Secure mobile agent system and its application in the trust building process of virtual enterprises

2005 ◽  
Vol 1 (3) ◽  
pp. 147-168 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michelle S. Wangham ◽  
Joni S. Fraga ◽  
Ricardo J. Rabelo ◽  
Lau C. Lung
Keyword(s):  
Mobile Agent ◽  
Trust Building ◽  
Virtual Enterprises ◽  
Agent System ◽  
Building Process

Research on mobile Internet mobile agent system dynamic trust model for cloud computing

2019 ◽  
Vol 16 (7) ◽  
pp. 174-194 ◽  
Author(s):  
Weijin Jiang ◽  
Yang Wang ◽  
Yirong Jiang ◽  
Jiahui Chen ◽  
Yuhui Xu ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Cloud Computing ◽  
Mobile Agent ◽  
Trust Model ◽  
Mobile Internet ◽  
System Dynamic ◽  
Agent System ◽  
Dynamic Trust

Observer Effects of Punishment in a Distribution Network

2013 ◽  
Vol 50 (5) ◽  
pp. 627-643 ◽  
Author(s):  
Danny T. Wang ◽  
Flora F. Gu ◽  
Maggie Chuoyan Dong
Keyword(s):  
Information Asymmetry ◽  
Information Flow ◽  
Distribution Network ◽  
Trust Building ◽  
Attitudes And Behaviors ◽  
Building Process ◽  
Relational Embeddedness ◽  
Managerial Implications ◽  
Deterrence Effect ◽  
Observer Effects

In a distribution network, a punishment event not only affects the disciplined distributor but also changes the attitudes and behaviors of others in the network (i.e., observers). By moving beyond a dyadic view of punishment, this article considers the effects of punishment on observers and integrates insights from social learning, fairness heuristic, and social network theories. The resulting framework of the observer effects of punishment in a distribution network, empirically tested with a survey in China, reveals two mechanisms through which punishment leads to reduced observer opportunism: (1) a direct deterrence effect and (2) a trust-building process. Moreover, two information-related constructs moderate the observer effects differently. The disciplined distributor's relational embeddedness, which motivates greater information flow to observers, aggravates the problem of information asymmetry against the manufacturer, making punishment less deterrent for observers. In contrast, the manufacturer's monitoring capability, which reduces information asymmetry, strengthens observer effects. The authors discuss both theoretical and managerial implications of using punishment to achieve collaboration from a wide network of channel members.

Design and Evaluation of a Fault-Tolerant Mobile-Agent System

2004 ◽  
Vol 19 (5) ◽  
pp. 32-38 ◽  
Author(s):  
M.R. Lyu ◽  
Xinyu Chen ◽  
Tsz Yeung Wong
Keyword(s):  
Mobile Agent ◽  
Fault Tolerant ◽  
Agent System

scholarly journals From Suspicion to Sustainability in Global Supply Chains

2020 ◽  
Vol 7 (2) ◽  
pp. 383-418
Author(s):  
Robert C. Bird ◽  
Vivek Soundararajan
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Supply Chains ◽  
Fundamental Problem ◽  
Trust Building ◽  
Global Supply Chains ◽  
Human Rights Abuses ◽  
Economic Survival ◽  
Building Process ◽  
Sustainability Practices

Global supply chains power 80% of world trade, but also host widespread environmental, labor, and human rights abuses in developing countries. Most scholarship focuses on some form of sanction to motivate supply chain members, but we propose that the fundamental problem is not insufficient punishment, but a lack of trust. Fickle tastes, incessant demands for lower prices, and spot market indifference force suppliers into a constant struggle for economic survival. No trust can grow in such an environment, and few sustainability practices can take meaningful root. Responding to multiple calls for scholarship in the supply chain literature, we propose a trust-building process by which supply chains can evolve from indifference and hostility to a relational partnership that produces joint investments in sustainable practices. The result is a supply chain that is more efficient, more humane, and embeds sustainability in the supply chain for the long-term.

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