scholarly journals Unreliable Gut Feelings Can Lead to Correct Decisions: The Somatic Marker Hypothesis in Non-Linear Decision Chains

2012 ◽  
Vol 3 ◽  
Author(s):  
Manuel G. Bedia ◽  
Ezequiel Di Paolo
2003 ◽  
Vol 65 (1) ◽  
pp. 81-88 ◽  
Author(s):  
Atsunobu Suzuki ◽  
Akihisa Hirota ◽  
Noriyoshi Takasawa ◽  
Kazuo Shigemasu

2011 ◽  
pp. 275-289
Author(s):  
Colin G. Johnson

In recent years, the idea that somatic processes are intimately involved in actions traditionally considered to be purely mental has come to the fore. In particular, these arguments have revolved around the concept of somatic markers, i.e., bodily states that are generated by mind and then reperceived and acted upon. This chapter considers the somatic marker hypothesis and related ideas from the point of view of postclassical computation, i.e., the view that computing can be seen as a property of things-in-the-world rather than of an abstract class of mathematical machines. From this perspective, a number of ideas are discussed: the idea of somatic markers extending into the environment, an analogy with hardware interlocks in complex computer-driven systems, and connections with the idea of “just-do-it” computation.


Author(s):  
Marco Verweij ◽  
Antonio Damasio

The somatic marker hypothesis has not always been fully understood, or properly applied, in political science. The hypothesis was developed to explain the personally and socially harmful decision-making of neurological patients who appeared to have largely intact cognitive skills. It posits that affect (consisting of emotions, feelings, and drives) facilitates and expands cognition, is grounded in states of bodily physiology and on the processing of those states in the entire nervous system, and is shaped by a person’s past experiences in similar situations. Thus far, it has received empirical support from lesion studies, experiments based on the Iowa Gambling Task, and brain imaging studies. The somatic marker hypothesis is not compatible with key assumptions on which various influential political and social approaches are based. It disagrees with the largely cognitive view of decision-making presented in rational choice analysis. Contrary to behavioral public policy, the somatic marker hypothesis emphasizes the extent to which affect and cognition are integrated and mutually enabling. Finally, it differs from poststructuralist frameworks by highlighting the constraints that evolutionarily older bodily and neuronal networks impose on decision-making. Rather, the somatic marker hypothesis implies that political decision-making is socially constructed yet subject to constraints, is often sluggish but also is prone to wholesale, occasional reversals, takes place at both conscious and unconscious levels, and subserves dynamic, sociocultural homeostasis.


1996 ◽  
Vol 351 (1346) ◽  
pp. 1413-1420 ◽  

In this article I discuss a hypothesis, known as the somatic marker hypothesis, which I believe is relevant to the understanding of processes of human reasoning and decision making. The ventromedial sector of the prefrontal cortices is critical to the operations postulated here, but the hypothesis does not necessarily apply to prefrontal cortex as a whole and should not be seen as an attempt to unify frontal lobe functions under a single mechanism. The key idea in the hypothesis is that ‘marker’ signals influence the processes of response to stimuli, at multiple levels of operation, some of which occur overtly (consciously, ‘in mind’) and some of which occur covertly (non-consciously, in a non-minded manner). The marker signals arise in bioregulatory processes, including those which express themselves in emotions and feelings, but are not necessarily confined to those alone. This is the reason why the markers are termed somatic: they relate to body-state structure and regulation even when they do not arise in the body proper but rather in the brain’s representation of the body. Examples of the covert action of ‘marker’ signals are the undeliberated inhibition of a response learned previously; the introduction of a bias in the selection of an aversive or appetitive mode of behaviour, or in the otherwise deliberate evaluation of varied option-outcome scenarios. Examples of overt action include the conscious ‘qualifying’ of certain option-outcome scenarios as dangerous or advantageous. The hypothesis rejects attempts to limit human reasoning and decision making to mechanisms relying, in an exclusive and unrelated manner, on either conditioning alone or cognition alone.


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