Corporate governance and information asymmetry between shareholders and lenders: an analysis of Italian listed companies

2016 ◽  
pp. 27-53
Author(s):  
Sabrina Pisano ◽  
Luigi Lepore ◽  
Rocco Agrifoglio
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Information Asymmetry ◽  
Agency Costs ◽  
Audit Committee ◽  
Independent Directors ◽  
Agency Conflicts ◽  
Minority Shareholders ◽  
Controlling Shareholder ◽  
Corporate Governance Mechanisms ◽  
Agency Costs Of Debt

This paper analyzes the information asymmetry between owner/manager and lenders. More specifically, the research investigates the role of corporate governance mechanisms in reducing the agency costs of debt. The findings show that lenders perceive higher agency costs of debt if the controlling shareholder owns a percentage of capital greater than 66%. Results also show that the presence of independent directors elected by minority shareholders on the board mitigates the agency conflicts between borrowers and lenders. In the same way, the audit committee independence reduces the agency costs of debt. Moreover, the study shows that when the audit committee chairman coincides with the board chairman banks perceive more risk and, therefore, a bigger asymmetry. This coincidence increases the concentration of power in the hands of just one person and this enhances the likelihood of opportunistic actions by the management that could damage lenders. This means that it is costly for companies to concede to just one person too much influence over the board activities, because it reduces the effectiveness of the monitoring role played by independent directors, increasing the information asymmetry between borrowers and lenders.

scholarly journals Emerging policies and the effectiveness of corporate governance mechanisms on earning quality

2020 ◽  
Vol 9 (3) ◽  
pp. 157-164
Author(s):  
Mohammed Mahdi Obaid ◽  
Muneer Rajab Amrah
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Audit Committee ◽  
Gulf Cooperation Council ◽  
Independent Directors ◽  
Board Independence ◽  
Governance Mechanisms ◽  
Corporate Governance Mechanisms ◽  
Earning Quality ◽  
The Relationship

Current study review extant empirical researches on the relationship between CG and EQ. However, the scope of the reviewed studies was shown to vary, most studies on CG and EQ are specific in focus, with different studies focusing on specific aspects or measures of CG. This study evaluates the role of emerging policies and the effectiveness of corporate governance mechanisms on earning quality within a conceptual framework for the Gulf cooperation council. This study concludes that the majority of companies with big board size, higher board independence, and more frequent meetings have improved EQ. Also, the result indicates companies with big audit committee size, a larger number of independent directors, more audit committee meetings and more experts tend to have an increase in EQ. Finally, this review emerged as a framework suitable for assessing the level of EQ disclosed and the relationship between CG and EQ base on GCC policies.

Determining factors of key audit matter disclosure in Thailand

2020 ◽  
Vol 32 (4) ◽  
pp. 563-584
Author(s):  
Suneerat Wuttichindanon ◽  
Panya Issarawornrawanich
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Southeast Asia ◽  
Audit Committee ◽  
Independent Directors ◽  
Governance Mechanisms ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Big 4 ◽  
Corporate Governance Mechanisms ◽  
Determining Factors

Purpose In Southeast Asia, auditors play a crucial role in the quality of financial reports. With the introduction of a new format of auditors’ report that requires disclosure of key audit matters (KAM), the disclosure practice of auditors is, thus, of great interest. Specifically, this study aims to investigate the factors that auditors take into consideration when issuing KAMs. Design/methodology/approach The research design is quantitative, with a focus on the number of KAM disclosures issued by auditors. As existing studies rely on the number of KAM disclosures in the analysis, this current research, thus, uses the quantity of KAM disclosures for comparison purposes. The analysis relies on secondary data and multiple regression analysis is used to establish the association between the number of KAM disclosures and three groups of determining factors, namely, auditor characteristics, corporate governance mechanisms and firm characteristics. Findings The significant determining factors of KAM disclosure include auditor’s litigation risk, firm complexity, profitability and industry type. Firms using a Big 4 audit firm, firms with many subsidiaries and firms in the technology, property and construction and finance industries have higher numbers of KAMs, while highly profitable firms issue lower numbers of KAMs. As for corporate governance mechanisms, the number of KAMs is significantly positively correlated with the number of independent directors (p < 0.10). Originality/value This research includes key corporate governance parties in the examination, including external auditors, independent directors and audit committees. The finding affirms the influence of Big 4 on KAM disclosure in Southeast Asia, while their roles are not significant in Western samples. The result also unearths the monitoring role of independent directors in KAM disclosure. The role of the audit committee in KAM disclosure is insignificant in Thai samples, while the committee role is statistically significant in the Western samples. Variations in the findings between this study and previous research could be attributed to differences in institutional settings between both regions.

