scholarly journals How Financial Incentives Induce Disability Insurance Recipients to Return to Work

2013 ◽  
Author(s):  
Andreas Ravndal Kostøl ◽  
Magne Mogstad
Keyword(s):  
Return To Work ◽  
Financial Incentives ◽  
Disability Insurance

scholarly journals How Financial Incentives Induce Disability Insurance Recipients to Return to Work

2014 ◽  
Vol 104 (2) ◽  
pp. 624-655 ◽  
Author(s):  
Andreas Ravndal Kostøl ◽  
Magne Mogstad
Keyword(s):  
Return To Work ◽  
Financial Incentives ◽  
Disability Insurance ◽  
Disposable Income ◽  
Randomized Experiment ◽  
Work Incentives ◽  
Sharp Discontinuity ◽  
Program Costs

Using a local randomized experiment that arises from a sharp discontinuity in Disability Insurance (DI) policy in Norway, we provide transparent and credible identification of how financial incentives induce DI recipients to return to work. We find that many DI recipients have considerable capacity to work that can be effectively induced by providing financial work incentives. We further show that providing work incentives to DI recipients may both increase their disposable income and reduce program costs. Our findings also suggest that targeted policies may be the most effective in encouraging DI recipients to return to work. (JEL D14, H55, J14, J22, J28)

scholarly journals Return-to-Work Policies and Labor Supply in Disability Insurance Programs

2018 ◽  
Vol 108 ◽  
pp. 272-276
Author(s):  
Arezou Zaresani
Keyword(s):  
Return To Work ◽  
Labor Supply ◽  
Labor Force ◽  
Administrative Data ◽  
Policy Change ◽  
Labor Force Participation ◽  
Disability Insurance ◽  
Sharp Discontinuity

Return-to-work policies in disability insurance (DI) programs allow beneficiaries to collect a portion of their benefits while working. I investigate whether a large increase in incentives to work in a return-to-work policy could induce benefit recipients to increase their labor supply. I quantify the effects on earnings and labor force participation using a sharp discontinuity in the induced incentives to work at the month of the policy change in a DI program in Canada. Using administrative data, I document that large incentives to work could induce beneficiaries to increase their labor supply both in intensive and extensive margins.

scholarly journals Financial Incentives and Earnings of Disability Insurance Recipients: Evidence from a Notch Design

2019 ◽  
Vol 11 (2) ◽  
pp. 269-300
Author(s):  
Philippe Ruh ◽  
Stefan Staubli
Keyword(s):  
Administrative Data ◽  
Financial Incentives ◽  
Disability Insurance ◽  
Program Entry

Most countries reduce disability insurance (DI ) benefits for beneficiaries earning above a specified threshold. Such an earnings threshold generates a discontinuous increase in tax liability—a notch—and creates an incentive to keep earnings below the threshold. Exploiting such a notch in Austria, we provide transparent and credible identification of the effect of financial incentives on DI beneficiaries’ earnings. Using rich administrative data, we document large and sharp bunching at the earnings threshold. However, the elasticity driving these responses is small. Our estimate suggests that relaxing the earnings threshold reduces fiscal cost only if program entry is very inelastic. (JEL H55, J14, J31)

Return to Work of Disability Insurance Beneficiaries Who Do and Do Not Access State Vocational Rehabilitation Agency Services

2015 ◽  
Vol 26 (2) ◽  
pp. 111-123 ◽  
Author(s):  
John O’Neill ◽  
Arif A. Mamun ◽  
Elizabeth Potamites ◽  
Fong Chan ◽  
Elizabeth da Silva Cordoso
Keyword(s):  
Return To Work ◽  
Vocational Rehabilitation ◽  
Disability Insurance ◽  
Rehabilitation Agency
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