scholarly journals Investigation of an Explosion at a Styrene Plant with Alkylation Reactor Feed Furnace

2019 ◽  
Vol 9 (3) ◽  
pp. 503 ◽  
Author(s):  
Yao-Chang Wu ◽  
Bin Laiwang ◽  
Chi-Min Shu

To prevent and mitigate chemical risks in the petrochemical industry, such as fires and spillage, process safety management (PSM), is essential, especially where flammable, corrosive, explosive, toxic, or otherwise dangerous chemicals are used. We investigated process safety (PS) between man–machine (material equipment) and environmental interfaces by using process hazard analysis (PHA) and fault tree analysis (FTA). By analyzing the data obtained through machinery and mechanical integrity (MI), pre-startup safety review (PSSR), current operating modes, and areal locations of hazardous atmospheres (ALOHA) simulations of the disaster’s aftermath, the cause of the styrene plant accident was found to be the fuel furnace (F101) switching process. Although the furnace had been extinguished, fuel continued to enter the furnace, and it was exposed to a high-temperature surface, resulting in the flashing ignition of the C4 fuel. The plan-do-check-act (PDCA) management model can be used to forestall the system from accident, and it is used to improve the proposal and develop countermeasures that would increase PSM performance and substantially lessen the impact of the thermal hazard. Disasters are often attributable to the unsafe state of machinery, equipment, or the environment, dangerous behaviors of the operator, and the lack of a thorough management system. It is anticipated that the investigation and analysis of the accident would not only find the real cause of the disaster but also lead to the establishment of better effective solutions for common safety problems.

Author(s):  
Kuok Ho Daniel Tang

Asset integrity is closely intertwined with process safety where the latter is often perceived to be equivalent or a subset of the former. In Malaysia, the requirements for offshore process safety are set by Petronas assuming exclusive rights to petroleum in the nation. It imposes and enforces these requirements on oil and gas companies entering into its production sharing contracts via the common law. Process safety management in Malaysia is strongly influenced by the US OSHA 3132 with elements comprising process safety information, process hazard analysis, operating procedures, employee participation, training, contractors, pre-startup safety review, mechanical integrity, hot work permit, management of change, incident investigation, emergency planning and response as well as compliance audits. These elements are largely included in the Mandatory Control Framework of Petronas and the trio of design, technical and operating integrity adopted in the process safety management of other oil and gas companies. These management practices align with the reiterative plan-do-check-act model. Process safety performance is also gauged with indicators suggested by international institutions such as the American Petroleum Institute. On top of the Control of Industrial Major Accident Hazards Regulations 1996 for onshore processes, this study deems that establishing statutory law for offshore installations will be beneficial to propel offshore safety in Malaysia to a greater height.


2018 ◽  
Vol 1 (1) ◽  
pp. 719-725
Author(s):  
Jolanta Ignac-Nowicka ◽  
Tibor Krenický

Abstract Technological progress, as well as the development of the sciences on occupational health and safety, increased safety and improved working conditions in enterprises of even the most onerous industries. To maintain the required level of safety, preventive actions are taken to identify all hazards in the workplace. In practice, many methods are used to identify hazards depending on the type of technological processes and the types of workstations analyzed. The article presents the advantages of the fault tree analysis method as a tool to support the process safety management in the enterprise. The article presents features of the fault tree analysis method as a tool for better security management in an enterprise. Cause and effect relationships between events in the fault tree schema on selected examples were examined. Indirect and direct causes of accidents and failures in the enterprise have been identified, including human errors (human factor). The use of the fault tree analysis method to support accident and failure risk assessment in an industrial plant was also analyzed.


1986 ◽  
Vol 64 (5) ◽  
pp. 848-853 ◽  
Author(s):  
Felicia D. Stevenson ◽  
Steven T. Maher ◽  
David R. Sharp ◽  
Barry D. Sloane

2012 ◽  
Vol 82 (3) ◽  
pp. 216-222 ◽  
Author(s):  
Venkatesh Iyengar ◽  
Ibrahim Elmadfa

The food safety security (FSS) concept is perceived as an early warning system for minimizing food safety (FS) breaches, and it functions in conjunction with existing FS measures. Essentially, the function of FS and FSS measures can be visualized in two parts: (i) the FS preventive measures as actions taken at the stem level, and (ii) the FSS interventions as actions taken at the root level, to enhance the impact of the implemented safety steps. In practice, along with FS, FSS also draws its support from (i) legislative directives and regulatory measures for enforcing verifiable, timely, and effective compliance; (ii) measurement systems in place for sustained quality assurance; and (iii) shared responsibility to ensure cohesion among all the stakeholders namely, policy makers, regulators, food producers, processors and distributors, and consumers. However, the functional framework of FSS differs from that of FS by way of: (i) retooling the vulnerable segments of the preventive features of existing FS measures; (ii) fine-tuning response systems to efficiently preempt the FS breaches; (iii) building a long-term nutrient and toxicant surveillance network based on validated measurement systems functioning in real time; (iv) focusing on crisp, clear, and correct communication that resonates among all the stakeholders; and (v) developing inter-disciplinary human resources to meet ever-increasing FS challenges. Important determinants of FSS include: (i) strengthening international dialogue for refining regulatory reforms and addressing emerging risks; (ii) developing innovative and strategic action points for intervention {in addition to Hazard Analysis and Critical Control Points (HACCP) procedures]; and (iii) introducing additional science-based tools such as metrology-based measurement systems.


2005 ◽  
Vol 5 (2) ◽  
pp. 161
Author(s):  
C. R. Che Hassan ◽  
M. J. Pitt ◽  
A. J. Wilday

The development of the audit method has included the identification of possible performance indicators at each level of the sociotechnical pyramid for a range of areas of work in which accidents have been shown to occur most frequently. The measurementof performance indicators is part of a feedback loop which causes safety improvements. Integration of performance indicators into the audit system has been tested at three operating chemical industries in Terengganu and Selangor in Malaysia. A summary of the weaknesses of the similar elements identified in the three audited plants is presented. Analysis on the approach used enables the identification of deficiencies in safety management aspects. Keywords: Accidents, audit, deficiencies, performance indicators, safety management, and sociotechnical pyramid.


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