scholarly journals What Is It Like To Be Immortal?

Diametros ◽  
2019 ◽  
pp. 65-77
Author(s):  
Joseph Ulatowski

The idea of an eternal and immortal life like the one we lead now seems quite appealing because (i) it will be sufficiently like our own earth-bound life and (ii) we will have the same kinds of desires we have now to want to live an eternal life.  This paper will challenge the view that we have a conception of what the conscious experience of an immortal is like, regardless of whether we might want to live it. Given that for us to conceive of an immortal life we must project onto it our own view of what it is like to live our own life and given that an immortal life may not be anything like the life we live, we cannot conceive of what it is like to be immortal.

2021 ◽  
Vol 11 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Caleb Liang ◽  
Wen-Hsiang Lin ◽  
Tai-Yuan Chang ◽  
Chi-Hong Chen ◽  
Chen-Wei Wu ◽  
...  

AbstractBody ownership concerns what it is like to feel a body part or a full body as mine, and has become a prominent area of study. We propose that there is a closely related type of bodily self-consciousness largely neglected by researchers—experiential ownership. It refers to the sense that I am the one who is having a conscious experience. Are body ownership and experiential ownership actually the same phenomenon or are they genuinely different? In our experiments, the participant watched a rubber hand or someone else’s body from the first-person perspective and was touched either synchronously or asynchronously. The main findings: (1) The sense of body ownership was hindered in the asynchronous conditions of both the body-part and the full-body experiments. However, a strong sense of experiential ownership was observed in those conditions. (2) We found the opposite when the participants’ responses were measured after tactile stimulations had ceased for 5 s. In the synchronous conditions of another set of body-part and full-body experiments, only experiential ownership was blocked but not body ownership. These results demonstrate for the first time the double dissociation between body ownership and experiential ownership. Experiential ownership is indeed a distinct type of bodily self-consciousness.


1917 ◽  
Vol 63 (263) ◽  
pp. 565-568
Author(s):  
Alan McDougall

In the beginning every creature was a patriarch: it was, philosophically, not only its individual self, but also all its potential progeny. Such a creature's whole conduct was directed towards the one goal of eternal life on earth. It so happened that in very many cases the creature's best chance of success involved association with other creatures of its kind, or even of other kinds. From this arose the complication of the acquirement of tribal instincts. Tribal instincts were acquired only for patriarchal purposes, though in very many cases they proved to be the immediate cause of the creature's death. A further complication arose when certain of the creatures acquired intellect and took to thinking. Philosophically, a living thing exists only that it may produce a generation capable of producing yet another generation. A generation is important only as the cause of its next generation. Intellect often gave the creature an immediate advantage over rivals, but it glorified the individual self at the expense of the patriarchal self. This is recognised in the third chapter of Genesis, where intellect is called the serpent, and thinking is called (in Chapter II) the tree of the knowledge of good and evil. The statement that “in the day that thou eatest thereof, thou shalt surely die” declares that the race is kept going only by those who do not understand how to limit their families.


2001 ◽  
Vol 54 (2) ◽  
pp. 155-176 ◽  
Author(s):  
George Hunsinger

‘All the gifts of God set forth in baptism,’ wrote John Calvin, ‘are found in Christ alone’ (Inst. IV.15.6). The baptismal gifts, for Calvin, were essentially three: forgiveness of sins, dying and rising with Christ, and communion with Christ himself (FV.15.1, 5, 6). They were ordered, however, in a particular way. Communion with Christ, Calvin considered, was in effect the one inestimable gift that included within itself the other two benefits of forgiveness and rising with Christ from the dead. Forgiveness and eternal life were thus inseparable from Christ's person and so from participatio Christi through our communion with him. Only by participating in Christ through communion could the divine gifts set forth in baptism be truly received. Any severing of these gifts from Christ himself would result only in empty abstractions. No spiritual gift—neither forgiveness nor eternal life nor any other divine benefit—was ever to be found alongside Christ or apart from him. Christ's saving benefits were inherent in his living person. Only in and with his person were they set forth and available to the church. Communion with Christ was thus bound up with Christ's person in his saving uniqueness. He himself and he alone, for Calvin and for the whole Reformation, was our wisdom, righteousness, sanctification and redemption (1 Cor. 1:30).


