Incentivizing and Tendering Conservation Contracts: The Trade-off between Participation and Effort Provision

2016 ◽  
Vol 92 (2) ◽  
pp. 273-291 ◽  
Author(s):  
S. Schilizzi ◽  
U. Latacz-Lohmann
Keyword(s):  
Trade Off ◽  
Conservation Contracts ◽  
Effort Provision

scholarly journals Fatter or Fitter? On rewarding and training in a contest

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Derek Clark ◽  
Tore Nilssen
Keyword(s):  
Incomplete Information ◽  
Selection Problem ◽  
Trade Off ◽  
Heterogeneous Players ◽  
Fixed Budget ◽  
Set Up ◽  
Effort Provision ◽  
And Training

Competition between heterogeneous participants often leads to low effort provision in contests. We consider a principal who can divide her fixed budget between skill-enhancing training and the contest prize. Training can reduce heterogeneity, which increases effort. But it also reduces the contest prize, which makes effort fall. We set up an incomplete-information contest with heterogeneous players and show how this trade-off is related to the size of the budget when the principal maximizes expected effort. A selection problem can also arise in this framework in which there is a cost associated with a contest win by the inferior player. This gives the principal a larger incentive to train the expected laggard, reducing the size of the prize on offer.

scholarly journals Partnerships versus Corporations: Moral Hazard, Sorting, and Ownership Structure

2014 ◽  
Vol 104 (1) ◽  
pp. 291-307 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ayça Kaya ◽  
Galina Vereshchagina
Keyword(s):  
Moral Hazard ◽  
Ownership Structure ◽  
Team Production ◽  
Trade Off ◽  
The Cost ◽  
Power Of Incentives ◽  
Effort Provision

Team production takes advantage of technological complementarities but comes with the cost of free-ridership. When workers differ in skills, the choice of sorting pattern may be associated with a nontrivial trade-off between exploiting the technological complementarities and minimizing the cost of free-ridership. This paper demonstrates that whether such a trade-off arises depends (i) on how the power of incentives required for effort provision varies with workers’ types, and (ii) on whether the workers are organized for production in partnerships or in corporations. These results have implications for how production is organized in different industries—in partnerships or in corporations. (JEL D21, D82, G32, M12, M54)

A Flow-Preserving Algorithm for the Time-Cost Trade-Off Problem

1982 ◽  
Vol 14 (2) ◽  
pp. 109-113 ◽  
Author(s):  
Suleyman Tufekci
Keyword(s):  
Time Cost ◽  
Trade Off

Dual Goals for Speed and Accuracy on the Same Performance Task

2012 ◽  
Vol 11 (3) ◽  
pp. 118-126 ◽  
Author(s):  
Olive Emil Wetter ◽  
Jürgen Wegge ◽  
Klaus Jonas ◽  
Klaus-Helmut Schmidt
Keyword(s):  
Memory Scanning ◽  
Performance Task ◽  
Performance Tasks ◽  
Trade Off ◽  
Test Experiment ◽  
Trade Offs ◽  
New Finding ◽  
Sternberg Paradigm ◽  
Speed Accuracy ◽  
Speed And Accuracy

In most work contexts, several performance goals coexist, and conflicts between them and trade-offs can occur. Our paper is the first to contrast a dual goal for speed and accuracy with a single goal for speed on the same task. The Sternberg paradigm (Experiment 1, n = 57) and the d2 test (Experiment 2, n = 19) were used as performance tasks. Speed measures and errors revealed in both experiments that dual as well as single goals increase performance by enhancing memory scanning. However, the single speed goal triggered a speed-accuracy trade-off, favoring speed over accuracy, whereas this was not the case with the dual goal. In difficult trials, dual goals slowed down scanning processes again so that errors could be prevented. This new finding is particularly relevant for security domains, where both aspects have to be managed simultaneously.

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