scholarly journals Newtonian and Non-Newtonian Elements in Hume

2016 ◽  
Vol 14 (3) ◽  
pp. 275-296 ◽  
Author(s):  
Matias Slavov

For the last forty years, Hume's Newtonianism has been a debated topic in Hume scholarship. The crux of the matter can be formulated by the following question: Is Hume a Newtonian philosopher? Debates concerning this question have produced two lines of interpretation. I shall call them ‘traditional’ and ‘critical’ interpretations. The traditional interpretation asserts that there are many Newtonian elements in Hume, whereas the critical interpretation seriously questions this. In this article, I consider the main points made by both lines of interpretations and offer further arguments that contribute to this debate. I shall first argue, in favor of the traditional interpretation, that Hume is sympathetic to many prominently Newtonian themes in natural philosophy such as experimentalism, criticality of hypotheses, inductive proof, and criticality of Leibnizian principles of sufficient reason and intelligibility. Second, I shall argue, in accordance with the critical interpretation, that in many cases Hume is not a Newtonian philosopher: His conceptions regarding space and time, vacuum, reality of forces, specifics about causation, and the status of mechanism differ markedly from Newton's related conceptions. The outcome of the article is that there are both Newtonian and non/anti-Newtonian elements in Hume.

2018 ◽  
Vol 54 (1) ◽  
pp. 175-190
Author(s):  
Jan Woleński

Abstract This paper discusses the concept of nothing (nothingness) from the point of logic and ontology (metaphysics). It is argued that the category of nothing as a denial of being is subjected to various interpretations. In particular, this thesis concerns the concept of negation as used in metaphysics. Since the Leibniz question ‘Why is there something rather than nothing?’ and the principle of sufficient reason is frequently connected with the status of nothing, their analysis is important for the problem in question. Appendix contains a short critical analysis of Heidegger’s famous statement Das Nichts nichtet.


Traditio ◽  
1995 ◽  
Vol 50 ◽  
pp. 75-94 ◽  
Author(s):  
William D. McCready

The observation has been made frequently enough in the recent and, indeed, not so recent scholarly literature to have assumed the status of a received truth: the Venerable Bede, esteemed for both his saintliness and his scholarship, simply did not like Isidore of Seville. Although Bede knew Isidore's major works, at least, and used them extensively, he was less respectful of Isidore, we are told, than he was of his other authorities. On only three occasions does he refer to Isidore by name, and each time it is to correct him. Part of the explanation, it has been suggested, lies in their sharply differing attitudes towards antique literary culture. Whereas Isidore was a product of the ancient world, says Riché, Bede decisively turned against its cultural and educational legacy, rejecting the approach, sanctioned by both Augustine and Gregory the Great, that enlisted the liberal arts in the service of Christian thought. He also, Riché goes on to say, was distrustful of the broadly-based scientific curiosity evinced in Isidore's works. Despite his acknowleged accomplishments, Bede's own scientific interests were, like those of other educated Anglo-Saxons, strictly limited. Natural philosophy writ large was suspect because of the irreligious aberrations to which it might lead. To C. W. Jones and a number of more recent commentators, the crux of the matter is Isidore's incompetence, not his excessive zeal. In Bede's view, Isidore simply did not work to a high enough standard. Hence he turned to other authorities, scarcely containing his disdain of the Sevillian. “The weakness of Isidore's treatment of cycles is manifest to the elementary student,” Jones points out; “it would be more than irritating to Bede.”


2019 ◽  
Vol 49 (2) ◽  
pp. 145-165
Author(s):  
Miles Hentrup ◽  

In this article, I offer a critical interpretation of Hegel’s claims regarding the presuppositionless status of the Logic. Commentators have been divided as to whether the Logic actually achieves the status of presuppositionless science, disagreeing as to whether the Logic succeeds in making an unmediated beginning. I argue, however, that this understanding of presuppositionless science is misguided, as it reflects a spurious conception of immediacy that Hegel criticizes as false. Contextualizing Hegel’s remarks in light of his broader approach to the problem of beginning, I contend that Hegel’s Logic is presuppositionless not in the sense that it satisfies a formal epistemological demand to begin free from all mediation, but in that its self-mediating structure facilitates an immanent deduction of the categories.


2019 ◽  
Vol 5 (4) ◽  
pp. 18
Author(s):  
Daban Mohammed Haji ◽  
Fenik Muhammad Ghafur

this research paper explores lexical lacunae at the word level at the context of English-Kurdish scientific translation. First, the paper briefly describes the development of scientific translation through space and time, and then it demonstrates the status of English and Kurdish as the language of natural sciences. Despite its significance, scientific translation has received little attention in the realm of Translation Studies, and none of the mainstream theories of translation is associated with scientific translation. Thus, this paper assumes that different translation procedures were opted for in overcoming the lexical lacunae in the context of English-Kurdish scientific translation. This paper scrutinises the English-Kurdish translation in the field of theoretical physics, an area which has hitherto left untouched. It explores a set of five theoretical physics books and their translated Kurdish versions, which altogether constitutes a corpus of circa 520,000 words. The study discloses that triplets, borrowing, expansion and omission procedures are employed to deal with lexical lacuna in the context of English-Kurdish scientific translation. It further reveals that LSP specialists were moderately prosperous in transmitting the full lexical contents of the ST.  