Author(s):  
Jeffrey G. Silcock

Luther does not develop a theology of hope because hope is not the central driver of his mature theology. Central for him is rather faith in the promise of God, which gives rise to hope as well as love. There are two sides to justification that correspond to the now/not-yet character of Luther’s eschatology. On the one hand, we are already righteous through the gift of Christ’s righteousness, which we have in spe but not yet in re. On the other hand, the hope of righteousness strengthens us against sin as we wait for the perfection of our righteousness in heaven. However, in the final analysis, the basis of our hope is not the incipient righteousness which has begun in us (in re) as we gradually grow in holiness and righteousness, but Christ’s own perfect righteousness which he imputes to us through faith (iustitia aliena). For hope can only be rock-solid if it is grounded not on anything within us, but on Christ alone. The early Luther has a very different view of things because, before 1518, he is still very much under the influence of Augustine, which means that justification is primarily a process that goes on within a person’s heart rather than, as in the later Luther, faith in God’s word of promise that comes to a person from outside and gives what it says. The dominant theological concept in Luther’s early work is the theology of humility, which is predicated on the view that God must first humble you and cause you to despair, before he can raise you up and give you hope. Since here faith is not yet oriented to the promise but defined by humility, it has to remain uncertain, as does hope. In the later Luther, on the other hand, faith gives rise to confidence and hope because it is firmly grounded in God’s word of promise, which is always reliable because God does what he says. With his faith firmly grounded in Christ, Luther knows that he can weather all the trials and struggles of life; in fact, he can even look forward to death, since for Christians death is but the door to life with God forever. For Luther, Christ is the only hope for a hopeless world. For him, this is not wishful thinking but is rock-solid because it is based on the promise of the crucified and risen Lord. This is also the basis of the Christian hope for eternal life in the presence of the Triune God, together with the renewed creation and all the hosts of heaven.


2019 ◽  
pp. 7-29
Author(s):  
Hans J. Lundager Jensen

ENGLISH ABSTRACT: In the Hebrew Bible, there is no wish for a heavenly existence among human beings; God and his angels on the one hand and human beings on the other, normally maintain a safe distance from each other. Divine beings are potentially deadly for humans, and dead humans are the strongest source of impurity that threatens to encroach upon holy places. With the ‘ontological’ transformation in antique Judaism and early Christianity that opened up the possibility of an eternal life in heaven, followed a reversal of the value of death-impurity in a manner that resembles Indian Tantrism; no longer something to avoid, the way to heaven passed through dead bodies. DANSK RESUMÉ: I Det Gamle Testamente er der ingen forventning eller ønske om et liv i himlen efter døden. Gud og guddommelige væsener på den ene side og mennesker på den anden bevarer normalt en rimelig afstand til hinanden. Guddommelige væsener er potentielt dræbende, og døde mennesker er den stærkeste form for urenhed der truer med at invadere hellige steder. Med den ‘ontologiske’ transformation der fandt sted i antik Jødedom og som åbnede for muligheden for et liv i himlen efter døden, fulgte en omvending af synet på døde menneskers kroppe, der på nogle punkter minder om den indiske tantrisme. Døde kroppe skulle ikke længere undgås, men opsøges på vejen til himlen.


Author(s):  
Olha Petrenko-Tseunova

The author analyzes wandering dyaks as a specific group of 18th-century Ukrainian city and town intellectuals. During vacations and religious holidays, these young people went to high clergy and secular houses. They sang congratulatory songs about Christmas or Easter and delivered orations – poetic humorous speeches – abo school life and pupils’ wretchedness. For their performance, the wandering dyaks were rewarded, mostly with food. There was a special order from the administration of Kyiv-Mohyla Academy to release poor students for food begging with the obligation to return before the beginning of the school year. Therefore, such poems usually ended with a request for a reward. Gastronomic poetics is one of the key tools of the «grassroots» baroque that appeared thanks to the intersection of the intellectual urban and folk rural cultures. This phenomenon became the basis for Ivan Kotlyarevsky’s «Eneida», a step towards new-time Ukrainian literature. The texts analyzed in the article were first found in manuscript songbooks of 18th and early 19th century, both in Naddnipryanshchyna and Western Ukraine. It is noticeable that even after the end of the baroque epoch these songs were not forgotten, they were still performed, and ethnographers fixed them in various versions. In contrast to the of «high» baroque, marked by the occurrence of metaphoricity and abstractness, one of the main characteristics of wandering dyaks’ poems is the emphasis on materiality, especially food. According to this, it is worth using gastrocriticism to interpret orations and travesties. Gastronomic markers in the festive burlesque function as a series of oppositions: daily and ceremonial food; proper and improper; moderate and excessive; bestowed and stolen; banned and allowed; spiritual and carnal. Four aspects are investigated in the article. First of all, the self-image of ever-hungry students is closely reviewed. School life for common citizen had a clear association with poverty, which pointes the prominent role of malnutrition and forced fasting in poems of wandering dyaks. Secondly, the appearing of gastronomic utopias is proved as a reaction to a prolonged period of starvation. One more aspect is the conviction of excessive feeding. The last but not the least is the motive of giving, feasting and donating food in the poems of wandering dyaks. The poetry of wandering dyaks consists of the element of folk culture, on the one hand, and the literary imagery, on the other. For the intellectual of the 18th-century nutrition, along with the usual meaning, reflects the unity of bodily and spiritual parts of human nature. In the baroque culture, the widespread metaphor is eating as a spiritual act, and the cognition is perceived as the saturation of the inner world. Nutrition is considered in two semantic terms: firstly, food as a sign of physicality and, potentially, sinfulness and seduction; secondly, food as the embodiment of eternal life, the celebration of vitality. The «high» baroque culture transmits the first vision. Instead, the «lower» culture is characterized by the second idea, which explains the emergence of gastronomic fantasies in the poems of wandering dyaks.


