scholarly journals Case Report: Theory of Mind and Figurative Language in a Child With Agenesis of the Corpus Callosum

2021 ◽  
Vol 11 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sergio Melogno ◽  
Maria Antonietta Pinto ◽  
Teresa Gloria Scalisi ◽  
Fausto Badolato ◽  
Pasquale Parisi

In this case report, we studied Theory of Mind (ToM) and figurative language comprehension in a 7.2-year-old child, conventionally named RJ, with isolated and complete agenesis of the corpus callosum (ACC), a rare malformation due to the absence of the corpus callosum, the major tract connecting the two brain hemispheres. To study ToM, which is the capability to infer the other’s mental states, we used the classical false belief tasks, and to study figurative language, i.e., those linguistic usages involving non-literal meanings, we used tasks assessing metaphor and idiom comprehension. RJ’s intellectual level and his phonological, lexical, and grammatical abilities were all adequate. In both the ToM false belief tasks and novel sensory metaphor comprehension, RJ showed a delay of 3 years and a significant gap compared to a typically developing control group, while in idioms, his performance was at the border of average. These outcomes suggest that RJ has a specific pragmatic difficulty in all tasks where he must interpret the other’s communicative intention, as in ToM tasks and novel sensory metaphor comprehension. The outcomes also open up interesting insights into the relationships between ToM and figurative language in children with isolated and complete ACC.

2020 ◽  
Vol 46 (Supplement_1) ◽  
pp. S271-S271
Author(s):  
Stylianos Chatziioannidis ◽  
Agorastos Agorastos ◽  
Stergios Kaprinis ◽  
Vasilios P Bozikas ◽  
Vasilis Bozikas

Abstract Background Childhood trauma (CT), a generic term encompassing experiences of severe abuse and neglect during childhood and adolescence, has been established as an important risk factor for the emergence of psychosis. Among the potential pathways involved in the CT-psychosis association, Theory of Mind (ToM) disruption holds a central position. ToM reflects the ability to attribute distinct mental states to oneself and other people, and correctly infer the beliefs, wishes, intentions and dispositions of others in order to predict their behavior and produce proper social responses. ToM is further elaborated in 1st order ToM (ToM1: the ability to understand that someone may hold a false belief about the state of the world) and 2nd order ToM (ToM2: the ability to understand that one person may hold a false belief about the belief of another person). Research shows that patients with schizophrenia-spectrum psychosis (SSP) exhibit marked deficits in ToM. CT may increase SSP risk by disrupting the emergence of normal ToM skills, thus inducing a vulnerability for cognitive errors, perceptual aberrations and impaired reality testing. Our study sought to explore the effect of CT on ToM performance in a group of SSP patients and a healthy control group (HC). Methods We compared 63 SSP patients to a healthy control group on measures of CT and ToM. CT (presence of parental antipathy, parental neglect, physical abuse, sexual abuse) was assessed with the Childhood Experience of Care and Abuse Questionnaire (CECA.Q). ToM1 and ToM2 performance was measured with the Perception of Social Inference Test (PESIT). Chi-squared analysis was performed to compare CT rates between SSP patients and HCs. Mann-Whitney U tests were employed to detect differences in ToM between the two groups. Within each group, the impact of CT and polytraumatization (accumulation of different CT types) on ToM performance was examined. Results SSP patients displayed significantly higher CT rates (χ2 (1, N = 124) = 34.5, p < .001) and worse ToM performance (ToM1: U = 653,5, p < .001; ToM2: U = 435,5, p < .001) than HCs. SSP inpatients were 11.6 times more likely to have been exposed to severe CT than HCs. Within the SSP group, CT was associated with increased ToM2 deficits (U = 259, p = .020), while polytraumatization was negatively correlated to both ToM1 (rs = -.297, p = .020) and ToM2 (rs = -.341, p = .007) performance. Maternal antipathy (U = 207, p = .036) and neglect (U = 148, p = .017) were the CT subtypes associated with worse ToM2 performance. No similar effects were detected within the HC group. Discussion Our finding of ToM deficits in SSP patients may indicate a bidirectional association, involving on the one hand a negative effect of psychotic illness on ToM skills, and on the other hand a vulnerability towards psychosis induced by severe, early disruptions in normal ToM acquisition. Worse ToM performance in SSP patients with cumulative CT may signify an additive or synergistic effect of CT and psychosis on ToM skills. The involvement of maternal antipathy and neglect in the aforementioned association highlights the pivotal role of the mother in the development of the child’s capacity to envision distinct mental states in self and others, a prerequisite for self-awareness and self-other individuation. The failure to detect similar effects in HCs may be attributed to the low frequency of CT in this group, potentially restricting the strength of this analysis. On the same matter, another explanation could be that CT by itself is not a sufficient condition for ToM impairment, and only becomes relevant when it acts in synergy with other harmful processes inherent in psychosis.


