scholarly journals Compensation as the moral foundation of Jus Post Bellum

2015 ◽  
Author(s):  
◽  
Adam Koszela

Given how much harm can be done after the fighting part of wars end, and given recent failures to secure lasting peace after conflicts (e.g. in Afghanistan and Iraq), developing an account of the conditions of a just peace, or jus post bellum, is crucial. Unfortunately, jus post bellum has long been largely ignored by just war theorists. In this dissertation, I present and briefly defend a theory of what morality requires of us after a war, according to which the arrangements that we commonly think parties formerly at war are morally required to institute are actually just the best ways for those parties to compensate each other for the warrelated injustices they have exposed each other to. I call this the compensation theory of jus post bellum. Part of this theory is the claim, which I briefly defend, that any time we violate someone's moral rights, morality requires us to compensate our victims, even if we did so during a war, and were overall morally justified in doing so. By being clear on the moral foundations of jus post bellum, the compensation theory of jus post bellum is helpful both in evaluating the morality of peace settlements, and in settling conflict between competing postwar arrangements. While it focuses on what parties to a war owe each other once the war is over, the compensation theory of jus post bellum does not rule out the possibility that a just peace is everyone's concern. Indeed, parties not involved in a war may well have a moral duty to help prevent harm after the war has ended, or to ensure that the compensation that the compensation theory of jus post bellum claims is owed is given. What these universal duties are is a promising area for future research. If true, the compensation theory of jus post bellum has some interesting implications for what morality demands of states during wars, as well as for what international law (which should at least partly reflect morality) should look like. First, it entails that a just peace may require just victors to compensate their defeated opponents. Given that even states that go to war justly do not always fight justly, and that wars almost inevitably involve harm to bystanders and innocents, this should not be too surprising. But it bears repeating, as just victors have a tendency to think that they owe their enemies little. Second, the compensation theory of jus post bellum entails that attempts to overpower one's enemy with superior firepower is morally costly. This is because such attempts typically involve innocents being exposed to collateral damage, which they then have to be compensated for. More measured, targeted strategies are morally preferred. Lastly, accepting the compensation theory of jus post bellum means paying much more attention to what countries at war do to their own citizens. Wartime emergency measures are common, and can be horrific. Unfortunately, they are sometimes treated as an internal, political issue, rather than an issue of wartime justice, on par with the other principles of just war. According to the compensation theory of jus post bellum, internal wartime measures that infringe rights are wartime injustices like any other, and the victims of such measures are owed compensation for their injustices. Compensating for such injustices, and preventing future ones, is thus not merely a matter of politics or social stability, but a matter of justice.

Author(s):  
Eric Patterson

Scholars and political leaders have recently grown increasingly uncomfortable with terms like victory and ‘unconditional surrender’. One reason for this becomes clear when reconsidering the concept of ‘victory’ in terms of ethics and policy in times of war. The just war tradition emphasizes limits and restraint in the conduct of war but also highlights state agency, the rule of law, and appropriate war aims in its historic tenets of right authority, just cause, and right intention. Indeed, the establishment of order and justice are legitimate war aims. Should we not also consider them exemplars, or markers, of just victory? This chapter discusses debates over how conflicts end that have made ‘victory’ problematic and evaluates how just war principles—including jus post bellum principles—help define a moral post-conflict situation that is not just peace, but may perhaps be called ‘victory’ as well.


2009 ◽  
Vol 23 (2) ◽  
pp. 147-164 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mark Evans

Recently, strong arguments have been offered for the inclusion ofjus post bellumin just war theory. If this addition is indeed justified, it is plain that, due to the variety in types of post-conflict situation, the content ofjus post bellumwill necessarily vary. One instance when it looks as if it should become “extended” in its scope, ranging well beyond (for example) issues of “just peace terms,” is when occupation of a defeated enemy is necessary. In this situation, this article argues that an engagement byjus post bellumwith the morality of post-conflict reconstruction is unavoidable. However, the resulting extension ofjus post bellum's stipulations threatens to generate conflict with another tenet that it would surely wish to endorse with respect to “just occupation,” namely, that sovereignty or self-determination should be restored to the occupied people as soon as is reasonably possible. Hence, the action-guiding objective of the theory could become significantly problematized. The article concludes by considering whether this problem supports the claim that the addition ofjus post bellumto just war theory is actually more problematic than its supporters have realized.


