scholarly journals CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND FINANCIAL CONSTRAINTS IN FAMILY CONTROLLED FIRMS: EVIDENCE FROM MALAYSIA

2017 ◽  
Vol 17 (3) ◽  
Author(s):  
Ei-Yet Chu ◽  
Tian-So Lai ◽  
Saw-Imm Song
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Capital Markets ◽  
Financial Constraints ◽  
Family Firms ◽  
Independent Directors ◽  
Equity Financing ◽  
Ceo Duality ◽  
Investment Opportunities ◽  
Internal Capital ◽  
External Capital

The hypothesis of financial constraints suggests that firms will be denied profitable investment dueto inaccessible to external capital markets as debt and equity financing are no longer perfectsubstitutions after firms utilize internal capital. In view of reduced investments during globalfinancial crisis in 2008-2009, the study investigates 157 firms, whether they face the issues offinancial constraints in Malaysia. In general, non-family firms rely heavily on the external debtmarket while family controlled firms utilizing internal cash and reducing their dependence on debtmarket for their investments, confirming financial constraints in family firms. However, thepresence of CEO duality does not exaggerate the problem of financial constraints, but rather leadsfamily firms to become stagnant in their investments. Independent directors appear to beineffective in governing family firms in issuing finances for investment. Apparently, their presencein family firms reduces firms’ investment opportunities either through internal cash and externaldebt financing, which could reduce shareholders’ value in the long-term.Keywords: Investments; Financial Constraints; Corporate Governance; Duality; IndependentDirector; Family Controlled firms.

scholarly journals The board of directors and firm performance: empirical evidence from listed companies

2019 ◽  
Vol 19 (3) ◽  
pp. 508-551 ◽  
Author(s):  
Alessandro Merendino ◽  
Rob Melville
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Firm Performance ◽  
Agency Theory ◽  
Ownership Structure ◽  
Listed Companies ◽  
Independent Directors ◽  
Board Structure ◽  
Board Size ◽  
Ceo Duality ◽  
Content Type

PurposeThis study aims to reconcile some of the conflicting results in prior studies of the board structure–firm performance relationship and to evaluate the effectiveness and applicability of agency theory in the specific context of Italian corporate governance practice.Design/methodology/approachThis research applies a dynamic generalised method of moments on a sample of Italian listed companies over the period 2003-2015. Proxies for corporate governance mechanisms are the board size, the level of board independence, ownership structure, shareholder agreements and CEO–chairman leadership.FindingsWhile directors elected by minority shareholders are not able to impact performance, independent directors do have a non-linear effect on performance. Board size has a positive effect on firm performance for lower levels of board size. Ownership structure per se and shareholder agreements do not affect firm performance.Research limitations/implicationsThis paper contributes to the literature on agency theory by reconciling some of the conflicting results inherent in the board structure–performance relationship. Firm performance is not necessarily improved by having a high number of independent directors on the board. Ownership structure and composition do not affect firm performance; therefore, greater monitoring provided by concentrated ownership does not necessarily lead to stronger firm performance.Practical implicationsThis paper suggests that Italian corporate governance law should improve the rules and effectiveness of minority directors by analysing whether they are able to impede the main shareholders to expropriate private benefits on the expenses of the minority. The legislator should not impose any restrictive regulations with regard to CEO duality, as the influence of CEO duality on performance may vary with respect to the unique characteristics of each company.Originality/valueThe results enrich the understanding of the applicability of agency theory in listed companies, especially in Italy. Additionally, this paper provides a comprehensive synthesis of research evidence of agency theory studies.

With one hand tied behind their back

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Graeme Guthrie
Keyword(s):  
New York ◽  
Capital Markets ◽  
Capital Market ◽  
Cable Television ◽  
Share Repurchases ◽  
Internal Capital Market ◽  
Internal Capital ◽  
External Capital ◽  
Investment Returns ◽  
Break Up

This chapter uses the New York cable television provider Cablevision to describe the way in which boards can delegate some of the task of monitoring management to participants in external capital markets. Unlike a firm’s current shareholders, who have little say over how their funds are allocated, external capital markets provide their funds only if the investment returns are adequate. This chapter shows how managers of firms with substantial cash-generating assets in place can use the collateral that these assets provide to weaken the discipline of external capital markets. It shows how their ability to do this is restricted if the board authorizes share repurchases or special dividends funded by increased borrowing, as these replace “soft” payouts to shareholders with “hard” payouts to bondholders. Managers’ ability to exploit collateral is further restricted if the board uses spinoffs to break up the firm’s internal capital market.

scholarly journals New Hope for Corporate Governance in China?