2021 ◽  
Vol 12 ◽  
Author(s):  
Zhuo Zhang ◽  
Haoxue Yu ◽  
Muyun Long ◽  
Hui Li

The purpose of this study was to explore theory of mind (ToM) differences in children with different birth orders (only-children, first-born children, and second-born children), and further explore the effect of cognitive verb training for only-children’s ToM. Adopting the paradigm of false belief, Study 1 was conducted in which a sample of 120 children aged 3–6, including first-born children, second-born children (siblings aged 1–13 years), and only-children were tested. The results showed that (1) children aged 3–6 had significantly higher scores on first-order false-belief than second-order false-belief. (2) Controlling for age, the only-children scored significantly lower than the first-born children. In Study 2, 28 only-children aged 4–5 (13 in the experimental group and 15 in the control group) who initially failed in false-belief tasks were trained with the cognitive verb animations. Significant post-training improvements were observed for only-children who received training of animations embedded with cognitive verb. Those findings indicated that ToM of only-children was significantly worse than first-born children of two-child families, and linguistic training could facilitate ToM of only-children whose ToM were at a disadvantage.


2014 ◽  
Vol 45 (4) ◽  
pp. 500-510 ◽  
Author(s):  
Adam Putko ◽  
Agata Złotogórska

Abstract The main objective of this study was to examine whether children’s ability to justify their action predictions in terms of mental states is related, in a similar way as the ability to predict actions, to such aspects of executive function (EF) as executive control and working memory. An additional objective was to check whether the frequency of different types of justifications made by children in false-belief tasks is associated with aforementioned aspects of EF, as well as language. The study included 59 children aged 3-4 years. The ability to predict actions and to justify these predictions was measured with false-belief tasks. Luria’s hand-game was used to assess executive control, and the Counting and Labelling dual-task was used to assess working memory capacity. Language development was controlled using an embedded syntax test. It was found that executive control was a significant predictor of the children’s ability to justify their action predictions in terms of mental states, even when age and language were taken into account. Results also indicated a relationship between the type of justification in the false-belief task and language development. With the development of language children gradually cease to justify their action predictions in terms of current location, and they tend to construct irrelevant justifications before they begin to refer to beliefs. Data suggest that executive control, in contrast to language, is a factor which affects the development of the children’s ability to justify their action predictions only in its later phase, during a shift from irrelevant to correct justifications.


2019 ◽  
Vol 61 (3) ◽  
pp. 142-146
Author(s):  
Asmita Karmakar ◽  
Atanu Kumar Dogra

2019 ◽  
Vol 14 (6) ◽  
pp. 579-589 ◽  
Author(s):  
Cora E Mukerji ◽  
Sarah Hope Lincoln ◽  
David Dodell-Feder ◽  
Charles A Nelson ◽  
Christine I Hooker

ABSTRACT Theory of mind (ToM), the capacity to reason about others’ mental states, is central to healthy social development. Neural mechanisms supporting ToM may contribute to individual differences in children’s social cognitive behavior. Employing a false belief functional magnetic resonance imaging paradigm, we identified patterns of neural activity and connectivity elicited by ToM reasoning in school-age children (N = 32, ages 9–13). Next, we tested relations between these neural ToM correlates and children’s everyday social cognition. Several key nodes of the neural ToM network showed greater activity when reasoning about false beliefs (ToM condition) vs non-mentalistic false content (control condition), including the bilateral temporoparietal junction (RTPJ and LTPJ), precuneus (PC) and right superior temporal sulcus. In addition, children demonstrated task-modulated changes in connectivity among these regions to support ToM relative to the control condition. ToM-related activity in the PC was negatively associated with variation in multiple aspects of children’s social cognitive behavior. Together, these findings elucidate how nodes of the ToM network act and interact to support false belief reasoning in school-age children and suggest that neural ToM mechanisms are linked to variation in everyday social cognition.