2012 ◽  
Vol 81 (3) ◽  
pp. 271-293 ◽  
Author(s):  
Inger Österdahl

Justice after war is becoming an increasingly pressing concern. The cases of Afghanistan, Iraq and most recently Libya illustrate the importance of as well as the difficulties involved in the efforts to manage the outcome of armed conflict in a constructive way. The jus post bellum is meant to serve as the normative framework for the efforts to stabilise the post-conflict situation. The jus post bellum also has the future peaceful and arguably democratic and human rights respecting development of the post-conflict society in view. This article aims at drawing the conceptual and substantive contours of the jus post bellum and to discuss its relationship with other parts of international law, primarily the other bodies of law making up the law of armed conflict. Depending on one’s perspective the jus post bellum can be claimed not yet to exist, to exist already or irrespective of which to be superfluous as a separate category of law. The article recognises the apparent need for a comprehensive post-conflict law to serve as a bridge between war and stable peace. What way the international community should take in order to arrive at a just and useful normative framework for building peace is far from certain, however.


2019 ◽  
Vol 29 (2) ◽  
pp. 3-24
Author(s):  
David Kwon ◽  

There is a growing discussion of the idea of jus post bellum (jpb) and what it means as an addition to just war thinking. This essay connects jpb to the thought of Augustine and Aquinas, so that jpb appears as integral in that tradition. To make this case, I argue that achieving jpb is key to building a just peace, of which the fundamental characteristic must be human security, and thus defines two approaches to the study of human security that emerges from the theological development of jpb ethics: Michael Schuck’s Augustinian and Kenneth Himes’s Thomistic jpb conceptions. I argue that they both emphasize the importance of human security, as shown by their arguments for building humanitarian norms post bellum, but have different aims and jpb moral implications.


2019 ◽  
Vol 36 (3) ◽  
pp. 429-438 ◽  
Author(s):  
Melvin Prince ◽  
Attila N. Yaprak ◽  
Dayananda Palihawadana

Purpose This paper aims to develop a model that explains the moral bases of consumer ethnocentrism and consumer cosmopolitanism as purchase dispositions. The authors build their work on moral foundations theory and the social theories of Emile Durkheim. Design/methodology/approach Theory-building from general theories of motivation is grounded in cultural norms, and empirical research is conducted to test theoretical propositions. Findings The focus is on the theoretical implications of binding or individualism morals of consumers within social groups. Consequently, variables in the model relate to ethical themes of community, autonomy and divinity. This theory posits that, for a variety of considerations, loyalty has a direct and positive effect on consumer ethnocentrism and on consumer cosmopolitanism. Serendipitously, other moral foundations have negative effects. The authors theorize that negative relationships exist between authority and consumer cosmopolitanism, and between sanctity and consumer ethnocentrism. This model also illustrates that consumer ethnocentrism positively predisposes favorable domestic product judgments. Research limitations/implications New ethical factors in consumer dispositions affecting product purchase decisions are explored. Hypotheses can be empirically replicated and moderated in future research. Practical implications Marketers can use the variables of personal values, moral foundations and gender role identity to fashion marketing communications and to target selective consumer segments. Social implications The persuasion process of social marketing will be enhanced by understanding relevant motives. Originality/value The use of the fine-grained moral foundation antecedents to predict consumer predispositions of ethnocentrism and cosmopolitanism is without precedent.


2019 ◽  
Vol 47 (2) ◽  
pp. 100-111 ◽  
Author(s):  
Aaron T. McLaughlin ◽  
Shola Shodiya-Zeumault ◽  
Stacey McElroy-Heltzel ◽  
Don E. Davis ◽  
Amy McLaughlin-Sheasby ◽  
...  

