scholarly journals "To Establish a More Effective Supervision of Banking": How the Birth of the Fed Altered Bank Supervision

2011 ◽  
Author(s):  
Eugene White
2021 ◽  
Vol 4 (2) ◽  
pp. 88-93
Author(s):  
Andabai Priye Werigbelegha

The study theoretically examines the failure of Lehman Brothers and Merril Lynch as a lesson for the banking institutions in Nigeria. Hence, the instability experience in the Nigeria financial system in recent time; especially, banking sub-sector was as a result of institutional failure. Banking experts in Nigeria viewed that the failure of the two banks was an enough signal to the Nigerian banking industry. Hence, the study reveals that the two banks were absolutely limited to the size and age in determining their future instead of depending on the effectiveness and efficient management of risky assets. Hence, the conventional lending procedures are not instituted; rather than depending on subprime mortgage arrangement that has no collateral securities. The declining home prices has make refinancing more difficult as a result of inadequate innovations in securitization. The recommends that the regulatory authorities should not only relied on the conventional tools of bank supervision, but, they should employ more non-conventional methods of obtaining classified information. The financial institutions should train and retrain their employees to meet the current reality on ground. The conventional lending procedures should be instituted rather than depending on subprime mortgage management that did not have collateral securities. The Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN) should be proactive to ensure effective supervision and risk management principles.


Author(s):  
Ivan Ivanov ◽  
Benjamin Ranish ◽  
James Wang
Keyword(s):  

2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Karthik Balakrishnan ◽  
Emmanuel T. De George ◽  
Aytekin Ertan ◽  
Hannah Scobie
Keyword(s):  

Author(s):  
Timothy J. Curry ◽  
Gary S. Fissel ◽  
Carlos D. Ramirez
Keyword(s):  

Author(s):  
Rachel A. Epstein

If post-communist countries realized marketized bank–state ties through transition and international pressure to privatize their banks with foreign capital, western Eurozone states have more recently come under pressure to follow suit. European Banking Union centralized bank supervision and introduced a single resolution board at the expense of national authority. Thus under banking union, national regulatory and supervisory forbearance was curbed; barriers to banking market entry were no longer the purview of national authorities; disproportionate bank lending to one’s own sovereign would be discouraged; and bank bondholders, creditors and depositors—i.e. market actors—paid the price for bank failures first, before governments and taxpayers. While European Banking Union put the euro on stronger foundations, it also curbed national economic policy discretion and limited tools for adjustment. Taking Italy, Portugal, Spain and Germany as examples, this chapter explains why and in what policy areas Eurozone states’ sovereignty clashed with banking union.


Author(s):  
Madiha Said Abdel‐Razik ◽  
Fayrouz El‐Aguizy ◽  
Ghada Wahby ◽  
Ahmed Samir Elsayad ◽  
Eman Moawad Elhabashi

2021 ◽  
pp. 1-34
Author(s):  
Peter Conti-Brown ◽  
Sean H. Vanatta

The U.S. banking holiday of March 1933 was a pivotal event in twentieth-century political and economic history. After closing the nation's banks for nine days, the administration of newly inaugurated president Franklin D. Roosevelt restarted the banking system as the first step toward national recovery from the global Great Depression. In the conventional narrative, the holiday succeeded because Roosevelt used his political talents to restore public confidence in the nation's banks. However, such accounts say virtually nothing about what happened during the holiday itself. We reinterpret the banking crises of the 1930s and the 1933 holiday through the lens of bank supervision, the continuous oversight of commercial banks by government officials. Through the 1930s banking crises, federal supervisors identified troubled banks but could not act to close them. Roosevelt empowered supervisors to act decisively during the holiday. By closing some banks, supervisors made credible Roosevelt's claims that banks that reopened were sound. Thus, the union of FDR's political skills with the technical judgment of bank supervisors was the key to solving the banking crisis. Neither could stand alone, and both together were the vital precondition for further economic reforms—including devaluing the dollar—and, with them, Roosevelt's New Deal.


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