Le immagini vaganti. Migrazioni iconografiche tra destra e sinistra

2013 ◽  
pp. 121-146
Author(s):  
Luciano Cheles

Parties frequently appropriate propaganda images from other movements, which all too often belong to the opposite end of the political spectrum. This article considers the main forms of visual appropriation and illustrates them with examples drawn from Italian and French post-war propaganda. It argues that the phenomenon is widespread especially among right-wing parties, which tend to adopt the imagery created by well-established political organisations to legitimate themselves, to present themselves to the voters in a more modern and appealing way or to attempt a dialogue with them. The technique of imitation may also be used to create a sense of confusion with the ultimate aim of neutralising the messages of other parties, or to steal votes from their natural constituencies. Left-wing parties too at times mimic the images (and slogans) of the right, but usually with parodying intentions which can escape the public at large.

Author(s):  
Laurențiu Ștefan

In Romania, a highly segmented and extremely volatile party system has contributed to a predominance of coalition governments. Alternation in power by coalitions led by either left-wing or right-wing parties used to be a major feature of Romanian governments. Thus, until a short-lived grand coalition in 2009, ideologically homogeneous coalitions were the general practice. Since then, parties from the right and left of the political spectrum have learned to work together in government. Given the semi-presidential nature of the political regime and the exclusive power to nominate the prime minister, the Romanian president plays an important role in coalition formation. The president also plays a pivotal role by shadowing the prime minister and therefore influencing the governance of coalitions. She has the power to veto ministerial appointments and therefore she can also shape the cabinet line-up. Pre-election coalitions are a common feature, more than two-thirds of Romanian coalition governments have been predicated on such agreements. Coalition agreements dealt with both policy issues and coalition decision-making bodies and the governance mechanisms that have been in most cases enforced and complied with—until the break-up of the coalition and the downfall of the respective government. One very common decision-making body is the Coalition Committee, which has been backed on the operational level by an inner cabinet made up of the prime minister and the deputy prime ministers, which usually are the heads of the junior coalition parties.


2015 ◽  
Vol 23 (3) ◽  
pp. 193-204 ◽  
Author(s):  
Matthijs Rooduijn ◽  
Tjitske Akkerman

How is populism distributed over the political spectrum? Are right-wing parties more populist than left-wing parties? Based on the analysis of 32 parties in five Western European countries between 1989 and 2008, we show that radical parties on both the left and the right are inclined to employ a populist discourse. This is a striking finding, because populism in Western Europe has typically been associated with the radical right; only some particular radical left parties have been labeled populist as well. This article suggests that the contemporary radical left in Western Europe is generally populist. Our explanation is that many contemporary radical left parties are not traditionally communist or socialist (anymore). They do not focus on the ‘proletariat’, but glorify a more general category: the ‘good people’. Moreover, they do not reject the system of liberal democracy as such, but only criticize the political and/or economic elites within that system.


2021 ◽  
Vol 2 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Karina Bénazech Wendling ◽  
Matthew Rowley

Populism, like nationalism, can be found on the right as well as on the left-wing of the political spectrum. However, current political debates demonstrate how in recent years, nationalist and populist movements have advanced the preservation of Christian “roots” against a global cosmopolitanism. Right-wing populism thus tends to present itself as a guardian of Christian culture, or Judeo-Christian culture. However, there is a struggle over the definition and the ownership of this religious heritage. Whilst it is certainly possible to identify sources within the Protestant tradition that may legitimise support for right-wing populism, the questions this struggle raises often relate to particular intersections of culture, theology, perspectives on history as well as political thought. This special issue explores and critiques these intersections, employing theological, historical, and sociological methods. While the main perspective is that of cross-disciplinary reflections on the fraught relationship between Protestantism and right-wing populism, it also examines the evolution of broader connections between Christianity and nationalism through time.


2020 ◽  
Vol 5 ◽  
pp. 27-49
Author(s):  
Jose M Pavia ◽  
Cristina Aybar

The political fragmentation following the 2008 Financial Crisis and its economic, social, political and institutional fall-out have led to a growing left-right polarisation of politics and a weakening of the middle ground. The effective number of parliamentary parties is at an all-time high both inthe Spanish Parliament (Congreso) and in the Valencian Autonomous Parliament (Corts). Voters are spoilt for choice and switch party more often. This paper uses transfer matrices to analyse the shifting voting patterns in the European, General, Regional, and Local elections held during 2019 in The Valencian Country. The most salient result is the ever-shifting pattern at each end of the political spectrum. On the right wing, there is the steady advance of Vox. On the left wing, UP and Compromís draw from virtually the same pool of fickle voters, with UP picking up most votes in national elections and Compromís winning hands-down in regional and local elections.


