scholarly journals Entrepreneurial Taxation with Endogenous Entry

2013 ◽  
Author(s):  
Florian Scheuer
Keyword(s):  
Endogenous Entry

scholarly journals Innovation, Reallocation, and Growth

2018 ◽  
Vol 108 (11) ◽  
pp. 3450-3491 ◽  
Author(s):  
Daron Acemoglu ◽  
Ufuk Akcigit ◽  
Harun Alp ◽  
Nicholas Bloom ◽  
William Kerr
Keyword(s):  
Productivity Growth ◽  
Endogenous Entry ◽  
Entry And Exit ◽  
Firm Level ◽  
High Type ◽  
Percent Improvement ◽  
Us Census ◽  
Innovative Capacity ◽  
Firm Entry And Exit ◽  
Central Economic

We build a model of firm-level innovation, productivity growth, and reallocation featuring endogenous entry and exit. A new and central economic force is the selection between high- and low-type firms, which differ in terms of their innovative capacity. We estimate the parameters of the model using US Census microdata on firm-level output, R&D, and patenting. The model provides a good fit to the dynamics of firm entry and exit, output, and R&D. Taxing the continued operation of incumbents can lead to sizable gains (of the order of 1.4 percent improvement in welfare) by encouraging exit of less productive firms and freeing up skilled labor to be used for R&D by high-type incumbents. Subsidies to the R&D of incumbents do not achieve this objective because they encourage the survival and expansion of low-type firms. (JEL D21, D24, H25, L52, O31, O34)

scholarly journals Endogenous Entry, Product Variety, and Business Cycles

2007 ◽  
Author(s):  
Florin Bilbiie ◽  
Fabio Ghironi ◽  
Marc Melitz
Keyword(s):  
Business Cycles ◽  
Product Variety ◽  
Endogenous Entry

Participation incentives in rank order tournaments with endogenous entry

2008 ◽  
Vol 95 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-23 ◽  
Author(s):  
Timothy Mathews ◽  
Soiliou Daw Namoro
Keyword(s):  
Rank Order ◽  
Endogenous Entry

scholarly journals Fighting Fire with Fire: Optimality of Value Destruction to Mitigate Short-Termism

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Adrian Aycan Corum
Keyword(s):  
Venture Capital ◽  
Firm Value ◽  
Private Equity ◽  
Added Value ◽  
Operating Costs ◽  
Endogenous Entry ◽  
Short Term ◽  
Short Termism

I study a model of short-termism where a firm's value is affected by the actions of an agent, who can represent the manager or the board, as well as an entrepreneur, venture capital, private equity, or activist shareholder. The agent either has a project with positive NPV and can further increase the NPV by exerting effort, or has a project that destroys value. The agent has a stake in the company and can liquidate it before the NPV of his actions is realized by the market. This ability to exit creates short-term incentives for the agent to not exert effort, as well as opportunities for him to profit even if he is destroying value. I find that replacing a fraction of agents that have positive NPV projects with value-destroying agents can increase average firm value, because it motivates the value-creating agents to work harder and this effect can dominate the added value destruction. Moreover, this result also holds under endogenous entry of agents: Reducing the entry or operating costs for the agents can increase average firm value and gross value destruction simultaneously, even though the fraction of agents with positive NPV projects decreases. Therefore, regulations that aim mitigating short-termism by curbing value destruction can actually yield opposite results and reduce average firm value instead.

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