Problemos ◽  
2006 ◽  
Vol 69 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jonas Čiurlionis

Erdvės ir laiko sampratų istorijoje I. Newtonas yra neabejotinai viena svarbiausių figūrų. Absoliučios erdvės ir laiko idėjos ilgą laiką buvo plačiai pripažintos ir realiai paneigtos tik XX a. pradžioje, atsiradus specialiajai reliatyvumo teorijai. Tačiau niutoniškajai mechanikai įsitvirtinti reikėjo nukonkuruoti R. Descartes’o gamtamokslines pažiūras. Kita vertus, ar gali būti, kad abiejų filosofų pažiūros yra ne tiek prieštaraujančios, kiek panašios? Ar gali būti, kad I. Newtonas pasinaudojo R. Descartes’o idėjomis, konstruodamas savo garsiuosius judėjimo dėsnius, kuriais konstatavo laiko ir erdvės absoliutumą? Šie probleminiai klausimai yra nagrinėjami straipsnyje.Reikšminiai žodžiai: erdvė, laikas, judėjimo dėsniai, reliatyvumas. R. DESCARTES AND I. NEWTON: SIMILARITIES AND DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THEIR SYSTEMS OF NATURAL PHILOSOPHYJonas Čiurlionis Summary Throughout the history of undertanding space and time, I. Newton is undoubtedly one of the most important figures. His ideas of absolute space and time were widely accepted and refused only in the beginning of the 20th century with the rise of special theory of reliativity. However, in order to be recognized, Newtonian mechanics had to win the competition against Cartesian natural philosophy. On the other hand, can it be that views of both philosophers are more similar than contradictory? Can it be that I. Newton used the ideas of R. Descartes while constructing his famous laws of motion – the foundation for the absolute space and time? These and similar problematic questions are discussed in the article.Keywords: space, time, laws of motion, relativity.


Vivarium ◽  
2019 ◽  
Vol 57 (1-2) ◽  
pp. 51-101
Author(s):  
C. Philipp E. Nothaft

AbstractThis article edits and examines a little-known epistolary treatise datable to 1322, which survives in a fifteenth-century manuscript in the Herzog-August-Bibliothek, Wolfenbüttel. The author of this work was engaged in a heated argument with the Parisian philosopher Jean de Jandun over the status and rationality of astrology. Jean’s pro-astrological stance is documented in a letter dated 28 October 1321, which survives for having been appended to the main treatise. In responding to Jean de Jandun’s letter, the author delivered a trenchant critique of astrology grounded almost entirely in philosophical, as opposed to theological, ideas, addressing issues such as empirical evidence, causality, and contingency. The author’s way of pointing out ruptures between astrology and Aristotelian natural philosophy marks him out as an intellectual precursor to the much better-known anti-astrological polemics written later in the same century by Parisian thinkers such as Nicole Oresme and Heinrich von Langenstein.


2019 ◽  
pp. 92-117
Author(s):  
Paul Thagard

Following a naturalistic approach to metaphysics, this chapter argues that materialism and scientific realism are much more plausible than their major alternatives: idealism and social constructivism. The appropriate philosophical method is to use inference to the best explanation of evidence rather than thought experiments and a priori speculation. Natural philosophy legitimately accepts the existence of objects, properties, relations, changes, events, processes, mechanisms, groups, space, and time. All of these concepts and hypotheses are subject to revision as science and philosophy generate more evidence and alternatives. However, skepticism is appropriate concerning the existence of other entities such as souls, gods, spirits, facts, and group minds. If evidence and inference to the best explanation support the existence of an entity, then we are justified in concluding that it exists.


Author(s):  
Gregory Brown

The correspondence between Leibniz and Samuel Clarke—mediated by Leibniz’s erstwhile friend and disciple at the electoral court in Hanover, Caroline of Brandenburg-Ansbach, princess of Wales—is arguably the most famous and influential of philosophical correspondences. In this chapter, I begin by tracing the background of the correspondence and the role that Caroline played in its inception and development. I then turn to a discussion of the main themes of the correspondence, paying particular attention to the importance of Caroline’s presence in shaping the themes of the debate: the principle of sufficient reason, the identity of indiscernibles, God’s choice in creating this world, space and time, God’s presence and activity in the world, miracles, and gravity.


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