Political Competition, Economic Reform and Growth: Theory and Evidence from Transition Countries

In 1978 Deng Xiaoping brought economic reform to the People's Republic of China. Using modern growth theory to assess the success of the Chinese reforms and the likelihood of continuing economic progress, we find a transformation in total factor productivity (TFP) growth unparalleled in recorded economic history. Moreover established growth economics finds that TFP growth, once established tends to persist at the same rate over long periods of time. While the death of Deng left a vacuum in political leadership, his reforms, crafted with great ingenuity, combined with political change limited to the bare minimum necessary, appear to have established the groundwork for continued growth. Still, a number of policy issues will need to be addressed by the Chinese government if that growth is to be achieved.

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Political Competition, Policy and Growth: Theory and Evidence from the US

The Review of Economic Studies ◽

10.1111/j.1467-937x.2010.00606.x ◽

2010 ◽

Vol 77 (4) ◽

pp. 1329-1352 ◽

Cited By ~ 191

Author(s):

TIMOTHY BESLEY ◽

TORSTEN PERSSON ◽

DANIEL M. STURM

Keyword(s):

Competition Policy ◽

Political Competition ◽

Growth Theory ◽

The Us

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ECONOMICS OF TRANSITION COUNTRIES AND ECONOMIC REFORM PATHS

Defendologija ◽

10.5570/dfnd.en.1231.05 ◽

2012 ◽

Vol 15 (31) ◽

pp. 63-75

Author(s):

Idriz Ćosić

Keyword(s):

Economic Reform ◽

Transition Countries ◽

Economics Of Transition

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Who Wants To Revise Privatization? The Complementarity of Market Skills and Institutions

American Political Science Review ◽

10.1017/s0003055409090248 ◽

2009 ◽

Vol 103 (2) ◽

pp. 284-304 ◽

Cited By ~ 35

Author(s):

IRINA DENISOVA ◽

MARKUS ELLER ◽

TIMOTHY FRYE ◽

EKATERINA ZHURAVSKAYA

Keyword(s):

Survey Data ◽

Transition Economies ◽

Economic Reform ◽

Good Governance ◽

Transition Countries ◽

Significant Difference ◽

Quality Of Governance ◽

The Difference ◽

Governance Institutions

Using survey data from 28 transition countries, we test for the complementarity and substitutability of market-relevant skills and institutions. We show that democracy and good governance complement market skills in transition economies. Under autocracy and weak governance institutions, there is no significant difference in support for revising privatization between high- and low-skilled respondents. As the level of democracy and the quality of governance increases, the difference in the level of support for revising privatization between the high and low skilled grows dramatically. This finding contributes to our understanding of microfoundations of the politics of economic reform.

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