scholarly journals In search of the concepts of the European Union research

2016 ◽  
pp. 129-152
Author(s):  
Stanisław Kaźmierczyk

In search of the starting points of the title concept one can focus on the EU law as a broadly viewed basis encompassing the accession of the states to the European Union, thus their membership. In this context the following important question may be asked, i.e. where we obtain the knowledge of the European Union. Referring to the juridical correlation in place, we would then say that the answer lies in the respective treaty ofthe primary law of the EU It goes without saying that this answer is not subject to doubt.  However, the answer itself does not prove comprehensive when we differentiate the foundation of the European Union, then the formal membership, and its development affiliation. Generally speaking, the first two areas legitimise the above presented ‘fromwhere’ in a different way from the way it is subject to legitimisation in the third area. The particle gains in importance as we still tend to (ultimately) explain the development of the European Union through the European legislation. One can apply this approach, yetone should also bear in mind that such action proves, above all, one-sided. The action primarily proves anti-developmental as it finds itself unable to shed light on the EU in the numerous aspects of its functioning.For the reasons given above, the main thesis of the paper is that, in the methodological ways of examining the thought, the European Union should be subject to examination through the EU as a community, i.e. the EU within the EU To help exemplify the reasoning, I applied the familiar inter, which is broadly applied in the methodologies of science. I ascribe the generation of new concepts to it, the ones that allow to examinethe complex structures of the EU, and through the examination it is hoped to coin new postulates that concern the steering of the EU as a way of practice. Undoubtedly, the inter is reconstructed on grounds of the up-to-date knowledge of itself. Only then do we conceptualise it, and arising out of this conceptualisation, we would reconstruct the postulates aimed at the EU, yet not in the narrow-juridical categories as the EU law doesnot exhibit a separately differentiated theory.

2019 ◽  
Vol 34 (1) ◽  
pp. 89-96
Author(s):  
Frederik Naert

Abstract This contribution addresses some particular aspects of fisheries and some specificities of the European Union (EU) in this field. The first section explains how institutional settings in the framework of which all states concerned can discuss mutual rights and obligations, including the ‘due regard’ obligation in the exclusive economic zone (EEZ), have been established in the field of fisheries. The second section presents two examples of situations in which the ‘due regard’ obligation has given rise to discussion: the negotiations on an Agreement to Prevent Unregulated High Seas Fisheries in the Central Arctic Ocean and discussions on Marine Protected Areas and other similar areas. In the third section, a few issues that are particular to the EU are identified, including the competences transferred to the EU and their external exercise by the EU and the impact of EU law on relations between Member States in their respective EEZs.


2017 ◽  
Vol 24 (6) ◽  
pp. 774-791 ◽  
Author(s):  
Juha Raitio

What does the concept of rule of law mean? Does it contain any material elements? Despite the difficulties, it is worth trying to define the rule of law, but in a certain context. Now this context relates to the Nordic (mainly Finnish), German and British conceptions of the rule of law as well as to the rule of law in the European Union. The rule of law is a relatively contradictory concept from a theoretical perspective. For example, one may disagree whether the concept of democracy is a prerequisite for the rule of law. Another difficult question seems to be whether the concept of the rule of law contains a substantive element. The third issue to disagree relates to the question whether and to what extent one should take into account the contemporary European and international interpretations of the concept. In this article the emphasis is on the EU law perspective in a sense that the rule of law is connected to respect for democracy and the protection of human rights just like it has been presented in the Article 2 TEU.


Author(s):  
Pavlos Eleftheriadis

This book offers a legal and political theory of the European Union. Many political and legal philosophers compare the EU to a federal union. They believe that its basic laws should be subject to the standards of constitutional law. They thus find it lacking or incomplete. This book offers a rival theory. If one looks more closely at the treaties and the precedents of the European courts, one sees that the substance of EU law is international, not constitutional. Just like international law, it applies primarily to the relations between states. It binds domestic institutions directly only when the local constitutions allow it. The member states have democratically chosen to adapt their constitutional arrangements in order to share legislative and executive powers with their partners. The legal architecture of the European Union is thus best understood under a theory of dualism and not pluralism. According to this internationalist view, EU law is part of the law of nations and its distinction from domestic law is a matter of substance, not form. This arrangement is supported by a cosmopolitan theory of international justice, which we may call progressive internationalism. The EU is a union of democratic peoples, that freely organize their interdependence on the basis of principles of equality and reciprocity. Its central principles are not the principles of a constitution, but cosmopolitan principles of accountability, liberty, and fairness,


2015 ◽  
Vol 16 (6) ◽  
pp. 1663-1700 ◽  
Author(s):  
Clelia Lacchi

The Constitutional Courts of a number of Member States exert a constitutional review on the obligation of national courts of last instance to make a reference for a preliminary ruling to the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU).Pursuant to Article 267(3) TFEU, national courts of last instance, namely courts or tribunals against whose decisions there is no judicial remedy under national law, are required to refer to the CJEU for a preliminary question related to the interpretation of the Treaties or the validity and interpretation of acts of European Union (EU) institutions. The CJEU specified the exceptions to this obligation inCILFIT. Indeed, national courts of last instance have a crucial role according to the devolution to national judges of the task of ensuring, in collaboration with the CJEU, the full application of EU law in all Member States and the judicial protection of individuals’ rights under EU law. With preliminary references as the keystone of the EU judicial system, the cooperation of national judges with the CJEU forms part of the EU constitutional structure in accordance with Article 19(1) TEU.


