scholarly journals Discourse Ethics beyond Apel and Habermas. A Realistic Relaunch

2011 ◽  
Vol 6 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Matthias Kettner

Karl-Otto Apel, not Jürgen Habermas (as is often wrongly supposed) is the philosophical originator of discourse ethics (“Diskursethik”).The central contention of a discourse ethics, according to Apel’s lectures in the mid-sixties, is that some necessary presuppositions of discourse have universally valid moral content, or at least some content that is morally relevant, i.e. relevant for outlining a morality the principles of which have unassailable rational credentials. If any such presuppositions can be identified as governing the practice of rational argumentation, then for any interlocutor’s communicative intention in a debate, waiving such presuppositions will clash with the construal of that debate as rationally meaningful debate, since it involves the interlocutor in a kind of inconsistency that Apel (like Habermas), drawing on speech-act theory, conceptualizes as a “performative self-contradiction”.

2015 ◽  
pp. 396-410
Author(s):  
Christian Linder

Since a while the ethics of persuasive technology (PT) have been discussed. One interesting approach is the assessment of PTs in the light of discourse ethics and the speech-act theory as proposed recently. While some see such an approach as promising, the author will illustrate that the application of discourse ethics is only appropriate for a few limited persuasive strategies. It is argued that most often PT does not provide the essentials of a discourse; reason or arguments to convince the counterpart. In line with discourse ethics the elements of speech-act theory refer to the preconditions every debater has to subscribe to in order to reach a mutual understanding that is the ultimate goal of a discourse. It is evident that PT has to deal with serious problems in order to fulfill the preconditions such as comprehensibility, truth, truthfulness and legitimacy. If discourse ethics is the theoretical framework which reflects the moral content of PT, the intention of the designer and his arguments or reasons have to be taken into account. It is argued that this often contradicts the purpose of persuasion or manipulation if PT is applied. This paper provides propositions that should ensure that the design of PT fulfill the basic requirements of discourse ethics.


2014 ◽  
Vol 5 (1) ◽  
pp. 44-58 ◽  
Author(s):  
Christian Linder

Since a while the ethics of persuasive technology (PT) have been discussed. One interesting approach is the assessment of PTs in the light of discourse ethics and the speech-act theory as proposed recently. While some see such an approach as promising, the author will illustrate that the application of discourse ethics is only appropriate for a few limited persuasive strategies. It is argued that most often PT does not provide the essentials of a discourse; reason or arguments to convince the counterpart. In line with discourse ethics the elements of speech-act theory refer to the preconditions every debater has to subscribe to in order to reach a mutual understanding that is the ultimate goal of a discourse. It is evident that PT has to deal with serious problems in order to fulfill the preconditions such as comprehensibility, truth, truthfulness and legitimacy. If discourse ethics is the theoretical framework which reflects the moral content of PT, the intention of the designer and his arguments or reasons have to be taken into account. It is argued that this often contradicts the purpose of persuasion or manipulation if PT is applied. This paper provides propositions that should ensure that the design of PT fulfill the basic requirements of discourse ethics.


Author(s):  
Matthias Kettner

The German philosopher Karl-Otto Apel is best known for his wide-ranging ‘transcendental pragmatic’ approach to a gamut of issues in theoretical and practical philosophy. This approach accords ‘argumentative discourse’ and its essential normative presuppositions a foundational role within all other philosophical inquiries for which justifiable validity claims are raised, for example epistemology, normative theories of rationality, Critical Theory and ethics. If there are such presuppositions then any interlocutor’s communicative intention to waive them will clash with the construal of that debate as rationally meaningful, since it involves the interlocutor in a kind of inconsistency that Apel (like Habermas), drawing on speech-act theory, conceptualizes as a ‘performative self-contradiction’. Apel (unlike Habermas) develops this concept into the doctrine of rationally definitive justification (Letztbegründung). Apel deserves to be better known as the originator of discourse ethics (Diskursethik), whose central contention (that some presuppositions of discourse have universally valid moral content) he developed in the mid-1960s.


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