scholarly journals Social Networks as Contract Enforcement: Evidence from a Lab Experiment in the Field

2014 ◽  
Author(s):  
Arun Chandrasekhar ◽  
Cynthia Kinnan ◽  
Horacio Larreguy
2018 ◽  
Vol 10 (4) ◽  
pp. 43-78 ◽  
Author(s):  
Arun G. Chandrasekhar ◽  
Cynthia Kinnan ◽  
Horacio Larreguy

Lack of well-functioning formal institutions leads to reliance on social networks to enforce informal contracts. Social proximity and network centrality may affect cooperation. To assess the extent to which networks substitute for enforcement, we conducted high-stakes games across 34 Indian villages. We randomized subjects’ partners and whether contracts were enforced to estimate how partners’ relative network position differentially matters across contracting environments. While socially close pairs cooperate even without enforcement, distant pairs do not. Individuals with more central partners behave more cooperatively without enforcement. Capacity for cooperation in the absence of contract enforcement therefore depends on the subjects’ network position. (JEL C93, D86, K12, O15, O17, Z13)


2001 ◽  
Vol 39 (4) ◽  
pp. 1177-1203 ◽  
Author(s):  
James E Rauch

The first two main sections survey the roles of transnational networks in alleviating problems of contract enforcement and providing information about trading opportunities, respectively. The next section covers how domestic networks influence international trade through their impact on domestic market structure. Two overarching questions unify these sections: how do networks affect efficiency, and will networks grow or shrink in importance for international trade over time. The last main sections develop research agendas for two less studied areas: the role of intermediaries who can connect foreign agents to domestic networks and the ability of transnational production networks to facilitate technology transfer.


2015 ◽  
Vol 12 (3) ◽  
pp. 651-676 ◽  
Author(s):  
KARTHIKEYA NARAPARAJU

AbstractIn developing countries, lack of formal contract enforcement mechanisms is compensated by informal governance enforced through trust, kinship, reputation, etc. This paper focuses on one such setting in India's urban informal economy: the ‘day labour’ market for casual labour. We survey seven such markets in Navi Mumbai (a city on the outskirts of Mumbai), and find considerable incidence of contract enforcement problems in the form of employers reneging on wage payments to labourers. We find that payments to labourers with access to social networks and a record of work done are less likely to be reneged. Further, consistent with the literature on the limits of informal enforcement, we find that labourers in large markets, with greater linguistic and caste-based diversity, are more likely to be reneged. We argue that interventions aimed at facilitating access to formal mechanisms might help overcome some of the limitations with informal enforcement.


Author(s):  
Mark E. Dickison ◽  
Matteo Magnani ◽  
Luca Rossi

2006 ◽  
Vol 27 (2) ◽  
pp. 108-115 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ana-Maria Vranceanu ◽  
Linda C. Gallo ◽  
Laura M. Bogart

The present study investigated whether a social information processing bias contributes to the inverse association between trait hostility and perceived social support. A sample of 104 undergraduates (50 men) completed a measure of hostility and rated videotaped interactions in which a speaker disclosed a problem while a listener reacted ambiguously. Results showed that hostile persons rated listeners as less friendly and socially supportive across six conversations, although the nature of the hostility effect varied by sex, target rated, and manner in which support was assessed. Hostility and target interactively impacted ratings of support and affiliation only for men. At least in part, a social information processing bias could contribute to hostile persons' perceptions of their social networks.


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