scholarly journals Internal Debt Crises and Sovereign Defaults

2008 ◽  
Author(s):  
Cristina Arellano ◽  
Narayana Kocherlakota
Keyword(s):  
Debt Crises ◽  
Sovereign Defaults ◽  
Internal Debt

scholarly journals Internal debt crises and sovereign defaults

2014 ◽  
Vol 68 ◽  
pp. S68-S80 ◽  
Author(s):  
Cristina Arellano ◽  
Narayana Kocherlakota
Keyword(s):  
Debt Crises ◽  
Sovereign Defaults ◽  
Internal Debt

Introduction

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kupelyants Hayk
Keyword(s):  
Sovereign Debt ◽  
Debt Crises ◽  
Sovereign Defaults

The introduction sets the scene for the examination of sovereign defaults. It sets the structure of and the methodology employed in the book. It provides a summary overview of sovereign debt crises, ensuing restructurings, and litigation. It also introduces the reader to the debate about the legitimacy of litigation against impecunious sovereign debtors.

Introduction

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Hayk Kupelyants
Keyword(s):  
Sovereign Debt ◽  
Debt Crises ◽  
Sovereign Defaults

The introduction sets the scene for the examination of sovereign defaults. It sets the structure of and the methodology employed in the book. It provides a summary overview of sovereign debt crises, ensuing restructurings, and litigation. It also introduces the reader to the debate about the legitimacy of litigation against impecunious sovereign debtors.

Visualizing Indicators of Debt Crises in a Lower Dimension

2012 ◽  
pp. 414-431
Author(s):  
Peter Sarlin
Keyword(s):  
Sovereign Debt ◽  
Developed Countries ◽  
The Self ◽  
Financial Data ◽  
Visualization Tool ◽  
Self Organizing Map ◽  
Warning Signals ◽  
Debt Crises ◽  
Sovereign Defaults ◽  
Som Model

Since the 1980s, two severe global waves of sovereign defaults have occurred in less developed countries (LDCs): the LDC defaults in the 1980s and the LDC defaults at the turn of the 21st century. To date, the topic is contemporary, while the forecasting and monitoring results of debt crises are still at a preliminary stage. This chapter explores whether the application of the Self-Organizing Map (SOM), a neural network-based visualization tool, facilitates the monitoring of multidimensional financial data. Thus, this chapter presents a SOM model for visualizing the evolution of sovereign debt crises’ indicators. The results of this chapter indicate that the SOM is a feasible tool for visualization of early warning signals of sovereign defaults.

scholarly journals Opening Pandora’s Box: Sovereign Bonds in International Arbitration

2007 ◽  
Vol 101 (4) ◽  
pp. 711-759 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michael Waibel
Keyword(s):  
Public Policy ◽  
International Law ◽  
Sovereign Debt ◽  
Great Success ◽  
International Arbitration ◽  
Sovereign Bonds ◽  
National Courts ◽  
Debt Crises ◽  
Sovereign Defaults

In recent years, sovereign debt crises have received much attention from the perspective of international public policy, but an effective legal solution to sovereign defaults has yet to coalesce within international law. Over the last two decades, private creditors have increasingly resorted to litigation in national courts, though without great success, in an effort to obtain payment on defaulted sovereign debt. Another, emerging option is arbitration —in particular, before the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID). Will ICSID be the new venue of choice for recovering on sovereign bonds? The conclusion reached here is that attempts to take defaulting countries to ICSID arbitration are unlikely to succeed.

Why Not Default?

2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jerome Roos
Keyword(s):  
Sovereign Debt ◽  
Debt Crisis ◽  
Social Consequences ◽  
Global Finance ◽  
International Crisis ◽  
The Great Depression ◽  
Debt Crises ◽  
City States ◽  
Sovereign Defaults ◽  
International Crisis Management

The European debt crisis has rekindled long-standing debates about the power of finance and the fraught relationship between capitalism and democracy in a globalized world. This book unravels a striking puzzle at the heart of these debates—why, despite frequent crises and the immense costs of repayment, do so many heavily indebted countries continue to service their international debts? The book provides a sweeping investigation of the political economy of sovereign debt and international crisis management. It takes readers from the rise of public borrowing in the Italian city-states to the gunboat diplomacy of the imperialist era and the wave of sovereign defaults during the Great Depression. The book vividly describes the debt crises of developing countries in the 1980s and 1990s, and sheds new light on the recent turmoil inside the Eurozone—including the dramatic capitulation of Greece's short-lived anti-austerity government to its European creditors in 2015. Drawing on in-depth case studies of contemporary debt crises in Mexico, Argentina, and Greece, the book paints a disconcerting picture of the ascendancy of global finance. It shows how the profound transformation of the capitalist world economy over the past four decades has endowed private and official creditors with unprecedented structural power over heavily indebted borrowers, enabling them to impose painful austerity measures and enforce uninterrupted debt service during times of crisis—with devastating social consequences and far-reaching implications for democracy.

scholarly journals Renegotiation Policies in Sovereign Defaults

2014 ◽  
Vol 104 (5) ◽  
pp. 94-100 ◽  
Author(s):  
Cristina Arellano ◽  
Yan Bai
Keyword(s):  
The Other ◽  
Bargaining Solution ◽  
Debt Crises ◽  
Sovereign Defaults ◽  
Decentralized Bargaining

This paper studies an optimal renegotiation protocol designed by a benevolent planner when two countries renegotiate with the same lender. The solution calls for recoveries that induce each country to default or repay, trading off the deadweight costs and the redistribution benefits of default independently of the other country. This outcome contrasts with a decentralized bargaining solution where default in one country increases the likelihood of default in the second country because recoveries are lower when both countries renegotiate. The paper suggests that policies geared at designing renegotiation processes that treat countries in isolation can prevent contagion of debt crises.

Can Sovereign Defaults Be Forecasted?

2000 ◽  
Vol 2000 (4) ◽  
pp. 32-42
Author(s):  
David Anthony
Keyword(s):  
Sovereign Defaults
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