This article examines the social buffering hypothesis of cultural humility in the context of religious offenses. In this study, participants ( N = 244) rated their cultural humility in terms of differing religious values and beliefs as well as their moral foundations in determining what is right or wrong. They then recalled an offense or hurt attributed to religious disagreements and indicated their motivations for forgiving the offender. Lower endorsement of individuating moral foundations predicted greater unforgiveness; however, cultural humility softened this relationship between individuating moral foundations and unforgiveness. When cultural humility was higher, participants were less likely to report unforgiveness motivations toward the religious offender, even if their individuating moral foundation scores were lower. Results from this study support the social buffering hypothesis of humility. Namely, individuals with higher levels of cultural humility demonstrate a greater capacity to maintain relationships during stressful religious disagreements by regulating intuitive and affective moral positions, particularly those that have previously been linked to social dominance or moral disinterest. We conclude this study by discussing limitations, practical applications, and areas for future research.


2022 ◽  
Vol 12 ◽  
Author(s):  
Erin Elizabeth Dempsey ◽  
Chris Moore ◽  
Shannon A. Johnson ◽  
Sherry H. Stewart ◽  
Isabel M. Smith

Morality can help guide behavior and facilitate relationships. Although moral judgments by autistic people are similar to neurotypical individuals, many researchers argue that subtle differences signify deficits in autistic individuals. Moral foundation theory describes moral judgments in terms of differences rather than deficits. The current research, aimed at assessing autistic individuals’ moral inclinations using Haidt’s framework, was co-designed with autistic community members. Our aim was to describe autistic moral thinking from a strengths-based perspective while acknowledging differences that may pose interpersonal challenges among autistic youth. We assessed 25 autistic and 23 neurotypical children’s moral judgments using the Moral Foundations Questionnaire for Kids. We used semi-structured interviews and qualitative analysis with a subset of participants to describe children’s moral reasoning. Analyses suggested that autistic and neurotypical children make similar judgments about moral transgressions across all five moral foundations. General linear mixed modeling showed that the greatest predictor of recommending punishment was how bad children deemed moral transgressions to be. We also found a trend that autistic children were more likely to recommend punishment for harmless norms violations than were neurotypical children. Future research could use longitudinal methods to understand the development of moral judgments among autistic and neurotypical children.


2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Caitlin Hannah McCurrie ◽  
Damien Crone ◽  
Felicity J Bigelow ◽  
Simon Laham

Moral psychology has relied nearly exclusively on text stimuli in the development and testing of theories. However, text stimuli lack the rich variety of morally-relevant social and contextual cues available in everyday interactions. A consequence of this pervasive ecological invalidity may be that moral psychological theories are mischaracterized by an overreliance on cue-impoverished moral stimuli. We address this limitation by developing a cue-rich Moral and Affective Film Set (MAAFS). We crowd-sourced videos of moral behaviours, using previously validated text stimuli and definitions of moral foundations as a guide for content. Crowd-sourced clips were rated by 322 American and 253 Australian participants on a range of moral and affective dimensions, including wrongness, moral foundation relevance, punishment, arousal, discrete emotion-relevance, clarity, previous exposure, and how weird/uncommon the moral acts were. Sixty nine moral videos formed the final stimulus set. Ratings confirmed that the videos are reliably rated as morally wrong, feature a variety of moral concerns and that the moral content is clear. The validation process revealed features that make the MAAFS useful for future research: (1) the MAAFS includes a range of videos that depict everyday transgressions, (2) certain videos evoke negative emotions at an intensity comparable to mood induction films, (3) the videos are largely novel: participants had never seen more than 90% of the videos. We anticipate the MAAFS will be a particularly valuable tool for researchers in moral psychology who seek to explore the structure of morality in scenarios that approximate real-life. However, the MAAFS may be valuable for other fields of psychology, for example, affective scientists may use these videos as a mood induction procedure. The complete stimulus set, links to videos, and normative statistics can be accessed at osf.io/8w3en.


Author(s):  
Carsten Stahn

Theories of just peace have remained understudied in international law and peace studies. This chapter introduces major themes of the book and traces the role of peace and justice in just peace discourse. It identifies different approaches towards just peace in three fields: just war theory, peacebuilding practice, and transitional justice approaches. It argues that just peace is more than ‘just a peace’, namely a stable peace with justice, but at the same time highly dependent on relational and discursive dimensions. It requires negotiation, recognition, and implementation and involves concession or compromise from parties. It is not only related to form and process, but connected to different dimensions of justice (retributive, procedural, restorative, and distributive justice) which need to be adjusted to the context of transitions from conflict to peace. Peace must be perceived to be fair and just.


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