Author(s):  
Paula Rubio-Fernández

Current accounts of Theory of Mind development have tried to explain the results of false-belief tasks with infants and children, but failed to account for the evidence of early belief reasoning reported in the experimental pragmatics literature. This chapter reviews a number of studies on the acquisition of the mental state verb know; toddlers’ understanding of factivity (or the difference between knowing and thinking); early referential communication and toddlers’ reliance on others’ engagement as a proxy for their knowledge, and the emergence of preschoolers’ understanding of the seeing-knowing relation. The results of these studies reveal a more nuanced picture than those of false-belief tasks, with some Theory of Mind abilities emerging earlier in conversation than in laboratory tasks, while children’s epistemic theories continue to develop beyond their passing of standard Theory of Mind tasks.


Psihologija ◽  
2020 ◽  
pp. 23-23
Author(s):  
Sanja Simlesa ◽  
Kaja Hacin ◽  
Maja Cepanec ◽  
Jasmina Ivsac-Pavlisa

The ability to attribute mental states to oneself and others, known as the theory of mind (ToM), has been widely researched over the past 40 years, along with its relation to language comprehension. However, a majority of the research on the relation between ToM and language used only verbal tasks assessing false belief understanding as a measure of ToM. Therefore, this study aimed to analyze the relation between language and ToM, using a larger battery of ToM measures, with different language demands. A total of 203 typically developing children between 46 and 68 months of age, with average nonverbal cognitive skills, were assessed using language comprehension and ToM tasks. The language aspect was assessed using the Reynell Developmental Language Scales (Language Comprehension scale A). To assess ToM, verbal and non-verbal tasks were taken from the ToM subtest of the NEPSY-II. Results indicated a significant correlation between language comprehension and verbal and non-verbal ToM measures. Hierarchical regression showed that language comprehension was a significant predictor for children's performance on both verbal and non-verbal ToM tasks. Specifically, language comprehension affected ToM, regardless of the language demands of the ToM tasks. However, language comprehension was a stronger predictor for verbal than non-verbal ToM tasks. The results of this study contribute to the view that the relation between language and ToM is fundamental and exceeds the features of specific tasks.


Author(s):  
Janet Wilde Astington ◽  
Claire Hughes

The chapter begins with an explanation of key foundational concepts in theory of mind, such as mental representation and false belief. We then discuss the history and current broad scope of the term, proposing a developmental-componential view that incorporates intuitive and reflective aspects of theory of mind. We continue with a comprehensive description of the developmental progression of theory of mind: from infants’ intuitive understanding of ordinary actions as reflecting others’ attention and intentions, through toddlers’ appreciation of world-inconsistent goals and preschool developments in understanding representational mental states, to school-age children’s mastery of an interpretative and complex theory of mind. We consideren passantindividual differences in development, as well as atypical development, such as in autism. Finally, new directions for research are explored, in the areas of neurology, education, and deontic reasoning.


2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Arab World English Journal ◽  
Ronnie Goodwin

Theory of Mind (ToM) is a conceptual theory that is credited with enabling individuals to anticipate the mental states of others, including their beliefs, desires, emotions, intentions, and additional emotive circumstances (Flavell, 2004). Linguistic acquisition is a natural development that begins to develop in children from birth and enables communication. The cognitive domains necessary to comprehend language is also required in order for the formation of ToM to develop. The interpretations made through ToM presumptions can contain the discernment of another’s false belief. In this context, the individual must be aware that the literal interpretation could be an inaccurate symbol or manufactured belief. This understanding requires a certain level of cognitive development in the child since the intention may be to signify something else and the child must be able to correctly process idiomatic expressions in order to accurately make ToM determinations (Caillies & Le Sourn-Bissaoui, 2008). This paper explores the relationship between ToM and linguistic acquisition in normally developing children, as well as those with various disabilities to ascertain the degree of cognitive development necessary in order to make ToM determinations. Exploration of this relationship reveals that linguistic and cognitive development are both essential in the construct of ToM perceptions in early childhood.


2009 ◽  
Vol 9 (1-2) ◽  
pp. 39-56 ◽  
Author(s):  
Eva Oberle

AbstractIn this study, the development of false-belief understanding was investigated among 3–5-year-old Yapese and Fais children in Micronesia. Sixty-nine children took part in an experiment investigating their understanding of false belief with a culturally adjusted surprise content task, which has been widely used in Theory of Mind (ToM) research and was first introduced by Hogrefe, Wimmer and Perner (1986). The results show that as in western cultures, 3-year-old Micronesian preschoolers do not display understanding of false belief measured with classical false-belief tasks, while 5-year-olds do. These findings contribute to research on the universality and cultural variability of cognitive development in preschool age children.


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