2007 ◽  
Vol 191 ◽  
pp. 590-612 ◽  
Author(s):  
James V. Feinerman
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Financial Markets ◽  
Capital Markets ◽  
Regulatory Framework ◽  
Company Law ◽  
Financial Disclosure ◽  
Independent Directors ◽  
Minority Shareholders ◽  
Securities Law ◽  
Chinese Law

AbstractChina's recent revisions to its Company Law and Securities Law have brought new attention to issues of corporate governance in Chinese companies and financial markets. Among the chief criticisms of the earlier laws – in both their provisions and application – were the lack of protection for minority shareholders, the paucity of independent directors, the absence of transparency and inadequate financial disclosure. The acknowledged need for greater congruence between Chinese law and practice and that of countries with more developed capital markets led to the proposal of amendments to China's legislation during the first half of this decade. This article highlights several improvements resulting from the revisions as well as remaining weaknesses in the regulatory framework for corporate enterprises in China.

scholarly journals Earnings management, corporate governance, and ownership structure of Philippine initial public offerings

2021 ◽  
Vol 18 (4) ◽  
pp. 175-191
Author(s):  
Angelo O. Burdeos
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Earnings Management ◽  
Initial Public Offerings ◽  
Ownership Structure ◽  
Stock Exchange ◽  
The Philippines ◽  
Ownership Concentration ◽  
Independent Directors ◽  
Ceo Duality ◽  
Public Offerings

Prior studies examined the effect of corporate governance variables on discretionary current accrual, the most widely used measurement of earnings management. The principal-agent conflict implies that the size of the board, the percent of independent directors, CEO duality, and auditor prestige limit discretionary current accruals (DCA). This paper extends past studies by examining the effect of ownership structure on discretionary current accruals. The study determines the level of income-increasing earnings management of initial public offerings (IPOs) in the Philippines and the factors that explain it. Particularly, the paper examines the effect of ownership concentration and largest shareholder ownership on discretionary current accruals. The study uses a final sample of 105 IPO firms in Philippine Stock Exchange (PSE) from 2008 to 2018. Employing the modified Jones’s (1991) model to measure discretionary current accrual and multiple regression analysis, the study finds -4.19% discretionary current accrual on the average. It also reveals that the 2002 Philippine Code of Corporate Governance (PCCG) is ineffective in curbing earnings management. In addition, there is an insignificant relationship between the size of the board, CEO duality, ownership concentration, largest shareholder ownership and auditor prestige, and earnings management. Furthermore, the paper finds a significant relationship between the percent of independent directors, industry sector, return on assets (ROA) and cash flow from operations and earnings management.

Internal Capital Markets in Times of Crisis: The Benefit of Group Affiliation*

2019 ◽  
Vol 24 (4) ◽  
pp. 773-811 ◽  
Author(s):  
Raffaele Santioni ◽  
Fabio Schiantarelli ◽  
Philip E Strahan
Keyword(s):  
Cash Flow ◽  
Capital Markets ◽  
Capital Market ◽  
Cash Transfers ◽  
Internal Capital Markets ◽  
Group Affiliation ◽  
Internal Capital Market ◽  
Investment Opportunities ◽  
Internal Capital ◽  
Better Than

Abstract Firms affiliated with business groups survive the stress of the global financial and euro crises better than unaffiliated firms. Using granular data from Italy, we show that better performance stems partly from access to an internal capital market, as the survival value of group-affiliated firms increases with group-wide cash flow. Internal cash transfers increase when banks’ health deteriorates, with funds moving from cash-rich to cash-poor firms and, some evidence suggests, to firms with favorable investment opportunities. Internal capital markets’ role thus increases when external markets (banks) are distressed.

scholarly journals Chinese CEO, Risk Taking and the Power of CEO: Empirical Evidence from Malaysian Family Firms

2021 ◽  
Vol 58 (1) ◽  
pp. 59-84
Author(s):  
Swee-Sim Foong ◽  
Jiunn-Shyan Khong ◽  
Boon-Leong Lim
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Empirical Evidence ◽  
Risk Taking ◽  
Lower Risk ◽  
Family Firms ◽  
Independent Directors ◽  
Ceo Power ◽  
Structural Power ◽  
Expert Power

This paper examines the risk taking behaviour of Chinese CEO. Our analysis is based on a sample of 362 family firms in Malaysia over the 2009-2015 period using panel GMM methodology. Firstly, our results offer evidence that Chinese CEOs are risk taking. We then examine how CEO power, in the context of Finkelstein’s (1992) structural power, ownership power, expert power and prestige power, might drive risk taking of Chinese CEOs. The results are rather mixed where greater ownership power is likely to promote higher risk taking but greater expert power resulted in lower risk taking. We further show that corporate governance can mitigate risk taking of Chinese CEO in family firms. When the proportions of independent directors and foreign institutional shareholdings exceed the median thresholds of 40% and 5%, respectively, we find that CEO risk taking behaviour turns from positive to negative. Stronger evidence is found when we adjust the thresholds to the 75th percentile of 50% and 15%, respectively. The result is also robust with the use of leverage as a measure for CEO risk taking.

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