scholarly journals Ownership structure and demand for independent directors: evidence from an emerging market

2020 ◽  
Vol 22 (2) ◽  
pp. 335-342
Author(s):  
Quoc Trung Tran
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Ownership Structure ◽  
Agency Costs ◽  
Emerging Market ◽  
State Ownership ◽  
Independent Directors ◽  
Minority Shareholders ◽  
Foreign Investors ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Insider Ownership

PurposeIn this study, we examine how ownership structure affects the use of independent directors in Vietnam – an emerging stock market.Design/methodology/approachWe develop logit and tobit regression models to investigate the effects of ownership structure on the propensity to use independent directors and the number of independent directors on the board, respectively. Insider ownership and the use of independent directors are proposed to have a non-linear relationship.FindingsWith a sample of 1,318 observations collected from 192 listed firms over the period from 2008 to 2017, we find that insider ownership and independent director appointment have a U-shaped relationship. It is positive when insiders hold a small proportion of shares, and turns out to be negative when insiders hold a large percentage of shares. In addition, both state ownership and foreign ownership are negatively related to firm decisions of appointing independent directors.Practical implicationsOur findings imply that minority shareholders should have appropriate actions to reduce agency costs and protect their own interests. In addition, policymakers should improve the effectiveness of corporate governance legislation to increase the presence of independent directors in order to protect minority shareholders. Moreover, government agencies also need to increase the number of independent directors in state-controlled firms as a means to improve their corporate governance. Foreign investors may be a substitute for independent directors; therefore, firms without independent directors are able to improve their corporate governance by attracting foreign investors.Originality/valueWhile the extant literature shows that independent directors can help firms decrease agency costs of equity in financial decisions and performance, there are relatively few studies investigating corporate decisions to use independent directors. This paper contributes to the literature of corporate governance mechanisms through independent directors in emerging markets.

scholarly journals Conceptual Relationship between Corporate Governance and Audit Quality in Shari’ah Compliant Companies Listed on Bursa Malaysia

2016 ◽  
Vol 10 (7) ◽  
pp. 106 ◽  
Author(s):  
Nawal Kasim ◽  
Nur Ain Binti Hashim ◽  
Syed Ahmed Salman
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Audit Committee ◽  
Audit Quality ◽  
Independent Directors ◽  
Governance Mechanisms ◽  
Good Corporate Governance ◽  
Corporate Governance Mechanisms ◽  
Audit Fee ◽  
Conceptual Relation ◽  
Conceptual Relationship

The issue of corporate governance has been a focus among researchers after the 1997/98 financial crisis. Many countries have implemented codes and guidelines of corporate governance to promote effective boards overseeing the operations of companies. In the case of Shari’ah compliant companies, boards still play a significant role and are responsible to ensure Shari’ah compliance. This paper reemphasises the conceptual relation between corporate governance mechanisms and audit quality. The corporate governance mechanisms are measured by board size, CEO duality, independent directors, financial experts on the audit committee, and the existence of an internal Shari’ah<em> </em>committee. There are numerous methods to measure audit quality including using audit fee and auditor reputation as proxies. The findings are mixed. This means that there is no consistent relationship between good corporate governance mechanisms and audit quality.