Author(s):  
Ivan Yakovyuk ◽  
Suzanna Asiryan ◽  
Anastasiya Lazurenko

Problem setting. On October 7, 2021, the Constitutional Tribunal of the Republic of Poland ruled in favor of Polish law over European Union law, which in the long run may violate the principles according to which the Union operates and the rights enjoyed by citizens of the state. Such a precedent can further serve as a basis for identical decisions of the bodies of constitutional jurisdiction of those states that have problems in fulfilling their obligations in the European community. Analysis of recent researches and publications. The problems of the functioning of the bodies of the European Union, the implementation of their decisions and the general status in EU law are widely studied in national science. In particular, many scholars have studied the legal nature of the EU, including: TM Anakina, VI Muravyov, NM Ushakov, A. Ya. Kapustina, NA Korolyova, Yu. Yumashev, BN Topornin, OYa Tragniuk, SS Seliverstov, IV Yakovyuk and others. Target of research is to establish the foundations of EU law in the functioning of Union bodies, especially the Court, as well as to determine the hierarchy of national law and EU law. Article’s main body. Over the years, the Court has, within its jurisdiction, issued a large number of judgments which have become the source of the Union’s Constituent Treaties and of EU law in general. Over the last two decades, the powers of the Court of Justice have changed significantly. In particular, this is due to the adoption of the Lisbon Treaty, which amended the EU’s founding treaties on the powers of the Court, then the reform of the European Court took place in 2015-2016, which concerned a change in the organizational structure of the Court. Despite the generally well-established case law of the Court of Justice of the European Union on the unification of the observance by the Member States of the basic principles of the European Union, the Constitutional Tribunal of the Republic of Poland adopted a decision on 7 October. Conclusions and prospects for the development. Following the decision of the Constitutional Court, the Polish authorities found themselves in a situation that significantly complicated its internal and external situation. The way out of which requires answers to fundamental questions about the legal nature of the EU. Undoubtedly, this is an issue not only between Poland and the EU, but also between other member states.


2017 ◽  
Vol 52 (1) ◽  
pp. 57-71
Author(s):  
Maciej Etel

Abstract The European Union and its member-states’ involvement in the economic sphere, manifesting itself in establishing the rules of entrepreneurs’ functioning – their responsibilities and entitlements – requires a precise determination of the addressees of these standards. Proper identification of an entrepreneur is a condition of proper legislation, interpretation, application, control and execution of the law. In this context it is surprising that understanding the term entrepreneur in Polish law and in EU law is not the same, and divergences and differences in identification are fundamental. This fact formed the objective of this article. It is aimed at pointing at key differences in the identification of an entrepreneur between Polish and EU law, explaining the reasons for different concepts, and also the answer to the question: May Poland, as an EU member-state, identify the entrepreneur in a different way than the EU?


Author(s):  
Tetjana Humeniuk

Purpose. The purpose of the article is to analyze topical issues of divergence of the Romano-Germanic and Anglo-American legal systems on the example of Brexit. Methodology. The methodology involves a comprehensive study of theoretical and practical material on this subject, as well as formulation of relevant conclusions and recommendations. The following methods of scientific cognition were used in the research process: dialectical, terminological, formal and logical, comparative and legal, system and functional methods. Results. The study found that an important role in resolving conflicts between EU law and UK national law was played by the Court of Justice of the European Union which declared British legislation invalid since it was not in line with EU law. Thanks to the case law of the CJEU and the national courts of the United Kingdom, it has been possible to adjust and harmonize the interaction between EU law and the national law of this country. As European integration is formed on the basis of a supreme legal force created by external (supranational) bodies, the national bodies that form the national rules of British law inevitably give up part of their powers in favor of EU law. Brexit is just the beginning of a long series of problematic issues that will arise in the EU as a result of member states’ more or less serious objections to a radical course to deepen European integration. And under such conditions, there is a widespread understanding that finding clear and effective answers to new challenges requires finding new conceptual (and most importantly, effective) approaches to the future functioning of the EU, as old mechanisms and methods no longer work properly and do not resolve contradictions spreading and becoming more acute. Scientific novelty. The study shows that the withdrawal of Britain from the European Union initiates a large-scale process of mutual transformation of the legal systems of both parties, the effectiveness of which will be determined by the realities of European geopolitical environment as well as domestic political processes within Great Britain itself. Practical importance. Research materials can be used for comparative law studies.


2021 ◽  
pp. 124-141
Author(s):  
Colin Faragher

Each Concentrate revision guide is packed with essential information, key cases, revision tips, exam Q&As, and more. Concentrates show you what to expect in a law exam, what examiners are looking for, and how to achieve extra marks. This chapter discusses the Treaty framework and sources of EU law as well as the institutions of the EU. It covers the legal background to the UK’s departure from the EU, the legal process through which the UK left the EU, the key provisions of the EU–UK Trade and Cooperation Agreement (2020), and the European Union (Future Relationship) Act 2020. This chapter also discusses the effect of the UK’s departure from the EU on the status of the sources of EU law and the effect of leaving the EU on the Charter of Fundamental Rights and Freedoms as well as failure to transpose a Directive into national law and the effect of leaving the EU on the Francovich principle.


2021 ◽  
pp. 717-778
Author(s):  
Robert Schütze

This chapter assesses the EU competition law on private undertakings. The relevant Treaty section is here built upon three pillars. The first pillar deals with anticompetitive cartels and can be found in Article 101 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU). The second pillar concerns situations where a dominant undertaking abuses its market power and is found in Article 102. The third pillar is unfortunately invisible, for when the Treaties were concluded, they did not mention the control of mergers. This constitutional gap has never been closed by later Treaty amendments, yet it has received a legislative filling in the form of the EU Merger Regulation.


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