al. PT Accessibility (a new type of veil of ignorance with even odds that do not trigger self-interest, risk related preferences or decision biases) is necessary in order to measure humans’ prosocial utilitarian behaviour and promote its societal benefits.

Moral-Epistemic Enhancement

2018 ◽  
Vol 83 ◽  
pp. 165-188
Author(s):  
Norbert Paulo
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Perspective Taking ◽  
Moral Epistemology ◽  
Academic Community ◽  
Epistemic Value ◽  
Moral Enhancement ◽  
Moral Decision ◽  
Moral Decision Making ◽  
Deliberative Processes ◽  
Recent Idea

AbstractThe idea of using biomedical means to make people more likely to behave morally may have a certain appeal. However, it is very hard to find two persons – let alone two moral philosophers – who agree on what it means to be moral or to act morally. After discussing some of the proposals for moral enhancements that all ethicists could agree on, I engage more closely with the recent idea of “procedural moral enhancement” that aims at improving deliberative processes instead of particular moral views, motivations, or dispositions. I argue that it is better understood as a contribution to moral epistemology and should thus be labeled “moral-epistemic enhancement”. I then defend perspective-taking as a moral epistemic capacity which can be enhanced by both traditional and non-traditional biomedical means; a capacity which almost always contributes to the epistemic value of moral decision-making. Perspective-taking seems to be an uncontroversial non-trivial capacity for moral decision-making reasonably widely shared by proponents of ethical beliefs within the academic community. The enhancement of this capacity is thus a good candidate for an uncontroversial non-trivial moral enhancement.

scholarly journals TOWARDS AN ETHICAL RECONTEXTUALISATION OF FREUD’S THEORY OF PERSONALITY

Phronimon ◽  
2017 ◽  
Vol 15 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-15
Author(s):  
Mojalefa LJ Koenane
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Human Nature ◽  
Thomas Aquinas ◽  
Moral Decision ◽  
Moral Decision Making ◽  
Moral Behaviour ◽  
Theory Of Human Nature

This paper explores the possibilities of complementing Freud’s theory of human nature with the doctrine of St Thomas Aquinas on the virtue of prudence (phronesis). The paper builds on the foundation laid down by Freud’s theory of the id, the ego, and the superego in relation to moral behaviour. However, it takes a rather different approach to moral decision-making and behaviour, culminating in the author’s creation of the concept of the moral-ego. What is being raised in this paper is a concern that Freud’s theory reduces morality to the dictates of the superego.

Leadership, morality and ethics: Developing a practical model for moral decision-making

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Alfred W. Kaszniak ◽  
Cynda H. Rushton ◽  
Joan Halifax
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Applied Ethics ◽  
Moral Decision ◽  
Moral Decision Making ◽  
Contemplative Science ◽  
Practical Model

The present paper is the product of collaboration between a neuroscientist, an ethicist, and a contemplative exploring issues around leadership, morality, and ethics. It is an exploration on how people in roles of responsibility can better understand how to engage in discernment processes with more awareness and a deeper sense of responsibility for others and themselves. It draws upon recent research and scholarship in neuroscience, contemplative science, and applied ethics to develop a practical understanding of how moral decision-making works and is essential in this time when there can seem to be an increasing moral vacuum in leadership.

Framing Morality: How Antecedent-Focused Strategies Can Shape Moral Judgments

2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Andreas Kappes ◽  
Jay Joseph Van Bavel
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Moral Philosophy ◽  
Moral Dilemmas ◽  
Emotional Reactions ◽  
Moral Judgments ◽  
Moral Decision ◽  
Process Dissociation ◽  
Moral Decision Making ◽  
First Response ◽  
High Conflict

From moral philosophy to programming driverless cars, scholars have long been interested in how to shape moral decision-making. We examine how framing can impact moral judgments either by shaping which emotional reactions are evoked in a situation (antecedent-focused) or by changing how people respond to their emotional reactions (response-focused). In three experiments, we manipulated the framing of a moral decision-making task before participants judged a series of moral dilemmas. Participants encouraged to go “with their first” response beforehand favored emotion-driven judgments on high-conflict moral dilemmas. In contrast, participants who were instructed to give a “thoughtful” response beforehand or who did not receive instructions on how to approach the dilemmas favored reason-driven judgments. There was no difference in response-focused control during moral judgements. Process-dissociation confirmed that people instructed to go with their first response had stronger emotion-driven intuitions than other conditions. Our results suggest that task framing can alter moral intuitions.

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