scholarly journals The Role of Top-Down Modulation in Shaping Sensory Processing Across Brain States: Implications for Consciousness

Author(s):  
Tom Sikkens ◽  
Conrado A. Bosman ◽  
Umberto Olcese
2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Devyn E Smith ◽  
Isabelle L Moore ◽  
Nicole M Long

Overlap between events can lead to interference due to a tradeoff between encoding the present event and retrieving the past event. Temporal context information -- 'when' something occurred, a defining feature of episodic memory -- can cue retrieval of a past event. However, the influence of temporal overlap, or proximity in time, on the mechanisms of interference are unclear. Here, by identifying brain states using scalp electroencephalography (EEG) from male and female human subjects, we show the extent to which temporal overlap promotes interference and induces retrieval. In this experiment, subjects were explicitly directed to either encode the present event or retrieve a past, overlapping event while perceptual input was held constant. We find that the degree of temporal overlap between events leads to selective interference. Specifically, greater temporal overlap between two events leads to impaired memory for the past event selectively when the top-down goal is to encode the present event. Using pattern classification analyses to measure neural evidence for a retrieval state, we find that greater temporal overlap leads to automatic retrieval of a past event, independent of top-down goals. Critically, the retrieval evidence we observe likely reflects a general retrieval mode, rather than retrieval success or effort. Collectively, our findings provide insight into the role of temporal overlap on interference and memory formation.


Neuron ◽  
2007 ◽  
Vol 54 (5) ◽  
pp. 677-696 ◽  
Author(s):  
Charles D. Gilbert ◽  
Mariano Sigman

Philosophy ◽  
2012 ◽  
Vol 87 (1) ◽  
pp. 29-50 ◽  
Author(s):  
Grant Gillett ◽  
Sam C. Liu

AbstractThe debates about human free will are traditionally the concern of metaphysics but neuroscientists have recently entered the field arguing that acts of the will are determined by brain events themselves causal products of other events. We examine that claim through the example of free or voluntary switch of perception in relation to the Necker cube. When I am asked to see the cube in one way, I decide whether I will follow the command (or do as I am asked) using skills that reason and language give to me and change my brain states accordingly. The voluntary shift of perspective in seeing the Necker cube this way or that exemplifies the top-down control exercised by a human being on the basis of the role of language and meaning in their activity. It also indicates the lived story that is at the centre of each human consciousness. In the third part of this essay, three arguments are used to undermine metaphysical objections to the very idea of top-down self control.


2004 ◽  
Vol 63 (3) ◽  
pp. 143-149 ◽  
Author(s):  
Fred W. Mast ◽  
Charles M. Oman

The role of top-down processing on the horizontal-vertical line length illusion was examined by means of an ambiguous room with dual visual verticals. In one of the test conditions, the subjects were cued to one of the two verticals and were instructed to cognitively reassign the apparent vertical to the cued orientation. When they have mentally adjusted their perception, two lines in a plus sign configuration appeared and the subjects had to evaluate which line was longer. The results showed that the line length appeared longer when it was aligned with the direction of the vertical currently perceived by the subject. This study provides a demonstration that top-down processing influences lower level visual processing mechanisms. In another test condition, the subjects had all perceptual cues available and the influence was even stronger.


2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Chris Robert Harrison Brown

Attention has long been characterised within prominent models as reflecting a competition between goal-driven and stimulus-driven processes. It remains unclear, however, how involuntary attentional capture by affective stimuli, such as threat-laden content, fits into such models. While such effects were traditionally held to reflect stimulus-driven processes, recent research has increasingly implicated a critical role of goal-driven processes. Here we test an alternative goal-driven account of involuntary attentional capture by threat, using an experimental manipulation of goal-driven attention. To this end we combined the classic ‘contingent capture’ and ‘emotion-induced blink’ (EIB) paradigms in an RSVP task with both positive or threatening target search goals. Across six experiments, positive and threat distractors were presented in peripheral, parafoveal, and central locations. Across all distractor locations, we found that involuntary attentional capture by irrelevant threatening distractors could be induced via the adoption of a search goal for a threatening category; adopting a goal for a positive category conversely led to capture only by positive stimuli. Our findings provide direct experimental evidence for a causal role of voluntary goals in involuntary capture by irrelevant threat stimuli, and hence demonstrate the plausibility of a top-down account of this phenomenon. We discuss the implications of these findings in relation to current cognitive models of attention and clinical disorders.


Author(s):  
Bruno and

Multisensory interactions in perception are pervasive and fundamental, as we have documented throughout this book. In this final chapter, we propose that contemporary work on multisensory processing is a paradigm shift in perception science, calling for a radical reconsideration of empirical and theoretical questions within an entirely new perspective. In making our case, we emphasize that multisensory perception is the norm, not the exception, and we remark that multisensory interactions can occur early in sensory processing. We reiterate the key notions that multisensory interactions come in different kinds and that principles of multisensory processing must be considered when tackling multisensory daily-life problems. We discuss the role of unisensory processing in a multisensory world, and we conclude by suggesting future directions for the multisensory field.


2010 ◽  
Vol 33 (6) ◽  
pp. 464-480 ◽  
Author(s):  
Paula M. Niedenthal ◽  
Martial Mermillod ◽  
Marcus Maringer ◽  
Ursula Hess

AbstractThe set of 30 stimulating commentaries on our target article helps to define the areas of our initial position that should be reiterated or else made clearer and, more importantly, the ways in which moderators of and extensions to the SIMS can be imagined. In our response, we divide the areas of discussion into (1) a clarification of our meaning of “functional,” (2) a consideration of our proposed categories of smiles, (3) a reminder about the role of top-down processes in the interpretation of smile meaning in SIMS, (4) an evaluation of the role of eye contact in the interpretation of facial expression of emotion, and (5) an assessment of the possible moderators of the core SIMS model. We end with an appreciation of the proposed extensions to the model, and note that the future of research on the problem of the smile appears to us to be assured.


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