scholarly journals Spousal Labor Supply as Insurance: Does Unemployment Insurance Crowd Outthe Added Worker Effect?

10.3386/w5608 ◽  
1996 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jonathan Gruber ◽  
Julie Berry Cullen
2000 ◽  
Vol 18 (3) ◽  
pp. 546-572 ◽  
Author(s):  
Julie Berry Cullen ◽  
Jonathan Gruber

2017 ◽  
Vol 107 (7) ◽  
pp. 1778-1823 ◽  
Author(s):  
Nathaniel Hendren

This paper studies the implications of individuals’ knowledge of future job loss for the existence of an unemployment insurance (UI) market. Learning about job loss leads to consumption decreases and spousal labor supply increases. This suggests existing willingness to pay estimates for UI understate its value. But it yields new estimation methodologies that account for and exploit responses to learning about future job loss. Although the new willingness to pay estimates exceed previous estimates, I estimate much larger frictions imposed by private information. This suggests privately traded UI policies would be too adversely selected to be profitable, at any price. (JEL D82, D83, G22, J22, J64, J65)


1994 ◽  
Vol 54 (1) ◽  
pp. 64-84 ◽  
Author(s):  
T. Aldrich Finegan ◽  
Robert A. Margo

Economic analysis of the labor supply of married women has long emphasized the impact of the unemployment of husbands—the added worker effect. This article re-examines the magnitude of the added worker effect in the waning years of the Great Depression. Previous studies of the labor supply of married women during this period failed to take account of various institutional features of New Deal work relief programs, which reduced the size of the added worker effect.


2021 ◽  
Vol 13 (3) ◽  
pp. 1-30
Author(s):  
Itzik Fadlon ◽  
Torben Heien Nielsen

We provide new evidence on households’ labor supply responses to fatal and severe nonfatal health shocks in the short run and medium run. To identify causal effects, we leverage administrative data on Danish families and construct counterfactuals using households that experience the same event a few years apart. Fatal events lead to considerable increases in surviving spouses’ labor supply, which the evidence suggests is driven by families who experience significant income losses. Nonfatal shocks have no meaningful effects on spousal labor supply, consistent with their adequate insurance coverage. The results support self-insurance as a driving mechanism for the family labor supply responses. (JEL D12, D15, G22, I12, J22)


2017 ◽  
Vol 107 (5) ◽  
pp. 343-348 ◽  
Author(s):  
Johannes F. Schmieder ◽  
Till von Wachter

This paper proposes a new measure of the disincentive cost of unemployment insurance (UI): the ratio of the behavioral cost (BC) to the mechanical cost (MC) of a UI reform. This measure represents the labor supply distortion relative to the additional (mechanical) transfer from the UI reform. We show the BC/MC ratio naturally arises from a model of optimal UI and can be readily computed and compared across different types of reforms and labor market contexts. We summarize the evidence regarding the BC/MC ratio for existing studies and relate it to typical measures of employment effects of UI.


2015 ◽  
Vol 7 (4) ◽  
pp. 243-278 ◽  
Author(s):  
Camille Landais

I show how, in the tradition of the dynamic labor supply literature, one can identify the moral hazard effects and liquidity effects of unemployment insurance (UI) using variations along the time profile of unemployment benefits. I use this strategy to investigate the anatomy of labor supply responses to UI. I identify the effect of benefit level and potential duration in the regression kink design using kinks in the schedule of benefits in the US. My results suggest that the response of search effort to UI benefits is driven as much by liquidity effects as by moral hazard effects. (JEL D82, J22, J65)


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