scholarly journals The Incidence of a Firm-Varying Payroll Tax: The Case of Unemployment Insurance

10.3386/w5201 ◽  
1995 ◽  
Author(s):  
Patricia Anderson ◽  
Bruce Meyer
Keyword(s):  
Unemployment Insurance ◽  
Payroll Tax

scholarly journals The Unemployment Insurance Payroll Tax and Interindustry and Interfirm Subsidies

1993 ◽  
Vol 7 ◽  
pp. 111-144 ◽  
Author(s):  
Patricia M. Anderson ◽  
Bruce D. Meyer
Keyword(s):  
Unemployment Insurance ◽  
Payroll Tax

The Labor Supply Consequences of Employment-Limiting Social Insurance Benefits: New Tests for Income Effects

2011 ◽  
Vol 11 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Henry R Hyatt
Keyword(s):  
Labor Supply ◽  
Unemployment Insurance ◽  
Social Insurance ◽  
Workers Compensation ◽  
Payroll Tax ◽  
Insurance Benefits ◽  
Income Effects ◽  
Price Distortion ◽  
Compensation Claim ◽  
Legislative Changes

Abstract Studies of moral hazard in employment-limiting social insurance programs such as Unemployment Insurance or Workers Compensation have demonstrated that higher benefits discourage work, emphasizing the price distortion inherent in benefit provision. Utilizing administrative data linking Workers’ Compensation claim records to wage records from an Unemployment Insurance payroll tax database, I explore a different explanation and implement tests for “income effects” that exploit the fact that claimants no longer experience a distorted price of non-employment after an employment-limiting benefit ends. A pair of legislative changes to a Workers’ Compensation benefit rate show little or no evidence of income effects and moderate evidence of income effects, respectively.

scholarly journals Unemployment Insurance Taxes and Labor Demand: Quasi-Experimental Evidence from Administrative Data

2021 ◽  
Vol 13 (1) ◽  
pp. 266-293 ◽  
Author(s):  
Andrew C. Johnston
Keyword(s):  
Unemployment Insurance ◽  
Great Recession ◽  
Firm Behavior ◽  
Labor Demand ◽  
Tax Rates ◽  
Payroll Tax ◽  
Administrative Records ◽  
The Great Recession ◽  
Quasi Experimental ◽  
Regression Kink Design

To finance unemployment insurance, states raise payroll tax rates on employers who engage in layoffs. Tax rates are, therefore, highest for firms after downturns, potentially hampering labor-market recovery. Using full-population, administrative records from Florida, I estimate the effect of these tax increases on firm behavior leveraging a regression kink design in the tax schedule. Tax hikes reduce hiring and employment substantially, with no effect on layoffs or wages. The results imply unanticipated costs of the financing regime which reduce the optimal benefit by a quarter and account for 12 percent of the unemployment in the wake of the Great Recession. (JEL D22, E24, H25, H32, H71, J23, J65)

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