The impact of board characteristics and ownership identity on agency costs and firm performance: UK evidence

2018 ◽  
Vol 18 (6) ◽  
pp. 1147-1176 ◽  
Author(s):  
Bahaaeldin Samir Allam
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Firm Performance ◽  
Agency Costs ◽  
Economic Conditions ◽  
Agency Conflicts ◽  
Governance Mechanisms ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Board Characteristics ◽  
Corporate Governance Mechanisms ◽  
The Impact

PurposeThis paper aims to provide a twofold empirical comparison: first, a comparison between the impact of corporate governance mechanisms on agency costs proxies and firm performance measures, and second, this comparison was used before and after the 2008 financial crisis, capturing two different economic states.Design/methodology/approachPanel regression methods were applied to two data sets of non-financial firms incorporated in the FTSE ALL-Share index over the period 2005-2011.FindingsThe results provide evidence that not all mechanisms lead to lower agency conflicts and/or higher firm performance. Ownership identity has a significant impact and the role of the governance mechanisms changes with the changes in the economic conditions surrounding the firm.Research limitations/implicationsThe results lend support to the notion that forcing a certain code of practice on firms to follow could compel them to move away from conflict reduction governance structures.Originality/valueTo the best of the authors’ knowledge, this is the first paper to provide a comparison of empirical evidence for the impact of board characteristics and ownership identity on agency costs and firm performance by using a comprehensive set of corporate governance mechanisms. This comparison challenges the prior studies that use performance as an indirect proxy for lower agency costs. Additionally, it compares the impact of the governance mechanisms during two different economic conditions.

scholarly journals Social capital, networks and interlocked independent directors: a Mexican case

2016 ◽  
Vol 6 (3) ◽  
pp. 291-312 ◽  
Author(s):  
Carlos Rafael Avina-Vazquez ◽  
Shahzad Uddin
Keyword(s):  
Social Capital ◽  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Network Structure ◽  
Point Of View ◽  
Independent Directors ◽  
Board Members ◽  
Minority Shareholders ◽  
Interlocking Directorates ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Corporate Governance Mechanisms

Purpose – The purpose of this paper is to investigate whether a pattern of interlocking directorates is emerging following reforms in Mexican corporations, and who, if any, are the powerful actors in this network. Drawing on the Bourdieusian notion of social capital, the paper also analyses theoretically the interlocking directorates, networks and powerful actors, and their influences on and potential implications for corporate governance mechanisms. Design/methodology/approach – The data used in the study consisted of 1,442 internal and external board members of the population of 126 Mexican corporations trading on the Mexican Stock Market as of January 2011. Use of social network analysis (SNA) demonstrates individuals’ links with corporations and allows the production of spatial maps to visualise the network structure of interlocking boards. Findings – Using the measures of SNA developed by Freeman (1979 and Bonacich (1972), the authors identify the most powerful and influential directors in the network structure of board members in Mexico. Board members with the greatest number of connections occupy central positions in the network. The authors also find a catalogue of corporate governance scandals. The inclusion of independent directors seems to have had no influence in ensuring better corporate governance. Research limitations/implications – Mapping out the directors’ links might offer excellent opportunities for policy makers to see how many companies a single director represents, how they share boards, and the implications for minority shareholders of sharing boards, and to understand the workloads of directors in carrying out the monitoring tasks expected of them. Originality/value – This paper makes an important contribution by employing SNA to illustrate interlocking directorates and the positions of powerful and influential actors. Examining networks of directors from a “social capital” point of view also provides an understanding of why the role of independent directors remains toothless in family-dominated corporations.

scholarly journals Corporate Governance Mechanisms and Firm Performance in Saudi Arabia

2021 ◽  
Vol 12 (3) ◽  
pp. 446
Author(s):  
Helmi A. Boshnak
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Saudi Arabia ◽  
Firm Performance ◽  
Audit Committee ◽  
Audit Committees ◽  
Independent Directors ◽  
Governance Mechanisms ◽  
Concentrated Ownership ◽  
Corporate Governance Mechanisms

