scholarly journals Inferring reward prediction errors in patients with schizophrenia: a dynamic reward task for reinforcement learning

2014 ◽  
Vol 5 ◽  
Author(s):  
Chia-Tzu Li ◽  
Wen-Sung Lai ◽  
Chih-Min Liu ◽  
Yung-Fong Hsu
2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Melissa J. Sharpe ◽  
Hannah M. Batchelor ◽  
Lauren E. Mueller ◽  
Chun Yun Chang ◽  
Etienne J.P. Maes ◽  
...  

AbstractDopamine neurons fire transiently in response to unexpected rewards. These neural correlates are proposed to signal the reward prediction error described in model-free reinforcement learning algorithms. This error term represents the unpredicted or ‘excess’ value of the rewarding event. In model-free reinforcement learning, this value is then stored as part of the learned value of any antecedent cues, contexts or events, making them intrinsically valuable, independent of the specific rewarding event that caused the prediction error. In support of equivalence between dopamine transients and this model-free error term, proponents cite causal optogenetic studies showing that artificially induced dopamine transients cause lasting changes in behavior. Yet none of these studies directly demonstrate the presence of cached value under conditions appropriate for associative learning. To address this gap in our knowledge, we conducted three studies where we optogenetically activated dopamine neurons while rats were learning associative relationships, both with and without reward. In each experiment, the antecedent cues failed to acquired value and instead entered into value-independent associative relationships with the other cues or rewards. These results show that dopamine transients, constrained within appropriate learning situations, support valueless associative learning.


Author(s):  
Mitsuo Kawato ◽  
Aurelio Cortese

AbstractIn several papers published in Biological Cybernetics in the 1980s and 1990s, Kawato and colleagues proposed computational models explaining how internal models are acquired in the cerebellum. These models were later supported by neurophysiological experiments using monkeys and neuroimaging experiments involving humans. These early studies influenced neuroscience from basic, sensory-motor control to higher cognitive functions. One of the most perplexing enigmas related to internal models is to understand the neural mechanisms that enable animals to learn large-dimensional problems with so few trials. Consciousness and metacognition—the ability to monitor one’s own thoughts, may be part of the solution to this enigma. Based on literature reviews of the past 20 years, here we propose a computational neuroscience model of metacognition. The model comprises a modular hierarchical reinforcement-learning architecture of parallel and layered, generative-inverse model pairs. In the prefrontal cortex, a distributed executive network called the “cognitive reality monitoring network” (CRMN) orchestrates conscious involvement of generative-inverse model pairs in perception and action. Based on mismatches between computations by generative and inverse models, as well as reward prediction errors, CRMN computes a “responsibility signal” that gates selection and learning of pairs in perception, action, and reinforcement learning. A high responsibility signal is given to the pairs that best capture the external world, that are competent in movements (small mismatch), and that are capable of reinforcement learning (small reward-prediction error). CRMN selects pairs with higher responsibility signals as objects of metacognition, and consciousness is determined by the entropy of responsibility signals across all pairs. This model could lead to new-generation AI, which exhibits metacognition, consciousness, dimension reduction, selection of modules and corresponding representations, and learning from small samples. It may also lead to the development of a new scientific paradigm that enables the causal study of consciousness by combining CRMN and decoded neurofeedback.


2014 ◽  
Vol 26 (3) ◽  
pp. 635-644 ◽  
Author(s):  
Olav E. Krigolson ◽  
Cameron D. Hassall ◽  
Todd C. Handy

Our ability to make decisions is predicated upon our knowledge of the outcomes of the actions available to us. Reinforcement learning theory posits that actions followed by a reward or punishment acquire value through the computation of prediction errors—discrepancies between the predicted and the actual reward. A multitude of neuroimaging studies have demonstrated that rewards and punishments evoke neural responses that appear to reflect reinforcement learning prediction errors [e.g., Krigolson, O. E., Pierce, L. J., Holroyd, C. B., & Tanaka, J. W. Learning to become an expert: Reinforcement learning and the acquisition of perceptual expertise. Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience, 21, 1833–1840, 2009; Bayer, H. M., & Glimcher, P. W. Midbrain dopamine neurons encode a quantitative reward prediction error signal. Neuron, 47, 129–141, 2005; O'Doherty, J. P. Reward representations and reward-related learning in the human brain: Insights from neuroimaging. Current Opinion in Neurobiology, 14, 769–776, 2004; Holroyd, C. B., & Coles, M. G. H. The neural basis of human error processing: Reinforcement learning, dopamine, and the error-related negativity. Psychological Review, 109, 679–709, 2002]. Here, we used the brain ERP technique to demonstrate that not only do rewards elicit a neural response akin to a prediction error but also that this signal rapidly diminished and propagated to the time of choice presentation with learning. Specifically, in a simple, learnable gambling task, we show that novel rewards elicited a feedback error-related negativity that rapidly decreased in amplitude with learning. Furthermore, we demonstrate the existence of a reward positivity at choice presentation, a previously unreported ERP component that has a similar timing and topography as the feedback error-related negativity that increased in amplitude with learning. The pattern of results we observed mirrored the output of a computational model that we implemented to compute reward prediction errors and the changes in amplitude of these prediction errors at the time of choice presentation and reward delivery. Our results provide further support that the computations that underlie human learning and decision-making follow reinforcement learning principles.


