scholarly journals Animals in Moral Limbo: How Literary Pigs May Help Lab-Generated Ones

Animals ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 10 (4) ◽  
pp. 629
Author(s):  
Nancy Tuck

When considering that artistic and literary artifacts reflect the cultural views and mores of a particular time period, there is a significant misalignment between stories depicting increased moral status of pigs (e.g., vis-à-vis human-porcine relationships) and ongoing practices of pig consumption, commodification, and medical experimentation. In fact, there has been increased industrial farm meat production and biotechnological experimentation. Xenotransplantation trials, for example, are being heralded “the answer” to organ shortages needed for human transplantation, while significant ethical concerns persist. In this paper, I posit that literary reflections add a valuable dimension to animal ethics deliberations, providing a meta-narrative against which to assess normative practices. Beginning with synopses of three books: E.B. White’s Charlotte’s Web (1952), Robert Newton Peck’s A Day No Pigs Would Die (1972), and Paul Griffin’s Saving Marty (2017), I illustrate a shifting moral status view of human–pig relationships. Next, I discuss personhood attributions through biological, philosophical, and legal frameworks; review benefits and risks of xenotransplantation; reflect on the moral status of non-human animals; and offer concluding thoughts.

Author(s):  
Sue Donaldson ◽  
Will Kymlicka

Western political theorists have largely ignored the animal question, assuming that animals have no place in our theories of democracy, citizenship, membership, sovereignty, and the public good. Conversely, animal ethicists have largely ignored political theory, assuming that we can theorize the moral status and moral rights of animals without drawing on the categories and concepts of political theory. This chapter traces the history of this separation between animals and political theory, examines the resulting intellectual blind spots for animal ethics, and reviews recent attempts to bring the two together. Situating animal rights within political theory has the potential to identify new models of justice in human-animal relations, and to open up new areas of scholarship and research.


2019 ◽  
Vol 47 (4) ◽  
pp. 760-767 ◽  
Author(s):  
Julian J. Koplin ◽  
Julian Savulescu

Brain organoid research raises ethical challenges not seen in other forms of stem cell research. Given that brain organoids partially recapitulate the development of the human brain, it is plausible that brain organoids could one day attain consciousness and perhaps even higher cognitive abilities. Brain organoid research therefore raises difficult questions about these organoids' moral status – questions that currently fall outside the scope of existing regulations and guidelines. This paper shows how these gaps can be addressed. We outline a moral framework for brain organoid research that can address the relevant ethical concerns without unduly impeding this important area of research.


BioScience ◽  
2019 ◽  
Vol 69 (10) ◽  
pp. 778-788 ◽  
Author(s):  
Christine E Webb ◽  
Peter Woodford ◽  
Elise Huchard

Abstract Animal ethics—the field of philosophy concerned with the moral status of animals—is experiencing a momentum unprecedented in its history. Surprisingly, animal behavior science remains on the sidelines, despite producing critical evidence on which many arguments in animal ethics rest. In the present article, we explore the origins of the divide between animal behavior science and animal ethics before considering whether behavioral scientists should concern themselves with it. We finally envision tangible steps that could be taken to bridge the gap, encouraging scientists to be aware of, and to more actively engage with, an ethical revolution that is partly fueled by the evidence they generate.


Author(s):  
Fiona Woollard

AbstractIt is tempting to think that zebras, goats, lions, and similar animals matter morally, but not in quite the same way people do. This might lead us to adopt a hybrid view of animal ethics such as ‘Utilitarianism for Animals; Deontology for People’. One of the core commitments of deontology is the Doctrine of Doing and Allowing (DDA): the view that doing harm is harder to justify than allowing harm. I explore how this core tenant of deontology applies to non-person, non-human animals and whether hybrid views of animal ethics can accept it. In doing so, I aim to do three things. First, to show that my defence of the DDA can solve a problem surrounding our duties to wild animals, while making only minimal claims about animal moral status. Second, to offer an argument that for many non-person, non-human animals, we should recognise deontological constraints on their treatment, but also see those constraints as importantly different from the constraints against doing harm to persons. Third, to get clearer on how we should understand Utilitarianism for Animals and Nozickian hybrid approaches to animal ethics.