This paper examines the impact of corporate governance mechanisms including board size, independence, and meeting frequency, audit committee size and meeting frequency, CEO duality and ownership concentration on the operational, financial and market performance of Saudi listed firms using a contingent theoretical-based framework drawing on agency theory, stewardship theory and resource dependence theory. This study examines 210 listed Saudi Stock Exchange firms over the timeframe 2017 to 2019. The paper applies both a manual content and regression analysis approach. The results show that firm performance deteriorates with board size and independence, audit committee and meeting frequency, and the presence of CEO role duality, while performance improves with board meeting frequency and ownership concentration. Thus, Saudi firms should respond by maintaining smaller boards and more frequent meetings, keeping the Chair and CEO roles separate, and maintaining smaller audit committees with more focused meetings. Further, the appointment of independent directors only makes a meaningful contribution to firm performance where they are truly independent. Finally, more concentrated ownership tends to encourage better firm performance due to the regime of monitoring and discipline concomitant with more powerful shareholders. The implications of this paper are threefold. First, the implementation by Saudi Arabia of the latest corporate governance regulations and IFRS adoption almost certainly impact firm performance markedly. Second, corporate governance regulations should recognize the role of more frequent board meetings and more concentrated ownership in enhancing corporate performance. Third, stakeholders should apply pressure on investee firms to maintain smaller boards, engage genuinely independent directors, separate the role of Chairman and CEO, and maintain smaller audit committees with fewer and more effective meetings. The results should help corporate boards when deciding on the best corporate governance mechanisms to enhance firm performance. Further, the study should provide policy makers with a better understanding of the corporate governance structures required to promote better performance by drawing on existing theories and the empirical modelling, in an emerging economy setting such as Saudi Arabia, a new and broader data set, thereby informing better future policy and protecting shareholders’ interests.

Does audit committee substitute or complement other corporate governance mechanisms

2017 ◽  
Vol 32 (7) ◽  
pp. 658-681 ◽  
Author(s):  
Yousef Hassan ◽  
Rafiq Hijazi ◽  
Kamal Naser
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Ownership Structure ◽  
Audit Committee ◽  
Negative Relationship ◽  
Governance Mechanisms ◽  
Governance System ◽  
African Countries ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Board Characteristics ◽  
Corporate Governance Mechanisms

Purpose The purpose of this paper is to examine the relation between audit committee (AC) and a set of other corporate governance mechanisms in one of the emerging economies, United Arab of Emirates (UAE). In particular, the current study examines whether an effective AC can serve as a substitute or as a complement mechanism to board characteristics and ownership structure of Emirati listed non-financial companies. Design/methodology/approach Using substitution and complementary theories, a panel data from 48 nonfinancial companies listed on the UAE Stock Exchanges [Abu Dhabi Stock Exchange and Dubai Financial Market] during the period between 2011 and 2013 were used in the current study. A composite measure of four proxies has been used to measure the AC effectiveness, namely, AC size, independence, financial expertise and diligence. To test the hypotheses formulated for the study, a logistic regression model was used to identify the influence of a set of board characteristics and ownership structure variables on the effectiveness of the AC after controlling for firm size, auditor type, industry type and profitability. Findings While AC effectiveness appeared to be positively associated with board size and board independence, it is negatively associated with CEO duality. This points to a complementary governance relation. On the other hand, the negative relationship between AC effectiveness and each of institutional and government ownership suggests substitutive relations. Research limitations/implications The main shortcoming of the current study is that it examines the influence of a certain set of corporate governance factors on the effectiveness of AC. Other corporate governance mechanisms may, however, contribute to the effectiveness of AC. The findings of the study can be used by companies’ managements and regulators in the UAE to improve the corporate governance system. Originality/value To the best of researchers’ knowledge, this study provides the first evidence about the interaction among multiple governance mechanisms required by the code of corporate governance issued by the UAE Ministry of Economy in 2009. The current paper is expected to add to the limited AC literature in Middle East and North African countries in general and Arab World in particular.