2021 ◽  
pp. 1-31
Author(s):  
Germain Lefebvre ◽  
Christopher Summerfield ◽  
Rafal Bogacz

Abstract Reinforcement learning involves updating estimates of the value of states and actions on the basis of experience. Previous work has shown that in humans, reinforcement learning exhibits a confirmatory bias: when the value of a chosen option is being updated, estimates are revised more radically following positive than negative reward prediction errors, but the converse is observed when updating the unchosen option value estimate. Here, we simulate performance on a multi-arm bandit task to examine the consequences of a confirmatory bias for reward harvesting. We report a paradoxical finding: that confirmatory biases allow the agent to maximize reward relative to an unbiased updating rule. This principle holds over a wide range of experimental settings and is most influential when decisions are corrupted by noise. We show that this occurs because on average, confirmatory biases lead to overestimating the value of more valuable bandits and underestimating the value of less valuable bandits, rendering decisions overall more robust in the face of noise. Our results show how apparently suboptimal learning rules can in fact be reward maximizing if decisions are made with finite computational precision.


2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Joanne C. Van Slooten ◽  
Sara Jahfari ◽  
Tomas Knapen ◽  
Jan Theeuwes

AbstractPupil responses have been used to track cognitive processes during decision-making. Studies have shown that in these cases the pupil reflects the joint activation of many cortical and subcortical brain regions, also those traditionally implicated in value-based learning. However, how the pupil tracks value-based decisions and reinforcement learning is unknown. We combined a reinforcement learning task with a computational model to study pupil responses during value-based decisions, and decision evaluations. We found that the pupil closely tracks reinforcement learning both across trials and participants. Prior to choice, the pupil dilated as a function of trial-by-trial fluctuations in value beliefs. After feedback, early dilation scaled with value uncertainty, whereas later constriction scaled with reward prediction errors. Our computational approach systematically implicates the pupil in value-based decisions, and the subsequent processing of violated value beliefs, ttese dissociable influences provide an exciting possibility to non-invasively study ongoing reinforcement learning in the pupil.


2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Matthew P.H. Gardner ◽  
Geoffrey Schoenbaum ◽  
Samuel J. Gershman

AbstractMidbrain dopamine neurons are commonly thought to report a reward prediction error, as hypothesized by reinforcement learning theory. While this theory has been highly successful, several lines of evidence suggest that dopamine activity also encodes sensory prediction errors unrelated to reward. Here we develop a new theory of dopamine function that embraces a broader conceptualization of prediction errors. By signaling errors in both sensory and reward predictions, dopamine supports a form of reinforcement learning that lies between model-based and model-free algorithms. This account remains consistent with current canon regarding the correspondence between dopamine transients and reward prediction errors, while also accounting for new data suggesting a role for these signals in phenomena such as sensory preconditioning and identity unblocking, which ostensibly draw upon knowledge beyond reward predictions.


2009 ◽  
Vol 21 (7) ◽  
pp. 1332-1345 ◽  
Author(s):  
Thorsten Kahnt ◽  
Soyoung Q Park ◽  
Michael X Cohen ◽  
Anne Beck ◽  
Andreas Heinz ◽  
...  

It has been suggested that the target areas of dopaminergic midbrain neurons, the dorsal (DS) and ventral striatum (VS), are differently involved in reinforcement learning especially as actor and critic. Whereas the critic learns to predict rewards, the actor maintains action values to guide future decisions. The different midbrain connections to the DS and the VS seem to play a critical role in this functional distinction. Here, subjects performed a dynamic, reward-based decision-making task during fMRI acquisition. A computational model of reinforcement learning was used to estimate the different effects of positive and negative reinforcements on future decisions for each subject individually. We found that activity in both the DS and the VS correlated with reward prediction errors. Using functional connectivity, we show that the DS and the VS are differentially connected to different midbrain regions (possibly corresponding to the substantia nigra [SN] and the ventral tegmental area [VTA], respectively). However, only functional connectivity between the DS and the putative SN predicted the impact of different reinforcement types on future behavior. These results suggest that connections between the putative SN and the DS are critical for modulating action values in the DS according to both positive and negative reinforcements to guide future decision making.


2017 ◽  
Vol 29 (12) ◽  
pp. 3311-3326 ◽  
Author(s):  
Samuel J. Gershman

The hypothesis that the phasic dopamine response reports a reward prediction error has become deeply entrenched. However, dopamine neurons exhibit several notable deviations from this hypothesis. A coherent explanation for these deviations can be obtained by analyzing the dopamine response in terms of Bayesian reinforcement learning. The key idea is that prediction errors are modulated by probabilistic beliefs about the relationship between cues and outcomes, updated through Bayesian inference. This account can explain dopamine responses to inferred value in sensory preconditioning, the effects of cue preexposure (latent inhibition), and adaptive coding of prediction errors when rewards vary across orders of magnitude. We further postulate that orbitofrontal cortex transforms the stimulus representation through recurrent dynamics, such that a simple error-driven learning rule operating on the transformed representation can implement the Bayesian reinforcement learning update.


eLife ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 10 ◽  
Author(s):  
Nina Rouhani ◽  
Yael Niv

Memory helps guide behavior, but which experiences from the past are prioritized? Classic models of learning posit that events associated with unpredictable outcomes as well as, paradoxically, predictable outcomes, deploy more attention and learning for those events. Here, we test reinforcement learning and subsequent memory for those events, and treat signed and unsigned reward prediction errors (RPEs), experienced at the reward-predictive cue or reward outcome, as drivers of these two seemingly contradictory signals. By fitting reinforcement learning models to behavior, we find that both RPEs contribute to learning by modulating a dynamically changing learning rate. We further characterize the effects of these RPE signals on memory, and show that both signed and unsigned RPEs enhance memory, in line with midbrain dopamine and locus-coeruleus modulation of hippocampal plasticity, thereby reconciling separate findings in the literature.


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