2021 ◽  
Vol 32 (2) ◽  
pp. 282-295
Author(s):  
Zorana Todorovic

This paper addresses the issue of the moral status of non-human animals, or the question whether sentient animals are morally considerable. The arguments for and against the moral status of animals are discussed, above all the argument from marginal cases. It is argued that sentient animals have moral status based on their having interests in their experiential well-being, but that there are degrees of moral status. Two interest-based approaches are presented and discussed: DeGrazia?s view that sentient animals have interests in continuing to live, and that their interests should be granted moral weight; and McMahan?s TRIA which similarly postulates that animals have interests and that in a given situation we should compare the human and animal interests at stake. Finally, the paper concludes that the anthropocentric approach to animal ethics should be abandoned in favour of the biocentric ethics.


Author(s):  
Shelly Kagan

According to a prominent view in contemporary philosophical discussions of animal ethics—a view the author calls unitarianism—animals have the same moral status as people do, so that otherwise similar interests of animals and people should be given the very same consideration in moral deliberation. In contrast, this book lays out and defends a hierarchical approach, according to which people count more than animals do, and some animals count more than others. Surprisingly, although this idea is close to being commonsense, for the most part moral theories have not been developed in such a way as to take account of these crucial differences in status. Accordingly, the author both argues for a hierarchical account of morality and explores what suitably status sensitive moral principles might look like. Particular topics examined include the modification of distributive principles to take account of status, whether animals should be given deontological standing, and the moral complications that arise in cases that either involve defending animals or defending people from animals. The book also considers what the basis of moral status might be, and it responds to some of the potentially troubling implications of adopting a hierarchical approach to morality.


Relations ◽  
2013 ◽  
pp. 23-35
Author(s):  
Matteo Andreozzi

The main aim of this paper is to demonstrate the need for a reassessment of the moral status of pets. I argue that pets rest on an undefined ethical borderline, which brings several puzzling problems to both human-centered ethics and animal ethics and that neither of these fields adequately handles these issues. I focus specifically on human relationships with companion animals as one of the most significant interspecific relationship involving humans and pets. I also show that a deeper questioning of the moral status of pets is a required step toward the moral rethinking of human-animal relationships.


2020 ◽  
Vol 48 (1) ◽  
pp. 85-108
Author(s):  
Heather Browning ◽  
Walter Veit ◽  

This paper addresses what we consider to be the most pressing challenge for the emerging science of consciousness: the measurement problem of consciousness. That is, by what methods can we determine the presence of and properties of consciousness? Most methods are currently developed through evaluation of the presence of consciousness in humans and here we argue that there are particular problems in application of these methods to nonhuman cases—what we call the indicator validity problem and the extrapolation problem. The first is a problem with the application of indicators developed using the differences between conscious and unconscious processing in humans to the identification of other conscious vs. nonconscious organisms or systems. The second is a problem in extrapolating any indicators developed in humans or other organisms to artificial systems. However, while pressing ethical concerns add urgency to the attribution of consciousness and its attendant moral status to nonhuman animals and intelligent machines, we cannot wait for certainty and we advocate the use of a precautionary principle to avoid causing unintentional harm. We also intend that the considerations and limitations discussed in this paper can be used to further analyze and refine the methods of consciousness science with the hope that one day we may be able to solve the measurement problem of consciousness.


Author(s):  
Robert Garner

This final chapter explores the range of ideas current in the contemporary animal ethics debate. Much of the chapter is devoted to documenting the critique of the animal welfare ethic, which holds that, while animals have moral standing, humans, being persons, have a superior moral status. Three different strands of this critique—based on utilitarian, rights, and contractarian approaches—are identified and explored. The final part of the chapter documents the fragmentation of the animal ethics debate in recent years. This has included a more nuanced position which seeks to decouple animal rights from abolitionism, accounts of animal ethics from virtue ethics and capabilities perspectives, and a relational turn associated with the feminist care ethic tradition and, more recently, the utilization of citizenship theory by Donaldson and Kymlicka.


2019 ◽  
Vol 1 (1) ◽  
pp. 7-21
Author(s):  
David Fraser

Abstract In Western culture, animal ethics has traditionally emphasized acts of deliberate cruelty and, in the twentieth century, institutionalized harms to animals through activities such as meat production and biomedical research. However, with a large human population and technologies that developed mostly during the last century, a new set of harms—unintended and often acting indirectly—now injure and kill vast numbers of animals. Unintended harms arise from human artifacts such as cars, windows and communication towers. Indirect harms occur from disturbances to the balances and processes of nature, for example through pollution, introduction of alien species and climate change. These harms will undoubtedly increase unless they become a focus of attention and mitigation. A new animal ethic is needed to incorporate these harms into ethical thought. It will need to address such issues as responsibility for unintended versus intended harms, and for collective versus individual actions, and it will greatly narrow the gap between animal ethics and environmental ethics.


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