scholarly journals Pengaruh Ukuran Perusahaan Dan Corporate Governance Terhadap Manajemen Laba Di Industri Perbankan Indonesia

2021 ◽  
Vol 9 (1) ◽  
pp. 111-120
Author(s):  
Karina Karina ◽  
Sutarti Sutarti
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Earnings Management ◽  
Audit Committee ◽  
Banking Sector ◽  
Audit Quality ◽  
Stock Exchange ◽  
Governance Mechanisms ◽  
Audit Firm ◽  
Corporate Governance Mechanisms ◽  
Size Firm

The purpose of this research is to provide empirical evidence of the affect of ownership concetration, firms size, and corporate governance mechanisms on earnings management. Ownership concetration was measure by the biggest stock of individual or organization, firms size was measure by natural logaritma of net assets, and corporate governance mechanisms were measure by three variabels (composition of board of commisioner, audit quality were measure by industry specialize audit firm, and composition of audit committee). Earnings management was measure by discretionary accruals use Modified Jones Method. The population of this research is 41 companies in the banking sector which were listed in Indonesian Stock Exchange (IDX). The research data were collected from banking companies financial statement for the period of 2016 to 2018. Based on purposive sampling method. The reseacrh hypotesis were tested using multiple regression analysis. The results of this research show that firm size, firm of commissioner and proportion of commissioner have significant relationships with earnings management. Next, variables composition of board of commissioner, ownership concetration and specialize audit firm have no significant relationship with earnings management. Keywords: ownership concetration, firms size, corporate governance, earnings management

scholarly journals PENGARUH CORPORATE GOVERNANCE TERHADAP MANAJEMEN LABA (Studi Pada Perusahaan Food and Baverages Yang Terdaftar di BEI

2020 ◽  
Vol 6 (2) ◽  
pp. 91
Author(s):  
Pipit Rabiatun ◽  
Irianto Irianto ◽  
Indah Ariffianti ◽  
Baiq Kisnawati
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Earnings Management ◽  
Audit Committee ◽  
Sampling Method ◽  
Stock Exchange ◽  
Managerial Ownership ◽  
Analysis Method ◽  
Discretionary Accrual ◽  
Corporate Governance Mechanisms ◽  
Method Analysis

This study is aimed to examine the effect of corporate governance mechanisms, such as, independent board of. commissioner composition, board of commisioner size, audit committee, institutional ownership, and managerial ownership toward profit management. This research used 5 of food company and Baverages that was listed in Indonesia stock Exchange since 2014-2018. The sample of this research are selected by purposive sampling method. Analysis method of this research used multiple regression. Earnings management measured by using discretionary accrual. The result of this study showed that the result of regression as follow: = 7,365 + 0,631 XI + 0,553 X2 + 0,583 X3 + 0,674 X4 + 0,768 X5 + e. However the result of variable: (1) Composition of independent commissioner council has the effect of significant at profit management. It was proved by t value is higher than t table that was 4,291 > 2,085. (2) Standard of commissioner council has the effect of significant at profit management, it was proved by the result of t value is higher than t table that was 3,148 > 2,085. (3) the committee of audit has the effect of significant at profit management. It was proved by t value is higher than t value 3,569 > 2.085. (4) The ownership of constitutional has the effect of significant at profit management. It was proved by t value is higher than t table that was 4,422 > 2,085. (5) The ownership of managerial at profit management. It was proved by t value is higher than t table 5,618 > 2,085. (6) Composition of independent commissioner council, standard of commissioner council, the committee of audit, the ownership of constitutional, the ownership of managerial have the effect of significant at profit management. The result of calculation showed that f value that is 22,861, while f table 2,74 (22,861 > 2,74). It means that f value is higher than f table. The result of calculation of Composition of independent commissioner council, standard of commissioner council, the committee of audit, the ownership of constitutional, and the ownership of managerial showed that the value coofesien was 0,730 (73%) and the balance 0,270 (27%) it is described by other variable was not include in this research.

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