scholarly journals Commentary: Religious credence is not factual belief

2016 ◽  
Vol 7 ◽  
Author(s):  
Konrad Talmont-Kaminski
Keyword(s):  
Factual Belief

scholarly journals Religious credence is not factual belief

Cognition ◽  
2014 ◽  
Vol 133 (3) ◽  
pp. 698-715 ◽  
Author(s):  
Neil Van Leeuwen
Keyword(s):  
Factual Belief

I. Fact and Value

1969 ◽  
Vol 5 (2) ◽  
pp. 129-139
Author(s):  
W. D. Hudson
Keyword(s):  
Moral Judgment ◽  
Moral Judgments ◽  
Good Sense ◽  
Ought Implies Can ◽  
Moral Value ◽  
God's Will ◽  
Factual Belief ◽  
Moral Philosophers

What connexion is there between factual statements concerning God or man and moral judgments? That is the question which occasions this paper. Not long ago moral philosophers were wont to say that there is a logical gap between the two sorts of utterance to which I have just referred: that nothing follows in terms of moral value from a statement of fact, no ‘ought’ from any ‘is’. They recognised only one restriction on what may be said in terms of ‘ought’ by what has been said in terms of ‘is’, namely that ‘ought’ implies ‘can’. It is manifest nonsense to say that anyone ought to do what he cannot do. But, this apart, they thought it possible without contradiction or anomaly to hold any conceivable factual belief and at the same time subscribe to any conceivable moral judgment. They would have held that it makes perfectly good sense to say, for example, ‘This is God’s will but it ought not to be done’ or ‘Men are not pigs but a good man will live like a pig’. Bizarre such judgments may be, they would have said, but nonsensical they are not. They conceived it to be their main business, as moral philosophers, to erect warning notices along the edge of the is-ought gap so that contemporary moralists would not fall headlong into it as so many of their predecessors, in less enlightened ages, had done.

Gripped by authority

2018 ◽  
Vol 48 (3-4) ◽  
pp. 313-336
Author(s):  
Terry Horgan ◽  
Mark Timmons
Keyword(s):  
Moral Realism ◽  
Moral Judgments ◽  
Psychological States ◽  
Ethical Position ◽  
Factual Belief

AbstractMoral judgments are typically experienced as being categorically authoritative – i.e. as having a prescriptive force that (i) is motivationally gripping independently of both conventional norms and one's pre-existing desires, and (ii) justificationally trumps both conventional norms and one's pre-existing desires. We argue that this key feature is best accommodated by the meta-ethical position we call ‘cognitivist expressivism’, which construes moral judgments as sui generis psychological states whose distinctive phenomenological character includes categorical authoritativeness. Traditional versions of expressivism cannot easily accommodate the justificationally trumping aspect of categorical authoritativeness, because they construe moral judgments as fundamentally desire-like. Moral realism cannot easily accommodate the aspect of inherent motivational grip, because realism construes moral judgments as a species of factual belief.

The Factual Belief Fallacy

2018 ◽  
Vol 15 (3) ◽  
pp. 319-343 ◽  
Author(s):  
Neil Van Leeuwen
Keyword(s):  
Cognitive Science ◽  
Philosophy Of Mind ◽  
Mental States ◽  
Cognitive Science Of Religion ◽  
Human Psychology ◽  
Science Of Religion ◽  
The Difference ◽  
Factual Belief ◽  
Large Background

This paper explains a fallacy that often arises in theorizing about human minds. I call it the Factual Belief Fallacy. The Fallacy, roughly, involves drawing conclusions about human psychology that improperly ignore the large background of mostly accurate factual beliefs people have. The Factual Belief Fallacy has led to significant mistakes in both philosophy of mind and cognitive science of religion. Avoiding it helps us better see the difference between factual belief and religious credence; seeing that difference in turn enables us to pose interesting normative questions about various mental states labeled “belief.”

The relationship between openness, moral evaluation, and factual belief

2014 ◽  
Author(s):  
Oren R. Shewach ◽  
Andrew N. Christopher ◽  
Eric D. Hill ◽  
Ryan J. Walker
Keyword(s):  
Moral Evaluation ◽  
The Relationship ◽  
Factual Belief

What Dilemma? Moral Evaluation Shapes Factual Belief

2012 ◽  
Vol 4 (3) ◽  
pp. 316-323 ◽  
Author(s):  
Brittany S. Liu ◽  
Peter H. Ditto
Keyword(s):  
Moral Evaluation ◽  
Factual Belief

More Accurate, But No Less Polarized: Comparing the Factual Beliefs of Government Officials and the Public

2020 ◽  
pp. 1-8
Author(s):  
Nathan Lee ◽  
Brendan Nyhan ◽  
Jason Reifler ◽  
D. J. Flynn
Keyword(s):  
Political Elite ◽  
Political Elites ◽  
Government Officials ◽  
The Public ◽  
Wide Range ◽  
Belief Polarization ◽  
The Government ◽  
Increase In Accuracy ◽  
Survey Approach ◽  
Factual Belief

Abstract Studies of the American public demonstrate that partisans often diverge not only on questions of opinion but also on matters of fact. However, little is known about partisan divergence in factual beliefs among the government officials who make real policy decisions, or how it compares to belief polarization among the public. This letter describes the first systematic comparison of factual belief polarization between the public and government officials, which we conducted using a paired survey approach. The results indicate that political elites are consistently more accurately informed than the public across a wide range of politically contentious facts. However, this increase in accuracy does not translate into reduced factual belief polarization. These findings demonstrate that a more informed political elite does not necessarily mitigate partisan factual disagreement in policy making.

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