scholarly journals Group-based Voting in Multicandidate Elections

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Laurent Bouton ◽  
Benjamin Ogden
Keyword(s):  
Multicandidate Elections

Group-based Voting in Multicandidate Elections

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Laurent Bouton ◽  
Benjamin Ogden
Keyword(s):  
Multicandidate Elections

scholarly journals Incentives to Cultivate Favored Minorities Under Alternative Electoral Systems

1993 ◽  
Vol 87 (4) ◽  
pp. 856-869 ◽  
Author(s):  
Roger B. Myerson
Keyword(s):  
Simple Model ◽  
Small Groups ◽  
Electoral Systems ◽  
Scoring Rules ◽  
Game Model ◽  
Approval Voting ◽  
Voting Rules ◽  
Single Transferable Vote ◽  
Sincere Voting ◽  
Multicandidate Elections

A simple model is used to compare, under different electoral systems, the incentives for candidates to create inequalities among otherwise homogeneous voters, by making campaign promises that favor small groups, rather than appealing equally to all voters. In this game model, each candidate generates offers for voters independently out of a distribution that is chosen by the candidate, subject only to the constraints that offers must be nonnegative and have mean 1. Symmetric equilibria with sincere voting are analyzed for two-candidate elections and for multicandidate elections under rank-scoring rules, approval voting, and single transferable vote. Voting rules that can guarantee representation for minorities in multiseat elections generate, in this model, the most severely unequal campaign promises.

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