Incontri diVisioni Psicoterapia della Gestalt e psicoanalisi relazionale in dialogo

2009 ◽  
pp. 37-60
Author(s):  
Margherita Spagnuolo Lobb

- This article is the transcription of the final panel of a seminar organized in January 2007 by directors of two institutes of psychotherapy, a gestalt therapy institute and a relational psychoanalysis institute. The directors of the two institutes dialogue with professors Daniel Stern, Massimo Ammaniti, Nino Dazzi on core principles of their approaches. The outcome is an interesting debate on concepts like consciousness, awareness, implicit and explicit knowledge, body experience, transfert and countertransfert, intentionality. They are addressed from different epistemological perspectives, from psychoanalysis to gestalt therapy to infant research.Key words: intersubjectivity, infant research, implicit knowledge, now moment, body experience, consciousness.Parole chiave: intersoggettivitŕ, infant research, conoscenza implicita, now moment, coscienza, corpo.

2009 ◽  
pp. 61-74
Author(s):  
Bernd Bocian

- The author, a German psychotherapist, takes into account similarities between gestalt therapy, object relational theories and infant research. He explores in particular similarities between object relational theories and the therapeutical work of Fritz Perls. In this context the autor discusses concepts like "internal theatre", the therapist as an "additional" other and the contribution of gestalt therapy to the work with the phenomenon of splitting. Bocian then explores the possibles overlaps between the evolutionary models of gestaltpsychology and gestalt therapy with that one of theorists of the infant resarch - in particolar of Daniel Stern - that are realised in the acknowledgment of the social nature of the child and his interaction with the mother.Key words: contemporary psychoanalysis, object relational theories, "additional" other, "internal theatre", splitting, development, infant research.Parole chiave: psicoanalisi contemporanea, teorie delle relazioni oggettuali, altro supplementare, "teatro interno", scissione, sviluppo, /infant research/.


2014 ◽  
Vol 30 (4) ◽  
pp. 551-568 ◽  
Author(s):  
Melinda Whong ◽  
Kook-Hee Gil ◽  
Heather Marsden

This article reviews studies in second language classroom research from a cross-theoretic perspective, arguing that the classroom holds the potential for bringing together researchers from opposing theoretical orientations. It shows how generative and general cognitive approaches share a view of language that implicates both implicit and explicit knowledge, and that holds a bias towards implicit knowledge. Arguing that it is implicit knowledge that should be the object of research, it proposes that classroom research would benefit from incorporating insights from a generative understanding of language. Specifically, there is a need for a more nuanced view of the complexity of language in terms of linguistic domain, and the interaction between those domains. Generative second language acquisition research that shows developmental differences in terms of both linguistic domain and interface is reviewed. The core argument is a call for more attention to the ‘what’ of language development in classroom research and, by implication, teaching practice. As such, the language classroom is seen to offer potential for research that goes beyond paradigm to address both the ‘what’ and the ‘how’ of language development.


2016 ◽  
Author(s):  
Marius Barth ◽  
Christoph Stahl ◽  
Hilde Haider

In implicit sequence learning, a process-dissociation (PD) approach has been proposed to dissociate implicit and explicit learning processes. Applied to the popular generation task, participants perform two different task versions: inclusion instructions require generating the transitions that form the learned sequence; exclusion instructions require generating transitions other than those of the learned sequence. Whereas accurate performance under inclusion may be based on either implicit or explicit knowledge, avoiding to generate learned transitions requires controllable explicit sequence knowledge. The PD approach yields separate estimates of explicit and implicit knowledge that are derived from the same task; it therefore avoids many problems of previous measurement approaches. However, the PD approach rests on the critical assumption that the implicit and explicit processes are invariant across inclusion and exclusion conditions. We tested whether the invariance assumptions hold for the PD generation task. Across three studies using first-order as well as second-order regularities, invariance of the controlled process was found to be violated. In particular, despite extensive amounts of practice, explicit knowledge was not exhaustively expressed in the exclusion condition. We discuss the implications of these findings for the use of process-dissociation in assessing implicit knowledge.


2019 ◽  
pp. 89-129
Author(s):  
Eli Alshanetsky

On the proposed solution to the puzzle, we recognize the correct formulations of our thoughts by relying on our implicit knowledge of what we are thinking. After discussing an analogous puzzle in the case of basic perceptual classification and constructing a model of implicit knowledge for the simpler case of color recognition, the chapter extends the model to the trickier case of thought. On this model, our implicit knowledge of an item consists in its stored signature—the invariant aspect of experience that its instances share. On the proposed solution, the process that mediates between implicit and explicit knowledge is not itself wholly sub-personal. Instead, it is best understood as straddling the personal/sub-personal divide. A deeper source of the puzzle that emerges from this chapter’s discussion of our involvement in articulation lies in the conflation between two types of freedom (or control) that we may have over a response.


