scholarly journals Information Disclosure Policy: Do States' Data Processing Efforts Help More than the Information Disclosure Itself?

2008 ◽  
Author(s):  
Hyunhoe Bae ◽  
Peter Wilcoxen ◽  
David Popp
Kybernetes ◽  
2010 ◽  
Vol 39 (5) ◽  
pp. 825-837 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jing Zhang ◽  
Shifei Shen ◽  
Rui Yang

PurposeThe purpose of this paper is to focus on resource allocation and information disclosure policy for defending multiple targets against intentional attacks. The intentional attacks, like terrorism events, probably cause great losses and fatalities. Attackers and defenders usually make decisions based on incomplete information. Adaptive attacking and defending strategies are considered, to study how both sides make more effective decisions according to previous fights.Design/methodology/approachA stochastic game‐theoretic approach is proposed for modeling attacker‐defender conflicts. Attackers and defenders are supposed both to be strategic decision makers and partially aware of adversary's information. Adaptive strategies are compared with different inflexible strategies in a fortification‐patrol problem, where the fortification affects the security vulnerability of targets and the patrol indicates the defensive signal.FindingsThe result shows that the intentional risk would be elevated by adaptive attack strategies. An inflexible defending strategy probably fails when facing uncertainties of adversary. It is shown that the optimal response of defenders is to adjust defending strategies by learning from previous games and assessing behaviors of adversaries to minimize the expected loss.Originality/valueThis paper explores how adaptive strategies affect attacker‐defender conflicts. The key issue is defense allocation and information disclosure policy for mitigation of intentional threats. Attackers and defenders can adjust their strategies by learning from previous fights, and the strategic adjustment of both sides may be asynchronous.


2020 ◽  
Vol 110 (1) ◽  
pp. 271-297 ◽  
Author(s):  
Deepal Basak ◽  
Zhen Zhou

In a regime change game, privately informed agents sequentially decide whether to attack without observing others’ previous actions. To dissuade them from attacking, a principal adopts a dynamic information disclosure policy, frequent viability tests. A viability test publicly discloses whether the regime has survived the previous attacks. When such tests are sufficiently frequent, in the unique cutoff equilibrium, agents never attack if the regime passes the latest test, regardless of their private signals. We apply this theory to demonstrate that a borrower can eliminate panic-based runs by sufficiently diffusing the rollover choices across different maturity dates. (JEL C72, D82, G21)


2021 ◽  
pp. 002224372110351
Author(s):  
Brian Mittendorf ◽  
Jiwoong Shin ◽  
Dae-Hee Yoon

Fear of escalating input prices in response to retail success is a commonly-discussed phenomenon affecting supply chains. Such a ratchet effect arises when a retailer feels compelled to modify his investments to better serve the end customers in order to hide positive prospects and restrain future wholesale price hikes. In a two-period model of supply chain interactions, the authors demonstrate that such an endogenous ratchet effect can have multi-faceted reverberations. A retailer fearing price hikes may be tempted to curtail near-term profits to ensure favorable long-term pricing. In response, the supplier can use deep discounts in its initial wholesale prices to convince the retailer to focus on its short-run profits rather than long-run pricing concerns. These deep discounts not only encourage mutually beneficial investments but also alleviate double-marginalization inefficiencies along the supply chain. In light of these results, the authors demonstrate that the mandatory information disclosure policy to reduce the ratchet effect decreases total channel efficiency compared to the case without information disclosure, precisely because mandatory disclosure interrupts the healthy tension among supply chain partners. Thus, the model presents a scenario where ratcheting concerns can create a degree of self-enforcing cooperation that results in socially beneficial responses in supply chains.


Author(s):  
Zulaikha Zulaikha ◽  
Agni Istighfar Paribrata

The public information disclosure policy has entered its 7th year of implementation since it was enacted in 2008 and began to be implemented in 2010. As with other procedures, monitoring and evaluation are required in the application so that the policy implementation does not deviate from the expected. In this Jokowi administration era, the ideas to realise open government are getting closer to the support of the development of information technology. But how is it implemented in the area? This research wants to photograph the implementation of public information disclosure policy in East Java, consisting of 38 districts/municipalities and 56 units of regional apparatus. The results of this study indicate that for the district or city government, the implementation of this information disclosure policy has been an encouraging development, but not so with the Regional Device Work Unit. Likewise, the Information Management and Documentation Officer also experienced progress although there are still shortcomings in the implementation of its duties.


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