Author(s):  
Godehard Brüntrup

SummaryIn Germany, Holm Tetens is an influential analytic philosopher of science, mind, and logic. For many years he had been arguing within the widely accepted framework of naturalism and atheism. It came, to put it mildly, as a surprise to the entire philosophical community in Germany when he published a book defending theism in 2015. In this book “Thinking God” he claims that physicalism is an incomplete account of reality, because the mental and ideal realm cannot be reduced to the physical realm. As an alternative, he develops a version of theistic idealism which stands in the tradition of “panentheism”. Human subjectivity is fully embedded into the all-encompassing divine subjectivity. In dealing with the problem of theodicy, he then argues that the hope for eternal life and salvation by a supremely good being makes life more meaningful, esp. because it offers a prospect for justice to the countless victims of history. To Tetens, the worldview of naturalism and the worldview of theistic idealism are on the one hand both equally rational and defensible. On the other hand, both cannot be defeated by knock-down arguments. In closing, he urges his peers in philosophy to take the question of God seriously again. Shortly after the publication of the book, the Catholic Academy of Bavaria and the Munich School of Philosophy jointly organized an international master class on Tetens’s views which was taught by himself. The papers published in this issue grew out of this master class. For each paper by a young scholar there is also a reply by Tetens. The following editorial addresses specifically the German-speaking audience. It was thus not translated into English. All original papers discussing Tetens’s views and his replies to these, however, were written in English for the sake of reaching a larger worldwide readership.


Elore ◽  
2005 ◽  
Vol 12 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Olga Davydova

In this article I ponder the relationship between rituals and identities in the context of the remigration of persons of Finnish origin from Russia to Finland. The traditional ethnological study of rituals of death presupposes that ritual has to do with the community’s system of values and answers the main questions of human existence concerning the possibility of eternal life. In this conception of ritual the person is seen as a member of collective and a carrier of its culture. On the contrary, the postmodern theory of subjectivity releases the subject from membership in the stable group, but argues that identification is a flexible strategic process, serving the individual’s and group’s future goals. Using examples of official Soviet-era funeral scenarios and unofficial Russian folk-religious funerals, I analyze those cultural models and ideologies. Through my own experiences of funerals in Petrozavodsk and Joensuu I introduce the multivoicedness of funeral practices. Remigration to Finland is a part of present-day Finnish nationalism on the one hand, and global transnational migration and diasporic space on the other. A return migrant’s ethnic, national, ideological and cultural identification tends to be multi- layered, inconsistent and hybrid. Conducting ritual according to a certain canon does not automatically express the “true identity” or moral values of the community, but rather perceived configurations of cultural power-relations of the society of residence.


2010 ◽  
Vol 18 (3) ◽  
pp. 570-583
Author(s):  
Wolf Singer

Phenomenal awareness, the ability to be aware of one’s sensations and feelings, emerges from the capacity of evolved brains to represent their own cognitive processes by iterating and self-reapplying the cortical operations that generate representations of the outer world. Search for the neuronal substrate of awareness therefore converges with the search for the neuronal code through which brains represent their environment. The hypothesis is put forward that the mammalian brain uses two complementary representational strategies. One consists of the generation of neurons responding selectively to particular constellations of features, and is based on selective recombination of inputs in hierarchically structured feed-forward architectures. The other relies on the dynamic association of large numbers of distributed neurons into functionally coherent cell assemblies which as a whole represent a content of cognition. Arguments and data are presented in favor of the second strategy as the one according to which meta-representations that support awareness are established. My hypothesis is that such distributed representations self-organize through transient synchronization of the oscillatory activity. Evidence showing that similar brain states are required both for the occurrence of these synchronization phenomena and for awareness is provided.


2020 ◽  
pp. 68-80
Author(s):  
Alexandre Matheron

In this chapter, Matheron presents some brief thoughts on Proposition 39 of Part V of the Ethics, which states that a body capable of many things has a mind whose greater part is eternal. The key to unlocking this seemingly unusual claim is to understand what happens in the body when the mind understands. This leads Matheron to reconstruct the demonstrations that accompany the preceding propositions in Part V as well as to a discussion of adequate and inadequate ideas in Spinoza. Though we might not be immediately aware of it, to have an adequate idea of something external us is to have the adequate idea of a certain order that is established between affections in our body whose structure matches the one that inheres in the thing in question. This leads Matheron to a discussion of the ‘third kind of knowledge’ and its relation to the Spinozist concept of eternity, all of which clarify the initial starting point: the acquisition of new and more adequate knowledge always entails a clearer understanding of our body’s capacities that are already included in the eternal idea that we are.


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