1999 ◽  
Vol 22 (5) ◽  
pp. 790-801 ◽  
Author(s):  
Josef Perner ◽  
Zoltan Dienes

In this response, we start from first principles, building up our theory to show more precisely what assumptions we do and do not make about the representational nature of implicit and explicit knowledge (in contrast to the target article, where we started our exposition with a description of a fully fledged representational theory of knowledge (RTK). Along the way, we indicate how our analysis does not rely on linguistic representations but it implies that implicit knowledge is causally efficacious; we discuss the relationship between property structure implicitness and conceptual and nonconceptual content; then we consider the factual, fictional, and functional uses of representations and how we go from there to consciousness. Having shown how the basic theory deals with foundational criticisms, we indicate how the theory can elucidate issues that commentators raised in the particular application areas of explicitation, voluntary control, visual perception, memory, development (with discussion on infancy, theory of mind [TOM] and executive control, gestures), and finally models of learning.


Author(s):  
Ricardo Tamayo ◽  
Peter A. Frensch

Abstract. Previous research has shown that explicit and implicit knowledge of artificial grammars may decay at different rates (e.g., Tamayo & Frensch, 2007 ; Tunney, 2003 ). We extend these findings to sequential regularities embedded in serial reaction time (SRT) tasks. We compared the forgetting patterns of implicit and explicit knowledge after a retention interval of 7 days without rehearsal. Explicit knowledge decayed after 7 days, whereas implicit knowledge was retained. These data were modeled according to the assumptions involved in the single-system model suggested by Shanks, Wilkinson, and Channon (2003) . The best fit for the model was obtained by modifying the parameters related to (a) the common knowledge-strength variable for implicit and explicit knowledge, and (b) reliability of the explicit test. We interpret these dissociations as a boundary condition for single-system models that assume constant random noise to explain dissociations in the forgetting patterns of implicit and explicit sequential knowledge.


2021 ◽  
Vol 11 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
V. N. Thakur ◽  
M. A. Basso ◽  
J. Ditterich ◽  
B. J. Knowlton

AbstractKnowledge without awareness, or implicit knowledge, influences a variety of behaviors. It is unknown however, whether implicit knowledge of statistical structure informs visual perceptual decisions or whether explicit knowledge of statistical probabilities is required. Here, we measured visual decision-making performance using a novel task in which humans reported the orientation of two differently colored translational Glass patterns; each color associated with different orientation probabilities. The task design allowed us to assess participants’ ability to learn and use a general orientation prior as well as a color specific feature prior. Classifying decision-makers based on a questionnaire revealed that both implicit and explicit learners implemented a general orientation bias by adjusting the starting point of evidence accumulation in the drift diffusion model framework. Explicit learners additionally adjusted the drift rate offset. When subjects implemented a stimulus specific bias, they did so by adjusting primarily the drift rate offset. We conclude that humans can learn priors implicitly for perceptual decision-making and depending on awareness implement the priors using different mechanisms.


1999 ◽  
Vol 22 (5) ◽  
pp. 777-778
Author(s):  
David C. Noelle

Distinguishing explicit from implicit knowledge on the basis of the active representation of certain propositional attitudes fails to provide an explanation for dissociations in learning performance under implicit and explicit conditions. This suggests an account of implicit and explicit knowledge grounded in the presence of multiple learning mechanisms, and multiple brain systems more generally. A rough outline of a connectionist account of this kind is provided.


1999 ◽  
Vol 22 (5) ◽  
pp. 787-788 ◽  
Author(s):  
John R. Vokey ◽  
Philip A. Higham

Implicit knowledge is perhaps better understood as latent knowledge so that it is readily apparent that it contrasts with explicit knowledge in terms of the form of the knowledge representation, rather than by definition in terms of consciousness or awareness. We argue that as a practical matter any definition of the distinction between implicit and explicit knowledge further involves the notion of control.


1999 ◽  
Vol 22 (5) ◽  
pp. 769-770
Author(s):  
James A. Hampton

In Dienes & Perner's analysis, implicitly represented knowledge differs from explicitly represented knowledge only in the attribution of properties to specific events and to self-awareness of the knower. This commentary questions whether implicit knowledge should be thought of as being represented in the same conceptual vocabulary; rather, it may involve a quite different form of representation.


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