Action explanation, intensionality, and empathy. From Anscombe to Quine (via Davidson)

PARADIGMI ◽  
2017 ◽  
pp. 199-210
Author(s):  
Antonio Rainone
Keyword(s):  
Action Explanation

scholarly journals Action explanation and its presuppositions

2019 ◽  
Vol 49 (1) ◽  
pp. 123-146
Author(s):  
Lilian O’Brien
Keyword(s):  
Causal Explanation ◽  
Intentional Action ◽  
Explanatory Role ◽  
Psychological States ◽  
Action Explanation

AbstractIn debates about rationalizing action explanation causalists assume that the psychological states that explain an intentional action have both causal and rational features. I scrutinize the presuppositions of those who seek and offer rationalizing action explanations. This scrutiny shows, I argue, that where rational features play an explanatory role in these contexts, causal features play only a presuppositional role. But causal features would have to play an explanatory role if rationalizing action explanation were a species of causal explanation. Consequently, it is not a species of causal explanation.

scholarly journals Factors Determining the Provision of Psychosocial Services for Oncological Patients and Their Loved Ones in Lithuania

2019 ◽  
Vol 19 ◽  
pp. 44-57
Author(s):  
Emilija Gaidytė ◽  
Eugenijus Dunajevas
Keyword(s):  
Data Analysis ◽  
Cancer Patients ◽  
Social Preferences ◽  
Family Members ◽  
Psychosocial Care ◽  
Secondary Data ◽  
Social Needs ◽  
Institutional Constraints ◽  
Action Explanation ◽  
Public Resources

It is acknowledged by various organizations, experts, and researchers around the world that meeting psychological and social needs is an important factor in cancer treatment. However, there is a shortage of psychosocial care supply for cancer patients and their family members in Lithuania. The aim of this study is to discern the causes of this insufficient supply. In order to find out the possible causes, Jon Elster’s action explanation framework was used. According to the framework, it is possible to deduce these factors: institutional constraints, economical (resources and labor supply) constraints, social preferences, and political preferences. Qualitative research (expert interviews) and secondary data analysis research methods were employed to gather the required data. A data analysis shows that the there are no institutional constraints for the provision of psychosocial care. However, there is a lack of public resources dedicated for the provision of psychosocial care. As a consequence, the main providers of psychosocial care for cancer patients and their family members are NGOs, which heavily depend on volunteer labor force. There is a contradiction in the point of view toward the professionalization of psychosocial care provision. It is the natural position of medical professionals that the provision of psychosocial care should be in the hands of professionals. On the other side, NGOs disagree with such a perspective. The need for psychosocial care is verbalized by experts and professionals; however, the general public prefers medical treatment. Thus, it is understandable why the public resources allocated to the provision of psychosocial care are so scarce. It is also evident that the political parties are not interested in psychosocial care, as it was shown by our analysis of their political programs.

scholarly journals Commonsense Justification for Action Explanation

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Shaohua Yang ◽  
Qiaozi Gao ◽  
Sari Sadiya ◽  
Joyce Chai
Keyword(s):  
Action Explanation

Against Internalism-Parity

2019 ◽  
pp. 79-95
Author(s):  
Christopher Cowie
Keyword(s):  
Reasons For Action ◽  
Reasons For Belief ◽  
Action Explanation ◽  
Moral Error ◽  
Categorical Reasons

An alternative argument is provided for rejecting internalism-parity. It is claimed that, from the perspective of internalism-based moral error theorists, categorical reasons for action are more problematic than categorical reasons for belief. This is because there are considerably stronger arguments for thinking that one’s reasons for action are constitutively dependent on one’s desires than for thinking that one’s reasons for belief are constitutively dependent on one’s desires. Three such arguments are considered: from action-explanation, from reasoning, and from paradigmatic-ascriptions. It is claimed that the first of these three arguments clearly does not apply to reasons for belief as to reasons for action. The applicability of the second and third arguments is harder to ascertain.

The Belief-Desire Model of Action Explanation Reconsidered: Thoughts on Bittner

2017 ◽  
Vol 48 (3) ◽  
pp. 290-308 ◽  
Author(s):  
Stephen Turner
Keyword(s):  
False Belief ◽  
False Beliefs ◽  
Culturally Specific ◽  
Explanatory Role ◽  
Cultural Artifact ◽  
Action Explanation ◽  
Radical Critique

The belief-desire model of action explanation is deeply ingrained in multiple disciplines. There is reason to think that it is a cultural artifact. But is there an alternative? In this discussion, I will consider the radical critique of this action explanation model by Rüdiger Bittner, which argues that the model appeals to dubious mental entities, and argues for a model of reasons as responses to states or events. Instead, for Bittner, agents are reason-selectors—selecting the states or events to respond to and selecting the ones the agent is disposed to respond to. By getting rid of the explanatory role of beliefs, this model runs into difficulties over errors usually attributed to false beliefs. These can be resolved by expanding the notion of dispositions to cover the case of false belief. But this suggests that the belief-reason model serves to divide the category of dispositions in an arbitrary or culturally specific way.

Reasons and Action Explanation

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Benjamin Wald ◽  
Sergio Tenenbaum
Keyword(s):  
Intentional Action ◽  
Theory Of Action ◽  
Action Explanation ◽  
Theories Of Action ◽  
Causal Theories

The problem of deviant causation has been a serious obstacle for causal theories of action. We suggest that attending to the problem of deviant causation reveals two related problems for causal theories. First, it threatens the reductive ambitions of causal theories of intentional action. Second, it suggests that such a theory fails to account for how the agent herself is guided by her reasons. Focusing on the second of these, we argue that the problem of guidance turns out to be related to a number of other issues in the literature on action explanation, and that it is much more general: it threatens not only causal theories but any theory of action. Finally, we suggest that a certain version of the view that acting has a constitutive or formal aim can overcome this problem.

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