scholarly journals Racial Differences in Inequality Aversion: Evidence from Real World Respondents in the Ultimatum Game

2011 ◽  
Author(s):  
John Griffin ◽  
David Nickerson ◽  
Abigail Wozniak
Keyword(s):  
Racial Differences ◽  
Real World ◽  
Ultimatum Game ◽  
Inequality Aversion

What does the Ultimatum Game mean in the real world?

2005 ◽  
Vol 28 (6) ◽  
pp. 824-825 ◽  
Author(s):  
Randolph C. Grace ◽  
Simon Kemp
Keyword(s):  
Cultural Differences ◽  
Predictive Validity ◽  
Real World ◽  
Large Scale ◽  
Ultimatum Game ◽  
Meta Analysis ◽  
Cross Cultural ◽  
Social Expenditure ◽  
Cross Cultural Differences ◽  
The Mean

The predictive validity of the ultimatum game (UG) for cross-cultural differences in real-world behavior has not yet been established. We discuss results of a recent meta-analysis (Oosterbeek et al 2004), which examined UG behavior across large-scale societies and found that the mean percent offers rejected was positively correlated with social expenditure.

scholarly journals Affective biases encoded by the central arousal systems dynamically modulate inequality aversion in human interpersonal negotiations

2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Daniel AJ Murphy ◽  
Catherine J Harmer ◽  
Michael Browning ◽  
Erdem Pulcu
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Social Life ◽  
Ultimatum Game ◽  
Cognitive Model ◽  
Negative Influence ◽  
Inequality Aversion ◽  
Actor Model ◽  
Facial Emotions ◽  
Model Free ◽  
Interactive Decision Making

AbstractNegotiating with others about how finite resources should be distributed is an important aspect of human social life. However, little is known about mechanisms underlying human social-interactive decision-making. Here, we report results from a novel iterative Ultimatum Game (UG) task, in which the proposer’s facial emotions and offer amounts were sampled probabilistically based on the participant’s decisions, creating a gradually evolving social-interactive decision-making environment. Our model-free results confirm the prediction that both the proposer’s facial emotions and the offer amount influence human choice behaviour. These main effects demonstrate that biases in facial emotion recognition also contribute to violations of the Rational Actor model (i.e. all offers should be accepted). Model-based analyses extend these findings, indicating that participants’ decisions are guided by an aversion to inequality in the UG. We highlight that the proposer’s facial responses to participant decisions dynamically modulate how human decision-makers perceive self–other inequality, relaxing its otherwise negative influence on decision values. In iterative games, this cognitive model underlies how offers initially rejected can gradually become more acceptable under increasing affective load, and accurately predicts 86% of participant decisions. Activity of the central arousal systems, assessed by measuring pupil size, encode a key element of this model: proposer’s affective reactions in response to participant decisions. Taken together, our results demonstrate that, under affective load, participants’ aversion to inequality is a malleable cognitive process which is modulated by the activity of the pupil-linked central arousal systems.

Dynamic modulation of inequality aversion in human interpersonal negotiations

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Daniel Murphy ◽  
Catherine Harmer ◽  
Michael Browning ◽  
Erdem Pulcu
Keyword(s):  
Social Life ◽  
Ultimatum Game ◽  
Cognitive Model ◽  
Negative Influence ◽  
Inequality Aversion ◽  
Choice Behaviour ◽  
Facial Emotions ◽  
Human Choice ◽  
Model Free ◽  
Interactive Decision Making

Abstract Negotiating with others about how finite resources should be distributed is an important aspect of human social life. However, little is known about mechanisms underlying human social-interactive decision-making in gradually evolving environments. Here, we report results from a novel iterative Ultimatum Game (UG) task, in which the proposer’s facial emotions and offer amounts were sampled probabilistically based on the participant’s decisions. Our model-free results confirm the prediction that both the proposer’s facial emotions and the offer amount should influence human choice behaviour. Model-based analyses extend these findings, indicating that participants’ decisions in the UG are guided by aversion to inequality. We highlight that the proposer’s facial affective reactions to participant decisions dynamically modulate how human decision-makers perceive self–other inequality, relaxing its otherwise negative influence on decision values. In iterative games, this cognitive model underlies how offers initially rejected can gradually become more acceptable under increasing affective load, and accurately predicts ~ 86% of participant decisions. Furthermore, modelling human choice behaviour isolated the role of the central arousal systems, assessed by measuring pupil size, during interpersonal negotiations. We demonstrate that pupil-linked central arousal systems selectively encode a key component of subjective decision values that relate to the magnitude of self–other inequality. Taken together, our results demonstrate that, under affective influence, aversion to inequality is a malleable cognitive process.

scholarly journals Know Your Neighbor: The Impact of Social Context on Fairness Behavior

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Neelanjan Sircar ◽  
Ty Turley ◽  
Peter Cornelis van der Windt ◽  
Maarten Voors
Keyword(s):  
Social Context ◽  
Sierra Leone ◽  
Real World ◽  
Laboratory Experiments ◽  
Ultimatum Game ◽  
Natural Setting ◽  
Game Play ◽  
Human Behaviors ◽  
Ultimatum Games ◽  
The Impact

Laboratory experiments offer an opportunity to isolate human behaviors with a level of precision that is often difficult to obtain using other (survey-based) methods. Yet, experimental tasks are often stripped of any social context, implying that inferences may not directly map to real world contexts. We randomly allocate 632 individuals (grouped randomly into 316 dyads) from small villages in Sierra Leone to four versions of the ultimatum game. In addition to the classic ultimatum game, where both the sender and receiver are anonymous, we reveal the identity of the sender, the receiver or both. This design allows us to explore how fairness behavior is affected by social context in a natural setting where players are drawn from populations that are well-acquainted. We find that average offers increase when the receiver's identity is revealed, suggesting that anonymous ultimatum games underestimate expected fair offers. This study suggest that researchers wishing to relate laboratory behavior to contexts in which the participants are well-acquainted should consider revealing the identities of the players during game play.

Medial frontal negativity reflects advantageous inequality aversion of proposers in the ultimatum game: An ERP study

2016 ◽  
Vol 1639 ◽  
pp. 38-46 ◽  
Author(s):  
Guangrong Wang ◽  
Jianbiao Li ◽  
Zheng Li ◽  
Mengxing Wei ◽  
Shaodong Li
Keyword(s):  
Ultimatum Game ◽  
Inequality Aversion ◽  
Medial Frontal Negativity ◽  
Frontal Negativity
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