2006 ◽  
pp. 54-75
Author(s):  
Klaus Peter Friedrich

Facing the decisive struggle between Nazism and Soviet communism for dominance in Europe, in 1942/43 Polish communists sojourning in the USSR espoused anti-German concepts of the political right. Their aim was an ethnic Polish ‘national communism’. Meanwhile, the Polish Workers’ Party in the occupied country advocated a maximum intensification of civilian resistance and partisan struggle. In this context, commentaries on the Nazi judeocide were an important element in their endeavors to influence the prevailing mood in the country: The underground communist press often pointed to the fate of the murdered Jews as a warning in order to make it clear to the Polish population where a deficient lack of resistance could lead. However, an agreed, unconditional Polish and Jewish armed resistance did not come about. At the same time, the communist press constantly expanded its demagogic confrontation with Polish “reactionaries” and accused them of shared responsibility for the Nazi murder of the Jews, while the Polish government (in London) was attacked for its failure. This antagonism was intensified in the fierce dispute between the Polish and Soviet governments after the rift which followed revelations about the Katyn massacre. Now the communist propaganda image of the enemy came to the fore in respect to the government and its representatives in occupied Poland. It viewed the government-in-exile as being allied with the “reactionaries,” indifferent to the murder of the Jews, and thus acting ultimately on behalf of Nazi German policy. The communists denounced the real and supposed antisemitism of their adversaries more and more bluntly. In view of their political isolation, they coupled them together, in an undifferentiated manner, extending from the right-wing radical ONR to the social democrats and the other parties represented in the underground parliament loyal to the London based Polish government. Thereby communist propaganda tried to discredit their opponents and to justify the need for a new start in a post-war Poland whose fate should be shaped by the revolutionary left. They were thus paving the way for the ultimate communist takeover


Author(s):  
Boris I. Kolonitskii

The article examines the cultural forms of legitimation / delegitimation of authority of the Provisional Government. Particular attention is paid to the personal authority of Alexander Kerensky, including rhetorical (persuasive) devices and visual images which underlay the tactics of praising or condemning him. As the main source, the article uses the newspapers of A.A. Suvorin, namely Malen'kaya gazeta [Little newspaper], Narodnaya gazeta [People’s newspaper], Rus' [Rus], Novaya Rus' [New Rus]. These newspapers are compared with resolutions, letters and diaries, and with publications in other periodicals. The study clarifies some aspects of political isolation of the Provisional Government in the fall of 1917. By this time, the propaganda attack on Kerensky was conducted not only by the Bolsheviks and other left-wing groups but also by the right-wing and conservative publications. The propaganda of the left- and right-wing opponents was significantly different but they had a point of contact: both of them created the image of the “traitor” who was unworthy to remain in power.


Significance The new government will have only 34 of the 179 seats, because policy differences among the right-wing parties, and the political strategy of the electorally strengthened anti-immigration, Euro-sceptic Danish People's Party (DF), mean DF will remain outside. Policy-making will be difficult. The government will be more economically liberal and pro-EU than it would have been with DF, but to make policy it will rely on partners across the political spectrum, especially the ousted Social Democrats -- who remain the largest party -- and DF. Impacts If DF is seen as a welfarist protector of ordinary citizens, it is more likely to repeat, at least, its 22% vote in the next election. The much-tighter immigration regime which is in prospect could taint Denmark's image and make it less attractive to foreign investment. The new government is likely to be an ally for much of UK Prime Minister David Cameron's EU reform agenda.


2021 ◽  
Vol 6 ◽  
Author(s):  
Svenja Kopyciok ◽  
Hilary Silver

Given rising populist nationalism and multiplying meanings of “right” and “left,” this paper assesses whether Europeans who identify as extremely left-wing on the political spectrum hold anti-immigrant attitudes. In contrast to right-wing xenophobes, we further examine whether the political left, who conventionally emphasize class conflict, oppose immigrants less for cultural reasons and more for materialist reasons. We also consider whether socioeconomic status and values traditionally associated with the political left—favoring redistributive policies, egalitarianism, or social rights to benefits and services for immigrants—temper left- more than right-wing xenophobia. We find that a surprisingly large share of those who identify as far left do express extremely xenophobic attitudes, and we profile them in contrast to far right xenophobes. With logistic regression analysis of nine waves of the European Social Survey (2002–2018), we find that, all things equal, socioeconomic status influences far left xenophobia more than far right xenophobia, but inegalitarian values, less support for redistributive policies, and welfare chauvinism can only partially account for far left xenophobia and unexpectedly do not distinguish it from far right xenophobia. This implies that far left parties might adopt anti-immigrant policies to try to retain their loyal voters, even though such policies do not comport with broader left-wing values and may increase racial and ethnic inequality. Controlling for demographic and attitudinal differences reduces the probability of xenophobia among the far left by about sixty percent, but there remains some residual anti-immigrant attitudes among this group still to be explained.


Significance The change in composition from a coalition between the Liberal Party (VVD) and Labour Party (PvdA) to one involving the VVD, the Liberal Democrats (D66), the Christian Democratic Appeal (CDA) and the Christian Union (CU) signifies a shift to the right of the political spectrum. Impacts Liberal economic policies are likely to increase labour market participation. New green policies such as investment in public transport and higher taxation on air travel and heavy goods vehicles' road usage are likely. The PVV is unlikely to return to previous levels of popularity as other parties have adopted more right-wing stances.


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